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ABSTRACT 
When firms divest to reconfigure their portfolio of businesses, they separate businesses or assets 
from their firm through sell-offs, spin-offs, equity carve-outs, or split-ups. Divestitures are 
complex events, structured in diverse ways, undertaken for manifold motives, and ultimately 
affect the future performance of the divesting firm. While their causes and consequences have 
been well-examined in literature, research gaps remain. This dissertation undertakes three 
comprehensive studies to resolve existing research gaps concerning the structure, motives, and 
performance effects of divestitures.  
The first study seeks to further differentiate research by considering the role of motive and 
structure when examining the effects of divestiture and divestiture experience on post-
divestiture accounting performance. It specifically examines the effects of sell-offs in general, 
sell-offs driven by a strategic motive, and sell-offs structured as part of a divestiture program. 
The second study acknowledges the diversity of divestitures and undertakes an in-depth 
exploration of divestiture programs. It describes their nature, examines when firms announce 
such programs in contrast to stand-alone divestitures, and measures how the market reacts to 
their announcement. The third study provides evidence from a consolidating industry where 
players usually seek efficiency gains and growth through mergers and acquisitions. The study 
is set in the global brewing industry, where the five largest players accounted for 60% of the 
global volume in 2018. It analyzes the market reaction to divestitures and its determinants.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Mit einer Desinvestition verändern Unternehmen ihr Beteiligungsportfolio und trennen sich 
von Geschäftsbereichen oder Vermögenswerten. Sie machen das entweder durch einen 
Verkauf, eine Abspaltung, eine Ausgliederung mit dem Verkauf von Anteilen oder eine 
Aufspaltung. Desinvestitionen sind komplexe Vorgänge, auf verschiedene Weisen strukturiert, 
von vielfältigen Motiven getrieben und beeinflussen letztendlich den zukünftigen Erfolg eines 
Unternehmens. Obwohl die Ursachen und Folgen von Desinvestitionen bereits sorgfältig 
erforscht wurden, gibt es eine Vielzahl von Ansätzen für weitere Forschung. Diese Dissertation 
widmet sich im Rahmen von drei umfangreichen Studien der Struktur von Desinvestitionen, 
ihren Motiven und ihren Implikationen für den Unternehmenserfolg.  
Die erste Studie berücksichtigt Motiv und Struktur bei der Untersuchung der Auswirkung von 
Desinvestitionen und der Erfahrung mit Desinvestitionen auf den buchhalterischen 
Unternehmenserfolg. Insbesondere werden differenziert die Auswirkungen von 
Desinvestitionen im Allgemeinen, von solchen, die mit einem strategischen Motiv begründet 
wurden, und solchen, die einem strukturierten Desinvestitionsprogramm zugeordnet werden 
konnten, untersucht. Die zweite Studie würdigt ebenfalls die strukturelle Vielfalt von 
Desinvestitionen und untersucht Desinvestitionsprogramme. Die Studie beschreibt das 
Auftreten von Desinvestitionsprogrammen, untersucht, wann Firmen sich dazu entscheiden, ein 
Programm im Gegensatz zu einer Einzeldesinvestition anzukündigen und misst die Reaktion 
des Aktienmarktes auf die Ankündigung eines solchen Programms. Die dritte Studie untersucht 
Desinvestitionen in einer sich konsolidierenden Industrie. In solch einem Umfeld verfolgen 
große Unternehmen Effiziensteigerungen in der Regel mit Hilfe von weiteren 
Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen und -übernahmen. Die Studie analysiert die Reaktion des 
Aktienmarktes auf Desinvestitionen und deren Determinanten in der globalen Brauindustrie, in 
der die fünf größten Markteilnehmer, in 2018, 60% des globalen Produktionsvolumens 
verantworteten. 
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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
As part of their corporate strategy, firms restructure their portfolio of businesses in a number of 
ways. The most common restructuring modes are mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and 
liquidations (Bowman & Singh, 1993; Bowman, Singh, Useem, & Bhadury, 1999). This 
dissertation focuses on divestitures. If a firm reconfigures its line of businesses and adjusts the 
ownership status through a divestiture, it does so through either a sell-off, spin-off, equity carve-
out, or split-up (Bergh, Johnson, & Dewitt, 2008; Mulherin & Boone, 2000). Divestitures are 
complex in the making, structured in diverse ways, undertaken for manifold motives, and 
ultimately affect the future performance of the divesting firm. While their causes and 
consequences have been well-examined in literature, research gaps remain (cf. Brauer, 2006; 
Kolev, 2016; Lee & Madhavan, 2010; Moschieri & Mair, 2008). This dissertation undertakes 
three comprehensive studies to resolve existing research gaps and further advance research 
regarding the structure, motives, and performance effects of divestitures. In the following, I 
provide a brief overview of the previous research on the three topics and highlight to what 
extent the dissertation contributes to it.  
Divestiture literature has thus far drawn only little attention to the diverse structure of 
divestitures. While divestiture research has acknowledged that restructuring often includes 
multiple divestitures (e.g., Haynes, Thompson, & Wright, 2002), divestitures have mostly been 
examined as “isolated, self-contained events” (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010: 85) or “one-off 
activities” (Mankins, Harding, & Weddigen, 2008: 99). Only a few studies have explicitly 
considered divestitures structured as a program in their research and analyzed their short-term 
capital market reaction (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). In contrast, 
acquisition research has exhaustively examined acquisition series or programs (Bhabra, Bhabra, 
& Boyle, 1999; Kronenwett, 2010; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Schipper & Thompson, 1983).  
A divestiture program is a series of divestitures that share a common rationale. The transactions 
that form such a structured program are interrelated, coordinated, and strategically consistent 
(Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Kronenwett, 2010). Divestiture programs can be clearly contrasted 
to stand-alone divestitures. First, they likely mark a major adjustment to a firm, its strategy, and 
its business portfolio. Second, multiple restructuring moves over a period of time signal a strong 
commitment of a firm’s management towards a course of action. Overall, a divestiture program 
is likely undertaken for a strategic rather than a tactical rationale (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). 
Prior literature has found that divestitures structured as part of a program are rewarded with a 
superior stock market reaction (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010).  
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This dissertation considers the structure of divestitures in all three studies. The first study 
examines the effect of sell-offs that are part of a structured divestiture program and the 
associated experience on the post-divestiture accounting performance of a firm in a longitudinal 
panel model. The second study examines when firms announce a divestiture program in contrast 
to a stand-alone divestiture and how the stock price reacts to the announcement of a divestiture 
program. The third study examines the capital market reaction to divestiture announcements 
that can be attributed to a previously announced divestiture program in contrast to non-program 
divestiture announcements in a consolidating industry. 
A variety of divestiture motives have been highlighted by previous research. Montgomery, 
Thomas, and Kamath (1984) list four primary motives. First, firms have been found to divest 
for a strategic motive linked to the firm or business unit strategy, often involving the reduction 
of a firm’s diversification to refocus on the core industry (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Johnson, 1996; 
Montgomery et al., 1984). Second, divestitures have been argued to aim at the selling of 
undesired units in a streamlining fashion to clean the business portfolio (Lee & Madhavan, 
2010; Montgomery et al., 1984). Third, research has highlighted the divesting for financial 
motives, e.g., when a firm faces financial distress, liquidity concerns, or overwhelming debt 
levels (Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996; Montgomery et al., 1984). Finally, literature has drawn 
attention to forced divestitures in response to regulatory or antitrust pressure (Brauer, 2006; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1991; Wright & Ferris, 1997).  
Divestiture research has predominantly drawn attention to the refocusing motive (cf., Johnson, 
1996), has rarely considered all motives at a time, and has not yet considered motives in a 
longitudinal setting or with regard to divestiture programs.  
This dissertation addresses the motives of divestiture in various ways. The first study examines 
the effect of sell-offs driven by a strategic motive, e.g., refocusing, and the associated 
experience on the post-divestiture accounting performance of a firm in a longitudinal panel 
model. The second study describes the motives of divestiture programs, the linkage of the 
antecedents of divestiture programs to these motives, and differentiates by motive when 
analyzing the effect of information disclosure on the market reaction to divestiture programs.  
A large body of extant literature has analyzed the relation between divestitures and firm 
performance. While results are mixed, a majority of studies find the relation to be positive 
(Brauer, 2006). In their meta-analysis of 94 studies, Lee and Madhavan (2010) support an 
averagely positive relationship, however, do also prescribe caution and note that "managers 
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should not pursue divestiture actions without context or contingency" (Lee & Madhavan, 2010: 
1363). Methodologically, scholars have examined the effects of divestiture on performance in 
two principal ways: the majority adopts an event study approach evaluating the stock market 
reaction (e.g., Bergh, Peruffo, Chiu, Connelly, & Hitt, 2019; Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; 
Depecik, van Everdingen, & van Bruggen, 2014; Owen, Shi, & Yawson, 2010), others explore 
the post-divestiture accounting performance of the divesting firm (e.g., Brauer, Mammen, & 
Luger, 2017; Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2016; Haynes et al., 2002; Vidal & Mitchell, 
2018).1 While most of these studies report a positive performance effect of divestitures, studies 
have also highlighted limiting factors of such a positive effect (e.g., Bergh, 1995; Cho & Cohen, 
1997; Depecik et al., 2014; Feldman et al., 2016; Kaiser & Obermaier, 2020; Montgomery & 
Thomas, 1988; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018; Wright & Ferris, 1997).  
Literature has mostly drawn on transaction cost economics and agency theory to explain post-
divestiture performance gains (Lee & Madhavan, 2010). It has argued that a divesting firm’s 
performance increases through an efficient reallocation of freed up financial and managerial 
resources, increasing corporate efficiency, and resolving inefficiencies across its businesses 
(Brauer, 2006; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). More recently, literature has begun to also consider 
experience when examining the performance effects of divestiture (Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer 
et al., 2017; Humphery-Jenner, Powell, & Zhang, 2019).  
This dissertation follows the call of Lee and Madhavan (2010) and Brauer et al. (2017) to take 
further contingencies into account when examining divestitures. The first study considers the 
contingencies of strategy and structure when analyzing the effect of sell-offs and sell-off 
experience on post-divestiture accounting performance in a longitudinal panel setting. Prior 
literature has considered such contingencies only when analyzing the short-term market 
performance of divestitures (e.g., Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Montgomery et al., 1984). The 
second study analyzes the market reaction to the announcement of divestiture programs, 
whereas previous literature has mostly analyzed the announcement of stand-alone divestitures. 
Further, it examines the signaling effect of disclosing program specifics on the market reaction. 
The third study analyzes the market reaction and the influential effect of determinants in a novel 
setting, a consolidating industry. 
                                                             
1 To a lesser extent, research has analyzed market-based performance, applying measures such as Jensen's alpha, 
the Sharpe or Treynor ratio (e.g., Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel, 1994). 
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Next, I provide a summary of the three studies and their results. Figure 1-1 provides an 
overview of the studies. It outlines for each study the respective aim & scope, and research 
design.  
The first study examines the effect of strategic motive and structure of divestitures, and of 
divestiture experience on a firm’s long-term accounting performance. It sets out to further 
differentiate the findings of previous research on divestiture performance and the more recent 
research on divestiture experience that found the latter to relate solely positive to post-
divestiture performance (Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017; Humphery-Jenner et al., 
2019). It analyzes a 15-year cross-industry and cross-country panel of 150 of the largest 
European public firms based on a dataset from 1997 to 2017. The analysis focuses specifically 
on sell-offs. It examines the effects of strategic sell-offs that are driven by a strategic motive 
and program sell-offs that are part of a structured divestiture program.  
In a fixed-effects regression, the study reveals a negative effect of program-related experience 
on post-divestiture performance. This suggests that a potential learning transfer is outweighed 
by the negative performance associated with years of restructuring or inherent to firms 
undergoing a divestiture program. The results contribute to and challenge prior research on the 
Figure 1-1: Key characteristics of the three studies 
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performance effects of divestiture experience that has found divestiture experience to be related 
solely positively to performance. Further initial evidence suggests a non-linear relationship 
between program-related sell-off intensity in the focal period and post-divestiture performance. 
Overall, the results stress the importance of considering the program nature of divestitures. 
Total and strategic sell-off intensity and the respective sell-off experience are not found to affect 
post-divestiture accounting performance.  
The second study analyzes when firms decide to announce a divestiture program and its capital 
market reaction. Thus, it takes up the findings on divestiture programs from the first study and 
seeks to advance the limited previous work on divestiture programs (Berger & Ofek, 1999; 
Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). The study is based on a unique, hand-collected dataset of 101 firms 
that announced 148 divestiture programs between 1997 and 2014. The study acknowledges the 
multiplicity of programs and provides a detailed description of their rationales and occurrence. 
Further, it considers the diversity of divestitures and analyzes when firms decide to announce a 
program in contrast to a stand-alone divestiture. Finally, it examines the market reaction to 
program announcements and considers the signaling effect of information disclosure on the 
market reaction. 
A multinomial logit regression shows that firms choose to announce divestiture programs in 
contrast to stand-alone divestitures when they are financially distressed or after a change in top 
management. Thus, they seem to prefer divestiture programs when facing uncertainty or when 
they need to restore market trust. Further, the study picks up on recent research on divestiture 
experience (e.g., Bergh & Lim, 2008; Peruffo, Marchegiani, & Vicentini, 2018) and industry 
divestiture waves (e.g., Brauer & Wiersema, 2012). The likelihood of announcing a program is 
found to increase only with distant experience and decrease after a divestiture wave in a firm’s 
primary industry. In an analysis of the market reaction to divestiture program announcements, 
the reaction is found to vary and to increase when a program value is disclosed – particularly 
for programs driven by a financial rationale or announced as part of a broader restructuring 
program. For programs with a refocusing rationale, the specification of assets is found to 
increase market returns. I argue that the disclosure of such program specifics increases the 
signaling effectiveness and credibility of a divestiture program. 
Finally, the third study sets out to answer the question to which extent capital markets value 
divestitures in a consolidating industry where players usually seek efficiency gains and growth 
through mergers and acquisitions. The study is set in the global brewing industry, where the 
five largest players accounted for 60% of the global beer volume in 2018. The study describes 
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the consolidation of the industry and the divestiture activity of publicly listed brewing groups. 
Further, it studies the reaction of capital markets to 66 divestitures undertaken by publicly listed 
breweries in the period from 1999 to 2018 and examines its success determinants. 
The results show that capital markets receive divestitures by publicly listed brewing groups on 
average positively. The study does not find a significant relation of consolidation over time to 
the market reaction. An identified negative relation of a firm’s global market share to the market 
reaction suggests that investors find little additional value creation potential in divestitures of 
market leaders. Among divestitures of core brewing operations, the sale of brand licenses for 
specific countries or regions is found to relate positively to the market reaction. Regarding the 
structure of divestitures, I find divestitures that are part of a program to be valued positively by 
the market. Surprisingly, firm diversification relates negatively to the market reaction. Thus, 
the capital market seems to reward firms that are more invested in brewing operations and 
naturally more likely to reinvest in their concentrated core industry. This is consistent with the 
argument that firms earn above-average returns in concentrated industries, and that these 
industries are more attractive to refocus on (Markides, 1992b, 1995; Powell & Yawson, 2005).  
The following dissertation is structured in five chapters, including this general introduction. 
Chapters two, three, and four present the three studies outlined in Figure 1-1. Each of the 
chapters consists of an individual introduction, a section on the theoretical background, a 
section on the applied methodology, a results section, and finally, a section discussing the 
results. Chapter five draws a general conclusion. Finally, chapter six presents the references 
cited throughout the dissertation. 
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2 THE ROLE OF MOTIVE AND STRUCTURE: PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF 
SELL-OFFS AND SELL-OFF EXPERIENCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Divestitures are complex events undertaken for manifold motives and structured in multiple 
ways. This study analyzes the long-term effects of sell-offs and sell-offs experience on 
performance considering two contingencies: strategic motive and structure. The analysis 
reveals significant results for the effect of sell-offs structured as part of a divestiture program. 
Results suggest that in the context of such programs, potential learning transfers are outweighed 
by the negative performance associated with years of restructuring or inherent to firms 
undergoing a program. Thus, this study contributes to research on the performance effects of 
divestiture experience and stresses the importance of considering the program nature of 
divestitures in research.  
Keywords: divestitures (sell-offs, programs, motives), firm performance, organizational 
learning 
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2.1 Introduction 
As part of their strategy, firms restructure their business through both acquisitions and 
divestitures. Such moves are complex in their process and may entail comprehensive changes 
to a firm’s business portfolio. Following organizational learning theory, firms should profit 
from accumulating knowledge and learning over time as they repeatedly engage in such 
transactions (Levitt & March, 1988). Acquisition research has extensively examined the 
relationship between experience and performance and come to contradictory and inconclusive 
results (cf. Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Studies find either a positive (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989), 
a negative (Kusewitt, 1985), none at all (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987), or an u-shaped relation 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). In contrast to the acquirer, the seller of a business should face 
less uncertainty. The seller most certainly knows the business to be divested, knows in which 
way the business is entangled with other operations, or where difficulties of disentanglement 
may lie. With less uncertainty to overcome, mastering and professionalizing the process 
becomes the differentiating factor. Only lately, divestiture research has adopted an experience 
stance. It outlines the multi-stage divestiture process, finds the effect of divestiture experience 
on performance to be positive, and calls for these results to be challenged considering motive 
and structure (Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017; Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019). Both 
strategically driven divestitures and those structured as part of a program are likely more 
carefully planned and initiated than opportunistic transactions (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). 
Thus, they should instill a superior learning environment. Literature has previously found 
divestitures linked to strategy (Montgomery et al., 1984) and those structured as part of a 
broader program (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010) to yield superior stock market reactions. 
However, in both cases and large parts of literature, divestitures are treated as discrete events 
and examined in settings that take a transactional perspective emphasizing the short-term 
market reaction to such events (cf. Brauer, 2006; Haynes et al., 2002). This neglects their effects 
over time (Haynes et al., 2002) and their complexity (Brauer, 2006; Kolev, 2016). Also, due to 
limited information, the capital market may find it difficult to accurately assess divestitures 
(Bergh et al., 2019). Only few researchers assume a longitudinal perspective and track divesting 
firms over time to analyze the performance effects of divestitures (e.g., Brauer et al., 2017; 
Haynes et al., 2002; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018).  
This study seeks to advance prior finance and strategy research in several ways. It measures the 
long-term performance effects of divestitures and experience. Based on a dataset covering the 
years 1997 to 2017, the study analyzes a cross-industry and cross-country panel of 150 of the 
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largest European public firms over 15 years from 2000 to 2014. In line with previous research 
on divestiture experience, it acknowledges fundamental process differences between sell-offs 
and spin-offs and focuses on sell-offs (cf. Bergh & Lim, 2008). The study advances prior 
literature in considering two contingencies when studying long-term performance and 
experience effects. First, it examines the effects of strategic sell-offs that are driven by a 
strategic motive, such as the selling of non-core assets. Second, it considers the structure of the 
strategic move in analyzing the effects of program sell-offs. Multiple program sell-offs form a 
divestiture program and are marked by a consistent rationale across a series of sell-offs. 
In a fixed-effects regression, significant results are found when examining sell-offs that are part 
of a divestiture program. Program-related experience is found to negatively moderate the 
relationship between program sell-off intensity, operationalized as relative size divested, and 
post-divestiture accounting performance. Thus, the study adds to the understanding of 
experience effects and challenges prior research that has found divestiture experience to be 
generally positively related to performance (Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017; 
Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019). Specifically, the results show that the more years a firm has 
been undergoing divestiture programs and the more sell-offs were undertaken as part of these 
programs, the more detrimental is the moderating effect. Analyses on the relationship between 
program sell-off intensity and post-divestiture performance provide initial evidence of a non-
linear s-shaped relationship. This would suggest that sell-offs, as part of a broader program, 
need to be material enough in size to have a positive effect on performance, while too much of 
it may diminish future firm performance. Further, total and strategic sell-off intensity and the 
respective sell-off experience are not found to have an effect on post-divestiture accounting 
performance. In contrast, shareholder wealth effects of a sub-sample, chosen based on a 
transaction size threshold, are both significant and positive.  
This study is structured as follows. The second section provides a review of the theoretical 
background and develops the hypotheses for performance effects, experience effects, and 
motive and structure. Section 3 describes the sample, presents the variables, and outlines the 
chosen data analysis methods. Section 4 provides the results of the fixed-effects regression, the 
supplementary analyses, and shareholder wealth effects. Finally, Section 5 discusses the results, 
theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and avenues for future research, and draws 
the conclusion.  
 10 
2.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Firms choose among different divestiture modes: sell-offs, spin-offs, equity carve-out, and 
split-ups (e.g., Bergh et al., 2008; Mulherin & Boone, 2000). Prior literature finds that learning 
differs across divestiture modes (Bergh & Lim, 2008). In line with prior research, this study 
focuses on sell-offs, as the most common type to divest (Brauer et al., 2017). In the following, 
I provide the theorization and the background for the development of the research hypotheses. 
Specifically, I discuss the performance effects of sell-offs, the moderating effect of sell-off 
experience, and elaborate on the characteristics of strategic and program sell-offs.  
2.2.1 Performance effects 
A large body of literature analyzes the relation between divestiture and subsequent firm 
performance. While the results of prior literature are mixed, overall, research hints to a positive 
relation (cf. Lee & Madhavan, 2010). However, only few studies analyze divestitures in a 
setting that acknowledges both their complexity (Brauer, 2006) and the difficulty of markets to 
assess them accurately (Bergh et al., 2019). The most recent longitudinal studies on accounting 
performance provide mixed results. Brauer et al. (2017) find divestitures to be positively 
associated with performance. Vidal and Mitchell (2018) note the contingency of prior 
performance and find high performers to have a lower ROA post-divestiture; however, find no 
effect of divestitures itself. Feldman et al. (2016) find positive performance effects only for 
family firms. 
In general, literature argues that post-divestiture performance increases from efficiently 
reallocating freed up financial and managerial resources and higher corporate efficiency across 
the entire business (Brauer, 2006; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). Based on both finance and strategy 
literature, three economic drivers for a performance increase following divestiture can be 
derived: efficient re-allocation of freed-up resources (Burgelman, 1994; Hoskisson & Johnson, 
1992), avoidance of negative synergies (Berger & Ofek, 1995; John & Ofek, 1995), and 
divestiture as a cheap source of financing (Lang, Poulsen, & Stulz, 1995). Negative synergies 
are often argued to stem from over-diversification (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Hoskisson, Johnson, 
& Moesel, 1994; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Markides, 1992a; Schipper & Smith, 1983) or a 
misfit between parent and subsidiary (John & Ofek, 1995; Markides & Singh, 1997; Schipper 
& Smith, 1983). However, research has also identified limitations to a performance increase: 
The sale of related units (Bergh, 1995), non-economic pressures (Durand & Vergne, 2015; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1991; Wright & Ferris, 1997), and managerial opportunism (Pathak, 
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Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2014; Sanders, 2001). Overall, the results of prior research and the 
arguments outlined above hint to a positive relation of sell-offs and performance: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Sell-off intensity is positively associated with a firm’s post-divestiture 
accounting performance. 
2.2.2 Divestiture experience and learning 
Performance implications of divestitures are traditionally argued to stem primarily from 
eliminating organizational and managerial inefficiencies (John & Ofek, 1995). More recently, 
scholars have begun to acknowledge the complexity of divestitures by taking a more process-
focused approach when examining its antecedents and outcomes. In this vein, they have also 
begun to augment the very rudimentary understanding of learning in the context of divestiture 
through organizational learning theory (Bergh et al., 2008; Brauer et al., 2017). Firms that 
repeatedly engage in sell-offs are found to experience higher post-divestiture performance 
(Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017; Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019). While findings on 
divestitures are so far unanimous, there are more and contradictory results on acquisitions (cf. 
Laamanen & Keil, 2008).  
Organizational learning theory argues that firms create knowledge from prior experience and 
that this experience is stored in and retrieved from a collective organizational memory (Levitt 
& March, 1988). Thus, prior experience shapes the routines of an organization and guides future 
behavior in similar circumstances. In repeatedly performing an activity, a firm learns from 
direct experience or “learning by doing” (Levitt & March, 1988; Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
However, to learn effectively, it is argued that a firm needs to develop “absorptive capacity”: it 
“needs … related knowledge to assimilate and use new knowledge”, which “increases both the 
ability to put new knowledge into memory ... and the ability to recall and use it” (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990: 129). Consequently, cumulative learning potential is the highest when related 
knowledge is readily available. Absorptive capacity does then enable firms to “learn from 
experiences, make inferences, and store knowledge that can be codified and applied to future 
decisions” to improve and facilitate decision-making (Bergh & Lim, 2008: 596). Also, once 
patterns for activities and decision-making exist, they create pressure for managers to follow 
these patterns (Kolev, 2016). Without experience in a particular action, it may not even be 
considered a legitimate alternative and violate past routines (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005). 
Divestitures are commonly described as complex events (Brauer, 2006; Kolev, 2016). In 
learning from prior divestitures, firms may be able to overcome the complexity of the multistage 
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divestiture process. Brauer et al. (2017) describe a four-stage process at which learning occurs 
when executing a sell-off: asset identification, asset transaction, asset separation, and asset 
reallocation. Along this process, they argue, that managers and firms profit from repeated 
experience when identifying assets, a better understanding of the process, the unbundling of 
resources in a way that generates two freestanding firms, and from refining their expertise to 
redeploy resources both timely and effectively. Extant literature finds that firms learn from 
divestitures in that they adjust their behavior following previous divestitures and are more likely 
to divest again (Kolev, 2016; Peruffo et al., 2018; Shimizu & Hitt, 2005; Villalonga & 
McGahan, 2005). In the first study on the effects of divestiture experience on performance, 
Bergh and Lim (2008) find evidence linking sell-off experience to better financial performance. 
They argue that the theory of absorptive capacity mostly applies to sell-offs. In contrast, spin-
offs are argued to require organizational improvisation capabilities, given that they are more 
idiosyncratic and occur less often. For spin-offs, knowledge is argued to be accumulated by 
managers rather than being absorbed by the organization as a whole. Further, for acquisitions, 
it was established that transactions need to be similar, e.g., in terms of industry or context, for 
a firm to profit from experience (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Otherwise, connections 
between actions and outcomes are misspecified, and wrong inferences may be drawn from prior 
experience (Levitt & March, 1988). For divestitures, the amount of industries from which a 
firm’s experience is drawn is found to moderate the performance relationship negatively, 
whereas divestiture experience within a firm’s core industry is found to be a positive moderator 
(Brauer et al., 2017). Direct learning enables a firm to accumulate knowledge on sell-offs and 
to apply this knowledge to improve and refine the sell-off process with each transaction. 
Further, given the complexity of sell-offs, firms should not solely rely on internal but also 
external experience and knowledge sources (Brauer et al., 2017). In line with prior research on 
divestiture experience, I hypothesize that firms learn from cumulated and repetitive sell-off 
experience, that they build up procedural knowledge that helps them to avoid errors and 
disadvantageous situations, and that they ultimately achieve superior performance: 
Hypothesis 2.2: Sell-off experience positively moderates the relationship between sell-
off intensity and post-divestiture accounting performance. 
2.2.3 Divestiture motive and structure 
Divestiture research has highlighted the contrast of strategically motivated divestitures to 
opportunistic or tactical divestitures (Lee & Madhavan, 2010). Montgomery et al. (1984: 831) 
argue that “divestitures should be rooted in corporate strategy” and not undertaken in a 
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“reactionary or piecemeal manner”. More recently, research has also begun to carve out the 
performance implications of structural differences in comparing divestitures that are part of a 
program with stand-alone transactions (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). This study draws upon this 
research. It examines the effects of sell-offs with a clearly communicated strategic motive and 
of program sell-offs structured as part of a series and marked by strategic consistency.  
Strategic vs. non-strategic sell-offs 
Strategically motivated divestitures are undertaken for various reasons. The most prominent 
one is the reduction of scope in operations to refocus on the core (Berger & Ofek, 1999; 
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992; John & Ofek, 1995; Markides, 1995). 
Hoskisson and Hitt (1994) argue that long-run competitiveness requires strong strategic control 
and an emphasis on innovation and product quality. Firms are suggested to regain strategic 
control and be able to compete successfully through the downscoping of their operations and 
the refocusing on their core business. However, it is also noted that this only enhances value if 
the core of a firm is sufficiently attractive to justify a shift of resources (Markides, 1992b). 
Research examined downscoping and refocusing in-depth with regard to large conglomerates’ 
reduction of diversification in the 1980s and 1990s (Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Hoskisson & 
Hitt, 1994; Williams, Paez, & Sanders, 1988). Further, reductions in diversification have been 
linked to increased investments in research and development, suggesting that downscoping 
firms use the proceeds to invest in their remaining assets and to improve competitiveness 
(Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). Also, research links an explicit increase in focus to value creation 
(Berger & Ofek, 1999; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Daley, Mehrotra, & Sivakumar, 1997; John 
& Ofek, 1995). John and Ofek (1995) find firm performance to improve in each of the three 
years after a divestiture primarily for those firms that increase their focus. In addition, Bergh 
(1998) has found firms following a refocusing strategy to perform better than firms that pursue 
a portfolio management strategy in the presence of product uncertainty. 
In contrast to strategic divestitures, Montgomery et al. (1984), list the selling of undesired units, 
the selling in response to liquidity concerns and the forced divesting of units. In general, 
literature has linked strategically motivated divestitures to superior performance (Lee & 
Madhavan, 2010). Also, research finds divestitures linked to a change in corporate strategy to 
result in positive shareholder wealth effects (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; 
Montgomery et al., 1984), whereas “routine, non-strategic divestitures” (Montgomery et al., 
1984: 838) are valued negatively. Thus, stockholders expect superior performance in terms of 
higher future income streams from strategically driven divestitures. 
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Based on the theoretical arguments, I argue that selling non-core or non-strategic businesses 
should result in performance improvement by lowering negative synergies and freeing up 
resources that can be reinvested into a firm’s core. Thus, sell-offs that are driven by a strategic 
rationale and rooted in a firm’s strategy should have a positive effect on firm performance: 
Hypothesis 2.3: Strategic sell-off intensity is positively associated with a firm’s post-
divestiture accounting performance. 
As noted, this study aims to advance organizational learning for divestitures by differentiating 
between strategic and non-strategic sell-offs. Bergh and Lim (2008) argue that effective 
learning requires repetition, explicit knowledge, and routines. I argue that strategic sell-offs are 
undertaken in a more carefully planned and rationally driven manner. They do not only facilitate 
the gathering of explicit knowledge and the translation into routines, but also ease the 
refinement, extension, and application of existing experience. Overall, I expect strategic sell-
off experience to have a positive effect on the relation of strategic sell-offs and performance: 
Hypothesis 2.4: Strategic sell-off experience positively moderates the relationship 
between strategic sell-off intensity and post-divestiture accounting performance. 
Program vs. non-program sell-offs 
As a way of restructuring, divestitures alter the configuration of a firm’s businesses, challenge 
its status quo and respond to changes in corporate strategy and firm environment (Bowman & 
Singh, 1993; Brauer, 2006; Lee & Madhavan, 2010). In research, divestitures were long treated 
as “isolated, self-contained events” (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010: 85) or “one-off activities” 
(Mankins et al., 2008: 99). Research has only reluctantly picked up the idea of strategic 
consistency across a series of divestitures. It recognizes the occurrence of divestitures as part 
of a series or examines restructuring or refocusing programs with multiple transactions (Berger 
& Ofek, 1999; Haynes et al., 2002; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992; 
Markides, 1995). Brauer and Schimmer (2010) are the only ones to differentiate between 
program and non-program divestitures. In an event study setting, they find program divestitures 
to yield superior shareholder returns. Practitioner-oriented literature underscores the potential 
value add from carefully planned divestiture programs (Dranikoff, Koller, & Schneider, 2002) 
and proactive management of the divestiture process (Mankins et al., 2008).  
Divestiture programs often mark major adjustments in a firm’s strategy (Brauer, 2006). Such 
adjustments often require multiple divestitures. In undertaking multiple transactions over a 
longer period, a firm commits towards a specific course of strategy. Strategy research links 
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firms that exhibit a high commitment to their strategy to higher performance (Robinson & 
Pearce, 1988). Commitment signals that management has confidence in the initiated change. It 
suggests that a program is strategic rather than tactical, that it is driven by a clear rationale, and 
that it is rooted in corporate strategy (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). The transactions that 
constitute a program are then marked by strategic consistency in pursuing the same strategy and 
in forming an interrelated and “coordinated series” over time (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010: 90; 
Kronenwett, 2010). Literature suggests that a series of strategically consistent decisions is 
superior to non-consistent decisions (Sen, 1993). This is supported by findings from Robinson 
and Pearce (1988), who identify a positive relationship between the consistency of strategic 
moves and firm performance. Consistently, Brauer and Schimmer (2010) reason that internal 
consistency and strategic relevance drives the identified positive performance effects of 
program transactions. However, programs may not always follow a strictly strategic rationale, 
as presented above. The driving force may just as well be the reduction of a firm’s debt burden 
or complying with antitrust regulation following a large acquisition. Nonetheless, a program 
would then still follow a strategy focused on improving a firm’s health and competitiveness or 
be part of a greater restructuring strategy including both acquisitions and divestitures. 
A firm accumulates knowledge with each divestiture of a program shaping the routines and 
patterns with which the further components of the program are undertaken. Research argues 
that learning is more effective if similar knowledge already exists (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) 
and that multiple repetitions are necessary to draw correct inferences (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999). Both arguments hold for divestiture programs. Accordingly, I argue that firms learn 
along a series of divestitures that constitute a program due to the similarity of sold assets, 
unchanged management team, short temporal intervals, and a more structured approach. 
Research argues that similar characteristics allow for a more specific, more likely, and thus 
more value-enhancing experience transfer (Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017; Singh & 
Zollo, 1998; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Program sell-offs are argued to share a common rationale. 
Thus, on many occasions, its components will be similar and homogenous rather than 
heterogeneous – be it because of size, financial situation, or a related industry of the units to be 
divested. Further, while effective learning relies on people (Levitt & March, 1988), the 
knowledge that is stored with people but not codified can easily be lost (Hayward, 2002). Along 
a divestiture program, employees and managers will likely develop an explicit knowledge and 
understanding of a specific program and it’s scope. It is likely that management remains the 
same throughout a program, and that the likelihood of effective learning and its application 
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increases. Moreover, research on acquisitions argues that benefits from experience are driven 
by recent but not distant acquisitions (Hayward, 2002). Given the shorter intervals between 
program sell-offs (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010), benefits from experience should materialize 
more likely. Further, divesting multiple units as part of a program requires a structured and 
systematic approach (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). Such a structured approach should facilitate 
and increase learning effectiveness. Though prior literature does not find significant wealth 
effects both for general as well as specific program experience (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010), I 
argue that benefits from learning do hold and should be superior within divestiture programs. 
First, as argued, a divestiture program may serve as a strong signal that a firm is divesting based 
on a strategic rationale and to implement a major adjustment to corporate strategy. Second, 
program sell-offs are not only interrelated but also strategically consistent in their shared 
rationale. Third, firms may profit from learning within a series of divestitures that share similar 
characteristics. Thus, divestiture programs should be associated with a positive effect on the 
performance implications of divesting: 
Hypothesis 2.5: Program sell-off intensity is positively associated with a firm’s post-
divestiture accounting performance. 
Firms will not only profit from an environment that facilitates learning within a program but 
also from learning across multiple programs due to: similarity of sold assets, unchanged 
management team, short temporal intervals, and a more structured approach. I employ two 
measures for program-related experience. First, I argue that program sell-off experience, in 
terms of the number of program sell-offs undertaken prior to the focal period, should positively 
moderate the performance relation. Second, the divestiture program experience, in terms of the 
cumulated time a firm has been undergoing a single, or multiple divestiture programs should 
also serve as a signal for multiple opportunities for superior learning. Thus, in addition to the 
number of program sell-offs, experience is also operationalized as years with an active 
divestiture program prior to the focal period: 
Hypothesis 2.6: Program sell-off experience/ divestiture program experience positively 
moderates the relationship between program sell-off intensity and post-divestiture 
accounting performance. 
To control for consistency of effects, I also test the effect of program end. The end of an 
extensive restructuring period should positively moderate the effect of sell-offs on performance.  
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2.3 Methods 
This section outlines the data sample, the dependent, independent, and control measures, and 
the method of data analysis that was applied to test the aforementioned hypotheses. 
2.3.1 Sample 
This study chose a cross-industry European setting to test its hypotheses. Extant literature on 
the accounting relationship of divestitures focused mostly on US firms (e.g., Bergh & Lim, 
2008; Feldman et al., 2016; Montgomery & Thomas, 1988). More recent studies have also 
relied on European (Brauer et al., 2017; Haynes et al., 2002) or global but often industry-
specific samples (Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). The basis for the sample was the STOXX Europe 
600 at the beginning of the observation period in 2000. This index covers a wide variety of 
industries and European countries.2 Similar to previous literature, financial industry firms, 
trading firms (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1999; Haynes et al., 2002), and the utility sector were 
excluded to assure comparability of data. Further, firms were required to have at least six 
consecutive years of accounting data.3 From all 254 firms that fulfilled the stated selection 
criteria, 150 were then sampled randomly to ensure a manageable sample size given a manual 
review of all transaction data. The final sample contained firms from 14 countries and covered 
industrials, basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, technology, health care, and 
telecommunications. I rely on data for the years 1995-2017, to study a panel over the period 
from 2000-2014.4 To avoid endogeneity problems, the sample included firms that divested 
frequently, firms that divested only seldom, firms that did not divest, firms that left the sample, 
and firms that entered later than 2000 because they had been formed after 1995 but before 2000. 
This resulted in an unbalanced panel of 1,923 observations across 150 firms (see Table 2-1). 
                                                             
2 Greece was deliberately excluded given that transaction activity on SDC was strongly below that of other 
countries suggesting incomplete coverage. 
3 The analysis included a control variable for past year’s performance. Further, the dependent variable captured 
the performance of the three years following the focal period. Six consecutive years of accounting data did then 
allow for two observation periods as a minimum threshold for this study. 
4 The independent variable for divestiture experience captured the five years prior to the focal period. As stated 
above, the dependent variable captured the three years following the focal period.  
Table 2-1: Balance of the panel 
  
No of years 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
No. of firms 1 5 4 7 1 2 3 3 6 3 3 8 9 95 
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Thomson Reuters’ SDC database was used to obtain an initial list of sell-offs undertaken by the 
firm sample. Transactions needed to fulfill the following criteria to be included in the analysis: 
i. The transaction was flagged as a divestiture deal by SDC. Deals that were also marked 
as spin-offs were excluded in line with prior literature on learning and the different 
learning characteristics (Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017). 
ii. The completion date of the transaction was within the relevant period of 1995 to 2014, 
five years before the observation period, to account also for divestiture experience.5  
iii. The transaction was a sell-off of operational assets – non-operational divestitures, e.g., 
the sale of property or buildings were excluded from this study. 
iv. The sell-off reduced the holding to a minority holding, e.g., the formation of a joint 
venture where a 50% share is retained, were excluded. 
Overall, 3,126 operational sell-offs were identified in SDC for the 150 firms over the 
observation period (see Table 2-2).6 In addition, 190 divestitures were identified as part of the 
manual review of divestiture announcements in primary and secondary sources. This resulted 
in a final sample of 3,316 or 22.1 sell-offs per firm between 1995 and 2014. Between 2000 and 
2014, 2,421 sell-offs were undertaken across all 1,923 firm-year observations. 
2.3.2 Measures 
Data to construct the variables presented in the following was taken from Worldscope (through 
Thomson Reuters). Strategic divestitures and divestiture programs were identified based on 
divestiture announcements, other press releases, and secondary sources obtained from Factiva 
                                                             
5 The actual observation period varied from firm to firm based on availability of accounting data. 
6 The number excludes transactions that were duplicates or falsely labelled as divestitures by SDC, e.g., if a seller 
and acquirer shared the same parent, if primary and secondary sources revealed only a minority interest in the sold 
assets, if transactions were falsely allocated to a parent or the target is a unit or subsidiary of a unit that was already 
divested before. 
Table 2-2: Distribution of sell-offs by firm 
         
No of sell-offs 0 1-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-50 >50 Total 
No. of firms 3 20 32 36 25 21 13 150 
% of firms 2.0% 13.3% 21.3% 24.0% 16.7% 14.0% 8.7% 100.0% 
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and LexisNexis. In this vein, I also augmented the initial list of sell-offs with missing financials 
and validated the information obtained from Thomson Reuters’ SDC database. In the following, 
dependent, independent, and control variables are outlined. 
Dependent variable 
Firm performance. Following prior literature, profitability was measured as return on assets 
(ROA). A three-year average following the focal year was chosen, given that prior research has 
shown that performance effects of divestitures take time to materialize (Bergh, 1998; Markides, 
1995) and has frequently applied three-year averages to measure performance (e.g., Bergh & 
Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017; Woo, Willard, & Daellenbach, 1992). Also, in excluding the 
focal year, the influence of one-time effects, such as restructuring costs or proceeds from selling 
the assets, was minimized (Brauer et al., 2017). A majority of prior research has relied on ROA 
as the primary performance measure (e.g., Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992; Montgomery & 
Thomas, 1988; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). I measured ROA as operating income relative to 
average total assets. Average total assets were calculated as the average of total assets at the 
beginning and the end of a period, acknowledging that profits are a flow that cumulates over 
time (Dickerson, Gibson, & Tsakalotos, 1997; Haynes et al., 2002).  
Independent variables 
Total sell-off intensity. Consistent with prior research, I operationalized sell-off intensity as 
relative firm size divested during a period. Previous research on divestitures has drawn on the 
target’s transaction price (e.g., Cho & Cohen, 1997; Haynes et al., 2002; Klein, 1986) or the 
target’s sales (e.g., Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Pathak et al., 2014) to 
calculate the relative size. Further, measuring sell-off intensity as a percentage of firm size does 
also account for acquisitions, which increase firm size, and thus decrease relative divestiture 
Table 2-3: Distribution of sell-off size 
         
Sell-off size 
(relative size 
divested) 
0 to  
0.5% 
>0.5 to 
1% 
>1 to  
5% 
>5 to 
10% 
>10 to 
20% 
>20 to 
50% 
>50% No size 
data 
No. sell-offs 1260 343 544 137 97 51 4 880 
% of sample 38.0% 10.3% 16.4% 4.1% 2.9% 1.5% 0.1% 26.5% 
Note: Sell-off size relative to firm size for all transactions where sales, transaction price, assets, or employees 
were available. 
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size (Pathak et al., 2014). Research has also relied on the number of sell-offs to operationalize 
sell-off activity (e.g., Brauer et al., 2017; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). However, this overvalues 
small and likely unsubstantial sell-offs and neglects the concentration of sell-offs at the lower 
tail of the size distribution (see Table 2-3). At the same time, it undervalues the less frequent 
large sell-offs, e.g., only 8.6% of sell-offs divest more than 5% of firm size (see Table 2-3). 
The average firm size divested in a given period peaked in 2000 with 4.1% and 2007 with 3.3% 
(see Figure 2-1). To control for robustness, I substituted sell-off intensity with the number of 
sell-offs as part of the supplementary analysis. As illustrated in Figure 2-1, both average firm 
size divested and average number of sell-offs developed similarly over the observation period. 
Literature has previously noted the issue of incomplete transaction and unit financials (Haynes 
et al., 2002; Nanda & Narayanan, 1999). I chose a multi-step approach to overcome this 
difficulty and operationalized the variable based on data availability. As a first choice, I 
Figure 2-1: Development of average sell-off activity across firm sample over time 
 
Table 2-4: Distribution of sell-off size by quartile 
   
Quartile Lower boundary Upper boundary 
1 0.00% 0.13% 
2 0.13% 0.48% 
3 0.48% 1.72% 
4 1.72% 72.43% 
Note: Sell-off size relative to firm size for all transactions where sales, transaction price, assets, or employees 
were available. 
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employed unit sales data relative to parent’s sales in the previous year. As a second choice, I 
used transaction price, including net debt relative to the previous year’s enterprise value. As a 
third and fourth choice, the variable was calculated using the unit’s assets relative to the 
previous’ year’s total assets or the divested employees relative to the previous year’s total 
employees. In line with Haynes et al. (2002), I argue that the remaining 26% of the sample, 
where no data was disclosed, should most likely be located at the lower tail of the sample. 
Accordingly, I allocated to these divestitures a value of 0.13%, the upper boundary of the first 
quartile of the divestiture size distribution across the sample (see Table 2-4). 
Strategic sell-off intensity. I identified strategic sell-offs based on divestiture announcements 
and further primary and secondary sources. The analysis of announcements to identify intent 
has been frequently employed in divestiture research (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1999; Markides, 
1995; Montgomery et al., 1984). However, firms do not necessarily state their rationale in their 
announcement, or a divestiture may be below a minimum size threshold to mandate an 
announcement. Thus, I also reviewed other primary sources that refer to a divestiture, e.g., 
conference call transcripts or press coverage that provides a broader context and often further 
official statements. Sell-offs were considered strategic if the announcement or secondary press 
coverage explicitly referred to a refocusing course, the sale of non-core or non-strategic assets, 
or linked the divestiture to a broader strategy or program with such an objective. For example: 
This disposal is part of the firm's announced strategy to refocus its industry sector. 
The sale is part of a strategy announced in May by the chairman, whereby the firm would 
sell all non-strategic assets. 
The operation is the first divestment carried out in accordance with an action plan, 
announced last March that aims to reduce costs and increase efficiency and includes the 
disposal of non-strategic assets. 
Program sell-off intensity. Previous research has applied different methods to differentiate 
between program and non-program transactions. Acquisition research has either assigned all 
transactions following the initial announcement of a program to a program (Bhabra et al., 1999; 
Schipper & Thompson, 1983) or has required acquisitions to be clustered in time (Conn, Cosh, 
Guest, & Hughes, 2004; Kronenwett, 2010; Laamanen & Keil, 2008). However, both methods 
do only consider uninterrupted series of transactions (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). Previous 
divestiture research has relied on the textual analysis of divestiture announcements to identify  
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programs (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). This study assumed a two-fold approach in considering 
both explicit program announcements and individual divestiture announcements through 
primary and secondary sources. I determined for each divestiture individually whether it was 
part of a program. To constitute a program, multiple divestitures had to be linked to an explicitly 
stated rationale or an explicit divestiture program announcement. Throughout the sample, 
recurring rationales of divestiture programs were refocusing, streamlining, or debt repayment 
efforts often following the strategic review of a newly instated CEO or a large acquisition. 
Figure 2-2 shows to which extent sell-off intensity across all firms and periods included in this 
study was considered strategic or part of a divestiture program based on the aforementioned 
criteria. 77.9% of the total sell-off intensity was considered strategic. 52.2% could be attributed 
to a program. Figure 2-3 shows the share of firms with divestiture programs during the study. 
The share could be seen to spike at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. 
Figure 2-2: Share of strategic and program sell-off intensity  
 
Note: Share relative to total sell-off intensity for the entire observation period from 2000 to 2014. 
Figure 2-3: Share of firms with an active divestiture program over time 
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Total sell-off experience. Sell-off experience was measured as the number of sell-offs 
undertaken in the five years prior to the focal period. The number of sell-offs is the more 
intuitive choice to measure experience given that learning and accumulation of knowledge have 
been argued to occur from repetition of actions (e.g., Zollo & Winter, 2002). In contrast, using 
deal size would suggest that a firm learns equally much from one large sell-off as it does from 
multiple smaller ones (Brauer et al., 2017). Nonetheless, given the concentration of divestiture 
size on the lower tail of the distribution (see Table 2-3), I required divestitures to be greater in 
size than 0.48%, the upper boundary of the second quartile (see Table 2-4). This guaranteed 
that any sell-off included in the variable offers a meaningful learning opportunity to the 
organization. Learning theory has argued that experience is fading over time (Levitt & March, 
1988). Accordingly, studies on transaction experience have often relied on a five-year window 
for measuring experience (e.g., Hayward, 2002; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Peruffo et al., 2018). 
Further, to test for robustness, I varied the size threshold and the experience window as part of 
the supplementary analyses. 
Strategic sell-off experience. I constructed strategic sell-off experience in the same way as total 
sell-off experience based on the sell-offs that were previously clustered as strategic.  
I measured a firm’s experience concerning divestiture programs in two ways: 
Program sell-off experience. In a first variation, program sell-off experience was 
operationalized in coherence with the other experience variables based on the sell-offs that 
could be attributed to a divestiture program. 
Divestiture program experience. In the second variation, experience with divestiture programs 
was operationalized as the number of years with an active divestiture program in the previous 
five years. 
Program end. The end of a program was operationalized as a dummy variable. It takes the value 
of 1 if the firm had an active divestiture program in the focal period and if there was no active 
program in the subsequent period. 
Control variables 
I included several control variables and lagged them by one period: prior firm performance, 
firm current ratio, firm leverage, firm size, and year effects. Prior firm performance was 
measured as return on assets in the previous year. Extant literature has found pre-divestiture 
performance to strongly predict post-divestiture performance (Bergh, 1998; Bergh & Lim, 
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2008; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). This is supported by profitability research that has argued and 
found profits to be persistent in time (Geroski & Jacquemin, 1988). Firm current ratio was 
measured as current assets over current liabilities and measures the level of slack resources 
(Feldman et al., 2016). Firm size was defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (Bergh & 
Sharp, 2015; Brauer et al., 2017). I measured firm leverage as total debt relative to total assets 
(Berger & Ofek, 1999; Dickerson et al., 1997; Haynes et al., 2002). Further, I included year 
dummies to account for possible time-dependent influences (Brauer et al., 2017; Haynes et al., 
2002).7 As part of the supplementary analysis, I also controlled for the level of product 
diversification measured using the entropy index (Palepu, 1985).8 
2.3.3 Data analysis 
Fixed-effects regression 
The research hypotheses were tested in a longitudinal panel setting. The panel setting comes 
with the advantage that it fully recognizes the multi-transaction and often multi-year 
perspective of experience effects and divestiture programs. In contrast, the event study 
methodology measures the market expectation to discrete events. Nonetheless, I also included 
measurements of market reaction to assure comparability with previous research and control 
for robustness. A Hausman (1978) test comparing the fixed-effects estimator with a random-
effects estimator and a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression clearly suggested the 
consistency of fixed-effects estimators. Thus, in the following, I present the results of the fixed-
effects panel regression with robust standard errors. The application of the fixed effects model 
and inclusion of a time-invariant firm-specific error term for each cross-section (firm dummies) 
ensured the consideration of unobservable firm-specific effects. Variables that were part of 
interactions were mean-centered to ease the interpretation of coefficients (Echambadi & Hess, 
2007). 
Shareholder wealth effects 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) were estimated based on a standard Market Model (MM) 
and the Fama-French-3-Factor Model (FF3F) to capture the short-term market reaction (Fama 
                                                             
7 In light of the mandatory change from local to IFRS reporting during the observation period, I did also run a 
robustness variation including a dummy that takes a value of 1 for a firm’s change to IFRS. However, it should be 
noted that Worldscope explicitly addresses the complexity of different financial accounting practices by providing 
uniform definitions and standardized financial statement organization. 
8 Sales per segment were obtained from Worldscope. Data differed significantly in granularity between firms but 
also within. One firm may have reported brands the one period and product segments the other period. Given the 
limited quality of the data to construct this variable, it was only included as part of the supplementary analysis. 
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& French, 1993). Abnormal returns are frequently measured in divestiture research to capture 
the shareholder wealth effects of divestitures (Lee & Madhavan, 2010). To measure the long-
term reaction, I calculated buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). The calculation of buy-
and-hold returns is the most commonly used method to measure the long-term performance of 
events (Barber & Lyon, 1997; Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999). Thus far, divestiture research has 
only seldom measured long-term stock market reactions (e.g., Chen & Feldman, 2018; Hanson 
& Song, 2003).  
The sell-offs that were identified for the main regression were mostly concentrated on the lower 
tail of the size distribution (see Table 2-3). Concerning the measurement of shareholder wealth 
effects, such smaller deals are unlikely to attract sufficient shareholder attention. Thus, prior 
literature has argued in favor of a minimum transaction size threshold (e.g., Owen et al., 2010; 
Rosenfeld, 1984). Accordingly, I set a threshold at a deal value of EUR 50M or at least 5% of 
relative firm size – calculated as deal value, including net debt, relative to enterprise value. 
Further, in line with the observation period of the main analysis, only divestitures announced 
in the firms’ fiscal years 2000 to 2014 were considered. 582 transactions of the initial sample 
matched these criteria. I employed Factiva to verify the announcement date reported in 
Thomson Reuters’ SDC database. To eliminate the effect of confounding events in the sample, 
I followed the recommendations of McWilliams and Siegel (1997). Specifically, I used Factiva 
to screen the press coverage of a firm in the five days around an announcement for financial 
events (e.g., firm results, earnings guidance, declaration of dividends, unexpected earnings), 
restructuring events (e.g., mergers, acquisitions, other divestitures, layoffs), major new product 
launches, major order placements, changes in key executives, and legal suits/disputes. This 
resulted in a final sample of 319 transactions undertaken by 98 firms. The S&P Europe 350 
index was chosen as the reference index. The STOXX Europe 600, from which the sample was 
drawn, had been created in 2000, and thus did not cover the estimation period for divestitures 
undertaken at the beginning of 2000. The required return data for firms and the reference index 
were obtained through Datastream. I set an estimation window of 120 days to comply with 
prior literature differentiating between program and non-program transactions (Brauer & 
Schimmer, 2010).  
In the MM, return follows a single-factor model. The model assumes the return of a stock on a 
day 𝑡 to be 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∝𝑖+ 𝛽𝑖 × 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, with 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 measuring the return of the reference market 
on day 𝑡, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 the error term and 𝛽𝑖 the sensitivity of 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 on the reference market. The abnormal 
return 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 was then calculated as the difference between the observed return and the expected 
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return measured by the model: 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡− (∝𝑖+ 𝛽𝑖 × 𝑅𝑀,𝑡). The CAR over an event window 
was calculated as 𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
. Next, the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) was calculated as the arithmetic mean across all events. Statistical significance was 
tested using the Patell (1976) z-test, the cross-sectional z-test as proposed by Boehmer, 
Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), and the non-parametric generalized sign test following Cowan 
(1992). 
In contrast, the FF3F uses three factors to describe the expected return of a stock: market risk, 
outperformance of small-cap firms, and outperformance of high book-to-market firms. The 
expected return is measured as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 =  ∝𝑖+ 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 is the risk-free return on day t. 𝑆𝑀𝐵 is the difference in return of small and big firms 
measured by market capitalization. 𝐻𝑀𝐿 measures the difference in return between firms with 
a high book to market ratio and those with a small ratio. CAR and CAAR were calculated 
accordingly to the MM. Fama/French European 3 Factors daily data for market return, SMB, 
HML, and risk-free return was retrieved from Kenneth French’s Fama/French data library as 
published by Dartmouth College. In addition to the inclusion of further factors, this served as a 
robustness control of the selected underlying index for the MM.  
The third measurement of shareholder wealth effects, BHAR, were computed as the difference 
between the buy-and-hold returns of the stock and the reference index for each day 𝑡 over a 
period 𝑇: 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 = [Π𝑡=1
𝑇 (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)] − [Π𝑡=1
𝑇 (1 + 𝑅𝑀,𝑡)]. Given that the sample was drawn 
from the largest public European firms by market capitalization at the beginning of 2000, the 
S&P Europe 350, which covers the 350 largest firms by market capitalization, was again used 
as reference index. I measured BHAR for the 250 days before the divestment and the 250, 500, 
and 750 days after the event. To assure the reliability of results in case of overlapping holding 
periods, I excluded divestitures undertaken within the holding period of an earlier divestiture 
of the same firm. A sample of 181 out of the 319 transactions remains. The average BHAR 
(ABHAR) for the total sample was calculated as the equal-weighted average across all events 
for each period. To test for the robustness of the average returns, I followed Lyon et al.’s (1999) 
suggestion of applying a bootstrapped version of Johnson’s (1978) skewness-adjusted t-statistic 
to account for the skewness of BHAR within the sample and receive well-specified test 
statistics. This approach involves the drawing of 1,000 bootstrapped resamples of size 𝑛𝑏 =
𝑛/4. From these resamples, I calculated the critical values of the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence 
intervals to reject the null hypothesis that the ABHAR is zero. 
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Table 2-5: Results of the fixed-effects panel regression with 3-year average ROA as the dependent variable 
Sell-off intensity and sell-off experience variables were varied based on the header row of the table to reflect total, strategic, or program sell-offs.  
Model Base Total sell-offs 
 
Strategic sell-offs Program sell-offs 
1  2a  2b  3  4a  4b  5  6a  6b  7a  7b  8a  8b  9a  9b  
Sell-off intensity -  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.00  -0.04 * -0.05  -0.13 * 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.07)  
Sell-off intensity2 -  -  -    -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.16  0.78 ** 
                            (0.11)  (0.38)  
Sell-off intensity3  -  -  -    -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.91 * 
                              (0.51)  
Sell-off experience -  -  0.00  0.00  -  0.00  0.00  -  0.00  0.00  -  -  -  -  -  -  
    (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)              
Sell-off intensity x Sell-off 
experience 
-  -  -  0.00  -  -  -0.01  -  -  -0.01 ** -  -  -  -  -  -  
      (0.01)      (0.01)      (0.01)              
Program experience -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.00  0.00  -  -  -  -  
                    (0.00)  (0.00)          
Sell-off intensity x 
Program experience 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.03 ** -  -  -  -  
                      (0.01)          
Program end -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.00  0.00  -  -  
                        (0.00)  (0.00)      
Sell-off intensity x 
Program end 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.08 ** -  -  
                        -  (0.03)      
Control - Firm prior 
performance 
0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.25 *** 0.24 *** 0.25 *** 0.25 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 
(0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  
Control - Firm current ratio 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
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Table 2-5: Results of the fixed-effects panel regression with 3-year average ROA as the dependent variable 
Sell-off intensity and sell-off experience variables were varied based on the header row of the table to reflect total, strategic, or program sell-offs.  
Model Base Total sell-offs 
 
Strategic sell-offs Program sell-offs 
1  2a  2b  3  4a  4b  5  6a  6b  7a  7b  8a  8b  9a  9b  
Control - Firm size -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Control - Firm leverage 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Constant 0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.24  0.23  
(0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  
Firm-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2 within 0.143  0.144  0.144  0.144  0.144  0.144  0.146  0.143  0.143  0.145  0.143  0.146  0.143  0.145  0.144  0.145  
F-value 12.16 *** 11.61 *** 11.13 *** 11.07 *** 11.63 *** 11.50 *** 11.16 *** 11.73 *** 11.41 *** 10.73 *** 11.41 *** 10.21 *** 11.13 *** 11.09 *** 11.60 *** 11.41 *** 
Ø VIF 2.30  2.30  2.31  2.31  2.30  2.32  2.31  2.29  2.31  2.30  2.31  2.31  2.29  2.30  2.34  3.10  
Note: Firm post-divestiture 3-year average ROA was set as the dependent variable; N=1,923 year observations across 150 firms between the years 2000 and 2014; Firm- and 
year-specific dummies were included in the analysis. Robust standard errors were clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Tested Hypotheses: 
- Hypothesis 2.1 (Model 1): Sell-off intensity is positively associated with a firm’s post-divestiture accounting performance. 
- Hypothesis 2.2 (Model 2a, 2b): Sell-off experience positively moderates the relationship between sell-off intensity and post-divestiture accounting performance. 
- Hypothesis 2.3 (Model 3): Strategic sell-off intensity is positively associated with a firm’s post-divestiture accounting performance. 
- Hypothesis 2.4 (Model 4a, 4b): Strategic sell-off experience positively moderates the relationship between strategic sell-off intensity and post-divestiture accounting 
performance. 
- Hypothesis 2.5 (Model 5, 9a, 9b): Program sell-off intensity is positively associated with a firm’s post-divestiture accounting performance. 
- Hypothesis 2.6 (Models 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b): Program sell-off experience/ divestiture program experience positively moderates the relationship between program sell-off 
intensity and post-divestiture accounting performance. 
(continued) 
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2.4 Results 
In the following, I present the results of the fixed-effects regression, its supplementary analysis, 
and the event study analysis measuring the shareholder wealth effects. 
2.4.1 Fixed-effects regression 
Table 2-5 reports the results of the fixed-effects panel regression. For each variable and 
interaction term, I report the coefficient, in the brackets below the robust standard errors, and 
next to the coefficient the significance based on the p-value. The base regression includes only 
the control variables. As expected, firm prior performance is a strong predictor of post-
divestiture performance. The same hypotheses are tested for total sell-offs (Models 1 to 2b) and 
strategic sell-offs (Models 3 to 4b). For program sell-offs, further variations are tested (Models 
5 to 9b). Sell-off intensity and sell-off experience variables are varied based on the header row 
of the table to reflect total, strategic, or program sell-offs. For example, Model 1 shows in the 
first row the coefficient of total sell-off intensity and Model 3 the coefficient of strategic sell-
off intensity. Also, R2 within, F-value, and average variance inflation factor (Ø VIF) are reported 
for each model. The means, standard deviation, and correlations of the variables used 
throughout the analysis are presented in Appendix 2-1. 
Model 1a provides a test of Hypothesis 2.1, which hypothesizes a positive relation of total sell-
off intensity and post-divestiture performance. Toal sell-off intensity does not have a significant 
effect on subsequent ROA (b = 0.02, not significant). Hypothesis 2.1 cannot be confirmed. 
Next, Models 2a and 2b address Hypothesis 2.2, which predicts a positive moderating effect of 
total sell-off experience on total sell-off intensity. The regressions do not indicate an effect of 
experience itself (b = 0.00, not significant) nor a moderating effect (b = 0.00, not significant). 
Thus, the results do not support Hypothesis 2.2. 
In the next step, I differentiated between strategic and non-strategic sell-offs. More specifically, 
strategic sell-offs were defined as sell-offs that are linked to a refocusing strategy or the selling 
of non-core assets either explicitly or implicitly through a shared program rationale. Hypothesis 
2.3 predicts a positive effect of strategic sell-off intensity on performance. The regression, as 
presented in Model 3, does not confirm the significance of such an effect (b = 0.02, not 
significant). Model 4a and 4b present the results for strategic sell-off experience. Hypothesis 
2.4 states a positive moderating effect of strategic sell-off intensity on strategic sell-off  
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Figure 2-4: Moderating effect of program sell-off experience on the relationship between 
program sell-off intensity and post-divestiture ROA based on Model 6b. 
 
Note: Program sell-off experience was operationalized as the number of sell-offs in the five years prior to the 
focal period that were part of a divestiture program and exceeded the size threshold of 0.48%. 
Figure 2-5: Moderating effect of divestiture program experience on the relationship between 
program sell-off intensity and post-divestiture ROA based on Model 7b. 
 
Note: Program experience was operationalized as the number of years with an active divestiture program in the 
previous five years. 
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intensity. The results indicate no effect of strategic sell-off experience by itself (b = 0.00, not 
significant) nor as moderator of sell-off intensity (b = -0.01, not significant).  
Models 5 tests Hypothesis 2.5. It predicts a positive relation of program sell-off intensity and 
post-divestiture performance. The results show no significant linear relationship (b = 0.00). 
Hypothesis 2.5 cannot be confirmed. Models 6a through 7b report the results for the effect of 
program-related experience. Hypothesis 2.6 suggests a positive moderating effect of program 
sell-off experience on program sell-off intensity. While there is no effect of program experience 
itself as tested in Model 6a (b = 0.00, not significant), the moderating effect on program sell-
off intensity as reported in Model 6b is significantly negative (b = -0.01, p = 0.03). Model 7b 
tests a variation of Hypothesis 2.6, where experience is defined in active program years in the 
five years prior to the focal period. Similar as in Model 6b, the moderating effect of program 
experience on program sell-off intensity is significantly negative (b = -0.03, p = 0.02). The 
effects of experience are depicted in Figure 2-4 and Figure 2-5. The results indicate that the 
more times a firm has divested as part of a divestiture program or undergone divestiture 
programs within the past years, the more likely is it to exhibit negative performance effects. 
The validity of results is further supported by Model 8b. It finds a strongly significant and 
positive moderating effect of the divestiture program end on the performance relation (b = 0.08,  
Figure 2-6: Moderating effect of program end on the relationship between program sell-off 
intensity and post-divestiture ROA based on Model 8b. 
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p = 0.02). This moderating effect is shown in Figure 2-6. Again, the program end variable 
itself, as reported in Model 8a, does not affect performance (b = 0.00, not significant). 
Given that the linear relation is not significant, I tested for non-linear relationships between the 
sell-off intensity variations and post-divestiture performance. Results for total sell-off intensity 
and strategic sell-off intensity remain insignificant. For program sell-offs, results provide initial 
evidence for an s-shaped performance relation. Model 9b reports the results of including all 
three terms. The normal term (b = -0.13, p = 0.06), the squared term (b = 0.78, p = 0.04) and 
the cubic term (b = -0.91, p = 0.08) reach all significance at the 10%-level (for a graphical 
depiction see Figure 2-7). The results are intriguing. They provide initial evidence that a 
program needs to divest a minimum proportion of a firm in a focal year for sell-offs to be 
positively associated with post-divestiture performance. At the same time, they indicate that 
little divestment or too much divestment can be negatively related to performance. However, it 
should be noted that only a handful of firms reach sell-off levels close to or above 45% of firm 
size as part of a program in a given period (see Table 2-3). 
Supplementary analyses 
To supplement the main analysis and control for robustness, I ran a number of variations of the 
main regression. First, I varied the sell-off intensity variable. I repeated the regression with a 
minimum size threshold for divestitures to be included in sell-off intensity of 0.13% (see Table 
Figure 2-7: Relationship between program sell-off intensity and post-divestiture ROA based 
on Model 9b. 
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2-4), the upper boundary of the first quartile of the divestiture size distribution. Results are 
robust under this variation. Further, the regression was repeated with the number of sell-offs as 
predictor variable instead of sell-off intensity. I ran three variations and counted either all sell-
offs in the focal period, sell-offs larger than 0.13%, or larger than 0.48%. Model 6b is not 
significant. Model 7b is only significant for the 0.48% threshold. Model 8b maintains its 
significance in all three variations. Second, I varied the experience variable to include either all 
transactions or those that exceed a lowered size threshold of 0.13% instead of 0.48%. Results 
are robust – Model 6b remains significant. Next, the operationalization of experience changed 
from quantity to a dummy variable, taking a value of one if a firm had divested at all in the 
previous five years. Results are not significant. Further, I varied the experience horizon to 
reflect sell-off activity above the threshold of 0.48% of only the three years prior to the focal 
period instead of five years. Model 7b remains significant, and in Model 6b the direction of 
coefficients is robust. Fourth, the direction of results is robust to changing the performance 
measure to return on sales (ROS) and return on capital employed (ROCE). Fifth, I included a 
product diversification variable, which was not part of the main model due to poor data quality. 
Results are robust against the inclusion of product diversification. Sixth, results are robust when 
including a dummy variable for a firm’s change from local to IFRS reporting.  
In addition, I ran several robustness tests on the fixed-effects regression. The null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg, modified Wald-test) was clearly rejected. 
Further, clustered robust standard errors were estimated to account for both heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation. Log-Likelihood tests were employed to control for an increase in model 
fit comparing models for total sell-off intensity with Model 1, models for strategic sell-off 
intensity with Model 3, and models for program sell-off intensity with Model 5. The χ2 statistic 
is significant for Model 4b compared to Model 3, and for Models 6b, 7b, and 8b compared to 
Model 5. Also, the χ2 statistic is significant for Model 4b compared to Model 4a, Model 6b 
compared to Model 6a, 7b compared to 7a, as well as 8b compared to 8a, confirming the 
increase in model fit for these models through the inclusion of the interaction terms. Further, 
variance inflations factors (VIFs) were calculated to test for multicollinearity (see Table 2-5). 
Average VIFs were below four for all models. Only for firm size, the VIF took a value higher 
than 10. Given the firm size’s role as a control variable without research interest, the increased 
VIF is unlikely to have severe consequences for model design and predictive power. Also, 
unsurprisingly, the self-moderated terms in models 9a and 9b exhibited inflated VIFs. 
 
 34 
2.4.2 Event study analysis 
In addition to the fixed-effects analysis, I assessed the magnitude of abnormal returns for sell-
off announcements and differentiated between program and non-program sell-offs.  
Table 2-6: CAAR over different event windows 
Market Model 
Event 
window 
Total (in %) Program sell-offs (in %) Non-Program sell-offs (in %) 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
-1 to 0 0.94 *** *** 54.55 ** 0.97 *** ** 56.74 * 0.90 *** * 51.77 - 
0 0.99 *** *** 56.43 *** 0.93 *** *** 58.43 *** 1.06 *** *** 53.90 *** 
-1 to 1 1.10 *** *** 52.66 ** 1.09 *** ** 53.37 * 1.11 *** ** 51.77 - 
-1 to 2 1.09 *** *** 55.49 ** 1.28 *** *** 56.18 ** 0.86 *** - 54.61 - 
-1 to 3 1.08 *** *** 53.29 - 1.34 *** ** 52.25 * 0.74 *** - 54.61 - 
-1 to 4 1.15 *** ** 51.72 - 1.52 *** ** 51.69 - 0.68 ** - 51.77 - 
-1 to 5 1.09 *** ** 53.29 - 1.57 *** ** 53.37 - 0.48 * - 53.19 - 
 
Fama-French-3-Factor Model 
Event 
window 
Total (in %) Program sell-offs (in %) Non-Program sell-offs (in %) 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
-1 to 0 0.93 *** *** 52.04 ** 0.94 *** ** 53.93 ** 0.92 *** - 49.65 - 
0 1.04 *** *** 57.68 *** 0.98 *** *** 58.99 *** 1.11 *** *** 56.03 *** 
-1 to 1 1.13 *** *** 55.80 *** 1.08 *** ** 56.74 ** 1.18 *** ** 54.61 - 
-1 to 2 1.06 *** *** 53.61 ** 1.18 *** *** 55.06 ** 0.91 *** - 51.77 - 
-1 to 3 1.01 *** ** 54.23 - 1.23 *** ** 55.06 * 0.72 ** - 53.19 - 
-1 to 4 1.06 *** ** 51.41 - 1.34 *** ** 53.93 - 0.71 ** - 48.23 - 
-1 to 5 0.96 *** * 54.55 - 1.28 *** ** 54.49 - 0.55 * - 54.61 - 
Note: The table shows average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in % 
based on a Market Model and a Fama-French-3-Factor Model. The estimation was based on a window of 120 
days prior to 10 days before the announcement. The sample of 319 divestitures undertaken by 98 firms comprises 
all those divestitures from the initial sample that were announced within fiscal periods 2000 to 2014, for which 
the deal value exceeded a threshold of EUR 50M or 5% compared to enterprise value, and for which no 
confounding event was identified. 178 transactions were attributed to a divestiture program, whereas 141 
divestitures were classified as stand-alone transactions. Positive denotes the share of events exhibiting positive 
CAR. Statistical significance was tested using the Patell (1976) z-test, the cross-sectional z-test as proposed by 
Boehmer et al. (1991) and the generalized sign test, according to Cowan (1992). 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2-6 reports the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) obtained from the Market 
Model (MM) and the Fama-French-3-Factor (FF3F) Model for a sub-sample of 319 transactions 
of the initial analysis. On average sell-offs create wealth. CAAR for program sell-offs are 
slightly lower on the event day and the following day (CAARP, MM, -1, +1 = 1.09%, CAARP, FF3F, 
-1, +1 = 1.08%) compared to non-program sell-offs (CAARNP, MM, -1, +1 = 1.11%, 
CAARNP, FF3F, -1, +1 = 1.18%). CAAR including the subsequent days are greater and increase for 
program sell-offs (CAARP, MM, -1, +5 = 1.57%, CAARP, FF3F, -1, +5 = 1.28%). In contrast, the wealth 
effects of non-program sell-offs diminish over time (CAARNP, MM, -1, +5 = 0.48%, 
CAARNP, FF3F, -1, +5 = 0.55%). However, conservative two-tailed tests rejected a significance of 
the difference in CAAR between program and non-program sell-offs. 
Table 2-7 provides the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (ABHAR) to the divesting 
firms. ABHAR is positive for a 250-day holding period before the event and found to increase 
thereafter. The significance of BHAR varies across holding periods based on the bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-test (Lyon et al., 1999). 
Divesting firms perform slightly lower in the second year (ABHAR250, 500 = 3.01) after the sell-
off compared with their performance prior to the sell-off (ABHAR-250, 0 = 4.78). The returns in 
the first (ABHAR0, 250 = 6.22) and third year (ABHAR500, 749 = 6.82) exceed prior performance.
Table 2-7: ABHAR over different holding periods 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Holding 
period in 
days 
Total (in %) Program sell-offs (in %) Non-Program sell-offs (in %) 
ABHAR Positive Skewness-adjusted 
t-test 
(Lyon et al., 1999) 
ABHAR Positive Skewness-adjusted 
t-test 
(Lyon et al., 1999) 
ABHAR Positive Skewness-adjusted 
t-test 
(Lyon et al., 1999) 
0 -250 to 0 4.78 52.49 ***  4.63 48.19 *  4.92 56.12 **  
1 0 to 250 6.22 53.59 -  9.26 53.01 -  3.65 54.08 ***  
2a 0 to 500 9.33 51.38 *  7.10 50.60 -  11.21 52.04 *  
2b 250 to 500 3.01 51.93 ***  -0.86 49.40 -  6.29 54.08 ***  
3a 0 to 750 13.52 56.91 -  6.69 51.81 -  19.30 61.22 -  
3b 500 to 750 6.82 52.49 ***  4.93 50.60 -  8.41 54.08 ***  
Note: The table shows the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (ABHAR). The sample consists of 181 
divestitures after controlling the initial transaction sample of 319 divestitures for overlapping 750-day holding 
periods. 83 transactions were attributed to a divestiture program, whereas 98 divestitures were classified as stand-
alone transactions. Positive denotes the share of events exhibiting positive BHAR. Returns for each holding period 
are calculated including shown starting day and excluding the ending day of a period.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 as derived from the bootstrapping procedure suggested by Lyon et al. (1999). 
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ABHAR for the first year is largest for firms that undertake program sell-offs and increase 
compared to the control period (ABHARP, -250, 0 = 4.63, ABHARP, 0, 250 = 9.26). For non-program 
sell-offs ABHAR is found to decrease in the first year (ABHARNP, -250, 0 = 4.92, 
ABHARNP, 0, 250 = 3.65). For the two- and three-year period after a sell-off, firms that undertook 
non-program sell-offs (ABHARNP, 0, 500 = 11.21, ABHARNP, 0, 750 = 19.30) outperform those that 
divested as part of a program (ABHARP, 0, 500 = 7.10, ABHARP, 0, 750 = 6.69). However, the 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test rejects the significance of the BHAR of program 
sell-offs. For non-program sell-offs, ABHAR for the one- and two-year period is significant. 
Given that these first analyses did not consider contingency factors, an additional OLS 
regression with robust standard errors was run (see Table 2-8). Cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) based on the MM for different event windows were set as dependent variables. As 
independent variables, I considered sell-off experience, a program dummy, and deal value as 
the relative size divested (e.g., Owen et al., 2010). These unreported results show a highly 
positive and significant relation between size divested and CAR. Experience is not found to be 
a significant predictor. The program dummy is not significant itself, but it is a significant 
positive moderator of deal value for CAR-1, +4 and CAR-1, +5. Thus, it magnifies the effect of 
Table 2-8: Results of OLS regressions with different CAR as the dependent variable 
Returns CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
Event window -1 to 1 -1 to 2 -1 to 3 -1 to 4 -1 to 5 
Sell-off experience 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Program dummy 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Deal value (rel. 
size divested) 
0.12 *** 0.10 *** 0.12 *** 0.08 ** 0.13 *** 0.09 * 0.15 *** 0.08  0.15 *** 0.07  
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
Deal value x 
program dummy 
-  0.07  -  0.11  -  0.13  -  0.21 * -  0.24 * 
  (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.10)    (0.13)    (0.14)  
Constant 
0.00  0.01 ** 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  -0.01  0.01  
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
N 304  304  304  304  304  304  304  304  304  304  
R2 0.10  0.11  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.10  0.06  0.09  
Adj. R2 0.10  0.10  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.06  0.09  0.05  0.08  
F-value 5.30 *** 5.22 *** 4.07 *** 4.10 *** 3.30 ** 2.90 ** 2.70 * 2.35 * 2.60 * 2.09 * 
Root MSE 0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.07  
Note: The dependent variable is the CAR based on a MM. The estimation was based on a window of 120 days 
prior to 10 days before the announcement. 15 transactions from the original sample of 319 divestitures were 
dropped, given that the dataset did not allow for the construction of sell-off experience based on the five previous 
years. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Similar models for BHAR failed to reach overall 
significance. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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deal value. In unreported models, I repeated the regression for BHAR. However, the overall 
significance of the models was low. Also, I repeated the main fixed-effects regression with the 
sample of 98 firms from which the 319 transactions for the event study are drawn. Results are 
robust and support the main analysis. 
To test for significant differences in the performance measures, I applied Spearman’s (1904) 
rank correlation coefficients (see Appendix 2-2). This nonparametric test allows for the 
measurement of both linear and non-linear relationships. Generally, the correlation across 
measures is low. Across measures, only CAR-1, 5 is found to share a significant and positive, 
yet, very limited correlation with BHAR0, 250, and BHAR0, 500. 
2.5 Discussion 
This study examines the performance and experience effects of sell-offs in a longitudinal 
setting, considering both strategy and structure.  
I find no significant effect of total sell-off intensity on post-divestiture ROA. This is in line with 
the recent study of Vidal and Mitchell (2018). However, the results stand in contrast to other 
recent research, which identifies a significant positive relationship (Brauer et al., 2017). It 
should be noted that firms in this study exhibit a by far higher sell-off activity of, on average, 
1.26 divestitures in each focal period compared to 0.56 in the study of Brauer et al. (2017). 
Also, given that the sample of this study is drawn from the 600 largest European firms by market 
capitalization, the average firm in this sample is likely considerably larger. Thus, for many 
firms in the sample of this study, divesting is part of day-to-day operations and professionalized 
portfolio management.  
With regard to sell-off experience, this study does not find significant positive performance 
effects. Even more, concerning sell-offs undertaken as part of a divestiture program, I find 
evidence for a negative experience effect. Thus, the findings advance other research in this 
field, which has identified a positive and significant relation for sell-offs in general (Bergh & 
Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017; Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019). However, as stated in the 
literature review, research on the relation between divestiture experience and performance is 
scarce and has only recently been adopted by scholars. In contrast, the many studies on the 
relation of experience and performance in the context of acquisitions showed mixed results (cf. 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Laamanen & Keil, 2008). They have found either a positive 
(Fowler & Schmidt, 1989), a negative (Kusewitt, 1985), none at all (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 
1987), or an u-shaped relation (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). 
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As presented in the previous section, results for strategic or non-strategic sell-offs are 
insignificant. However, there is a strong theoretical argument that a strategic move or action 
should be superior to a non-strategic one. This is supported by the findings of prior research 
concerning refocusing (Berger & Ofek, 1999). Thus, the issue is most likely to be found in the 
classification of strategic and non-strategic sell-offs. Analysis of the sample shows that 49.7% 
of the number of sell-offs between 2000 and 2014, and 77.9% of sell-off intensity are marked 
as strategic. This classification is based on explicitly announced motives such as a focus on 
core assets, the disposal of non-core or non-strategic assets, or the implicit linkage to a broader 
strategy or a program with such an objective. The classification may be biased in a way that 
corporate language as part of a professionalized portfolio management may tend to classify 
most and especially large sell-offs as a sale of non-core or non-strategic assets. 
The findings concerning program sell-offs add to a more differentiated view when examining 
the performance relationship of divestitures. In contrast to classifying a sell-off as strategic, the 
program classification sets a higher threshold. Only 39.0% of sell-offs are explicitly linked to 
a program, translating to 52.2% of sell-off intensity. The finding of a negative moderating effect 
of program experience and program sell-off experience on program sell-off intensity suggests 
that a potential learning transfer is outweighed by the negative performance associated with 
years of restructuring or inherent to firms undergoing a program. The more years a firm has 
been undergoing divestiture programs and the more program sell-offs it has already undertaken, 
the more detrimental is the impact of program sell-off intensity on post-divestiture performance. 
Further, the completion of a firm’s program efforts is found to be a positive moderator of the 
effect of program sell-off intensity on post-divestiture performance. In this vein, it should be 
noted that divestiture programs are in many cases undertaken as part of restructuring efforts, 
the ending of which often marks a firm’s return into more shallow and stable waters. Thus, the 
presence of a divestiture program does likely entail some information with regard to a firm’s 
health status. While several of the included control variables account for a firm’s health, some 
degree of information could have been accounted neither for in the control variables nor in the 
unobserved fixed-effects. While I identify no linear relationship between program sell-off 
intensity and post-divestiture performance, the results show initial evidence for an s-shaped 
relation. Prior longitudinal research has described the performance relation of divestitures and 
sell-offs in general as strictly linear and found divestiture to have a positive performance effect 
irrespective of the amount divested (e.g., Brauer et al., 2017; Haynes et al., 2002). The findings 
of this study suggest that this does not necessarily hold for sell-offs that are part of a divestiture 
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program. This underscores the negative impact of program-related experience and underscores 
the downsides of program sell-offs with regard to performance. An s-shaped relation implicates 
that a divestiture program needs to be sufficiently large and material to result in a positive effect 
on performance. It suggests that little divestment may do more harm than good to performance. 
Further, divesting substantial parts of a firm can be detrimental to performance, e.g., in an 
extreme shift of corporate focus. Also, programs may be initiated in an effort to reduce heavy 
debt burdens. In such a context, a firm may act more opportunistic than strategic and sell off 
units to cater to immediate debt needs instead of carefully considering the long-term 
performance effects.  
Given the insignificant relation of total sell-off intensity and post-divestiture performance, 
shareholder wealth effects are measured. Indeed, the event study shows significant and positive 
CAAR for sell-offs. This is in line with prior research (cf. Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Lee & 
Madhavan, 2010; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). Both the MM and FF3F Model find wealth effects 
for non-program sell-offs to be higher on the event day itself and the following day. However, 
while the wealth effects of non-program sell-offs sharply diminish thereafter, returns for 
program sell-offs are persistent and increase over time. Non-program transactions should, in 
general, come as more of a surprise to the market, explaining higher returns on day zero and 
one. For program sell-offs, the market has likely already incorporated some reaction to a 
program before the announcement of one of the program’s components. As the market further 
processes the information and gains a greater understanding of the sell-offs’ circumstances, the 
surprise effect of non-program sell-offs then seems to diminish, whereas program sell-offs are 
received more favorably. The general direction of results supports prior findings on superior 
abnormal returns of program divestitures (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). However, the difference 
in return between program and non-program sell-offs, as identified in this study, is not 
significant. Also, an OLS regression finds a program dummy itself to have no significant effect. 
However, its moderating effect of deal value, the strongest predictor for CAAR, is significantly 
positive for longer event windows. Thus, providing partial support for greater wealth effects of 
program sell-offs.  
Long-term shareholder wealth effects are positive for sell-offs, though only partially significant. 
Positive long-term wealth effects are in line with prior literature (Hanson & Song, 2003). 
ABHAR increases for all sell-offs and when differentiating between program and non-program 
sell-offs in the first year, with program sell-offs yielding a higher ABHAR. In years two and 
three, ABHAR is higher for firms that undertake non-program sell-offs. However, only non-
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program sell-offs are significantly positive, based on Lyon et al.’s (1999) bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic. Results are in line with the main analysis. As discussed before, 
many firms that divest as part of a program often undergo extensive restructuring for multiple 
years to follow. The results of the fixed-effects regression have shown that the more a firm has 
divested as part of a program and the longer it has undergone divestiture programs, the less 
likely is an increase in post-divestiture performance. However, it should be noted that 
skewness-adjusted significance strongly varies over the different holding periods.  
A comparison of the different performance measures applied in the main and supplementary 
analysis of this study shows little correlation across measures. This finding stresses the 
importance and the impact the chosen performance measure can have on the results of 
divestiture research.  
2.5.1 Theoretical and practical implications 
This study adds in several meaningful ways to divestiture research. First, it adds to the emerging 
stream of research that assumes a process perspective and leaves behind the transactional 
understanding of divestiture (e.g., Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017; Brauer & Schimmer, 
2010; Damaraju, Barney, & Makhija, 2015; Moschieri & Mair, 2011; Thywissen, Pidun, & 
Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2018). Results add to a more nuanced analysis of divestiture performance 
and experience effects in considering the two contingencies of motive and structure.  
Second, with regard to structure, the results of this study demonstrate the importance of 
considering the program nature of divestitures and provide a substantial extension of the limited 
prior research in this area (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). The study differentiates between 
program and non-program sell-off effects in a longitudinal setting and provides further evidence 
on the differences in shareholder wealth effects based on the program character of divestitures.  
The third contribution is the consideration of the strategic motive of the seller. While results do 
not confirm the significance of strategic divestitures, the study adds to earlier research on 
strategy and motives of divestitures (e.g., Markides, 1995; Montgomery & Thomas, 1988).  
Fourth, with regard to experience, it answers the explicit calls of research to consider the 
aforementioned contingencies and challenges the results of prior research on the experience-
performance relation of divestitures (e.g., Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017).  
Last, it contributes to the mature field of divestiture performance research in adding a pan-
European and cross-industry setting to a field which has except for few notable exceptions 
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primarily been focused on the US, UK, and single-industry settings (Brauer et al., 2017; Lee & 
Madhavan, 2010; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). The findings of this study provide initial and weak 
evidence for a non-linear relationship between divestiture and post-divestiture accounting 
performance when it comes to divestiture programs. Thus, they add to and challenge the 
existing research on accounting performance that has identified this relationship to be strictly 
linear (e.g., Brauer et al., 2017; Haynes et al., 2002).  
This study also provides valuable insights to practitioners concerning divestiture programs. It 
was previously argued that firms should divest in a structured, deliberate, and proactive manner 
(Dranikoff et al., 2002; Mankins et al., 2008). The results of this study highlight that the 
liberating impact and potentially positive effect of divestitures on performance, as identified in 
prior literature, may diminish after many years of intensive divestment. Further, managers have 
to make sure to free sufficient resources and initiate real change. At the same time, they have 
to careful not to overwhelm their organization and not to introduce too high levels of uncertainty 
and complexity associated with too much change, e.g., when selling the main business of a firm 
and focusing on a smaller high-growth segment.  
2.5.2 Limitations and future research 
This study is subject to multiple limitations and opens avenues for future research. First, the 
results imply that future divestiture research should further explore and test the possibility of a 
non-linear performance relationship, the existence of experience effects, and program effects.  
Second, future studies should test the generalizability of results in different geographic and 
industrial settings. This study takes a European perspective, while most prior research has 
focused on the US. Future research could, for example, test results in global or other regional 
settings. Divestiture research (e.g., Haynes et al., 2002) has deliberately excluded industries 
based on data comparability such as the financial services or real estate industries. It would be 
valuable to explore similar research questions in longitudinal settings for those industries.  
Third, the clustering of the transactions obtained from the SDC database as program or strategic 
sell-offs is based on firm announcements and, in many cases, other primary or secondary 
coverage. This does require not only an explicit communication of the rationale or program but 
also the availability of the original coverage. However, due to the length of the panel, primary 
sources such as a firm’s press archives were not readily available for earlier periods. Thus, 
operationalization often relies on secondary sources and databases and the prerequisite that 
these provide sufficient and complete coverage for those periods. Future research can diminish 
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this issue by focusing on markets where official disclosure is required and stored, or by focusing 
on shorter, more recent periods. While M&A databases provide additional information, such as 
the deal synopsis in SDC or announcement documents for more recent deals in Zephyr, these 
mostly take the perspective of the acquirer and only seldom that of the seller.  
A fourth limitation is that sell-offs are operationalized as relative firm size divested based on 
unit sales, transaction price, unit assets, and unit employees. This approach is chosen as not 
deliberately to exclude transactions. While lack of transaction financials and unit data is a well-
known issue (Haynes et al., 2002; Nanda & Narayanan, 1999), an ideal setting should be based 
on either one of the size alternatives, preferably, unit sales or transaction price.  
Fifth, the insignificant results concerning total sell-off experience challenge previous research. 
Further work is necessary to confirm or repel experience effects on performance. When 
assessing experience, one difficulty that emerges is how to operationalize experience. 
Following prior research, I operationalize experience as the number of previous sell-offs (Bergh 
& Lim, 2008). At the same time, I acknowledge this difficulty and vary both the year and size 
thresholds for sell-offs to be considered. However, the results remain robust. Future research 
should test further variations of experience. 
2.5.3 Conclusion 
This study finds significant performance and experience effects for sell-offs that form a 
divestiture program. The results suggest that a potential learning transfer from program sell-
offs is outweighed by the negative performance associated with years of restructuring or 
inherent to firms undergoing a divestiture program. Thus, the study contributes to research on 
the performance effects of divestiture experience and challenges prior research that has found 
this effect to be generally positive (Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017; Humphery-Jenner 
et al., 2019). Further, initial evidence suggests that it may be decisive for program sell-offs in 
a focal period to be substantial enough in size for a performance effect to be positive. At the 
same time, it suggests that while divestiture programs can lead to improved performance, they 
do not serve as a universal solution to improve firm performance. Overall, the results indicate 
that frequent divestiture programs can be detrimental to long-term performance and that the 
completion of a divestiture program marks the entering of more shallow and stable waters. 
Finally, the results stress the importance of considering divestiture programs in divestiture 
research. Further research is necessary to confirm the insignificant results concerning sell-offs 
in general and strategic sell-offs.  
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2.6 Appendix 
Appendix 2-1: Means, standard deviations and correlations 
  
 
Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Firm performance 0.08 0.07 1.00* 
          
  
2. Total sell-off intensity 0.02 0.07 -0.08* 1.00* 
         
  
3. Strategic sell-off 
intensity 
0.02 0.06 -0.06* 0.93* 1.00* 
        
  
4. Program sell-off 
intensity 
0.01 0.05 -0.06* 0.71* 0.73* 1.00* 
       
  
5. Total sell-off 
experience 
2.42 2.79 -0.12* 0.18* 0.17* 0.17* 1.00* 
      
  
6. Strategic sell-off 
experience 
1.76 2.38 -0.08* 0.17* 0.17* 0.17* 0.93* 1.00* 
     
  
7. Program sell-off 
experience 
1.37 2.48 -0.07* 0.15* 0.15* 0.18* 0.89* 0.90* 1.00* 
    
  
8. Program experience 0.91 1.32 -0.09* 0.18* 0.17* 0.21* 0.74* 0.75* 0.83* 1.00*      
9. Program end 0.08 0.27 -0.04 0.24* 0.27* 0.38* 0.18* 0.17* 0.20* 0.24* 1.00*     
10. Firm prior 
performance 
0.09 0.07 0.72* -0.11* -0.09* -0.08* -0.20* -0.17* -0.14* -0.16* -0.07* 1.00*    
11. Firm current ratio 1.48 0.74 0.16* -0.03 -0.03 -0.08* -0.09* -0.08* -0.10* -0.10* -0.06* 0.18* 1.00*   
12. Firm size 15.70 1.38 -0.15* -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.12* 0.07* 0.10* 0.14* 0.06* -0.21* -0.33* 1.00*  
13. Firm leverage 0.26 0.15 -0.05* 0.07* 0.04 0.07* 0.05* 0.01 0.03 0.05* 0.05* -0.09* -0.38* 0.19* 1.00* 
* p < 0.05 
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Appendix 2-2: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. CAR -1, 1 1.00        
2. CAR -1, 5 0.74*** 1.00       
3. BHAR 0, 250 0.09 0.18** 1.00      
4. BHAR 0, 500 0.09 0.12* 0.75*** 1.00     
5. BHAR 0, 750 0.09 0.12 0.75 0.83* 1.00    
6. ROA t+1 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 1.00   
7. ROA t+1, t+2 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.99*** 1.00  
8. ROA t+1, t+3 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.98*** 0.99*** 1.00 
Note: CAR based on the MM. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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3 THE DIVERSITY OF DIVESTITURE: WHEN FIRMS ANNOUNCE 
DIVESTITURE PROGRAMS AND ITS MARKET REACTION 
 
ABSTRACT 
Divestitures mark a substantial adjustment of a firm’s strategy. Based on a sample of 101 
European firms, this study examines when firms announce a divestiture program – a series of 
divestitures that share a common rationale – in contrast to a stand-alone divestiture and how the 
market reacts to the announcement of such a program. The results show that firms choose to 
announce divestiture programs when they are financially distressed or after a change in top 
management. I find the market reaction to divestiture program announcements to vary and to 
increase when a program value is disclosed – particularly for programs driven by a financial 
rationale or announced as part of a broader restructuring program. For programs with a 
refocusing rationale, the specification of assets is found to increase market returns.  
Keywords: divestiture programs (characteristics, antecedents, announcement returns), 
management turnover, financial distress, signaling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored by Florian Kiesel and Dirk Schiereck. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The causes and consequences of divestitures have already been well examined in literature (e.g., 
Brauer, 2006; Kolev, 2016; Lee & Madhavan, 2010; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). Most studies 
examine divestitures as “isolated, self-contained events” (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010: 85) or 
“one-off activities” (Mankins et al., 2008: 99). However, when firms adjust their strategy and 
restructure their portfolio of business units, they often engage in a series of transactions rather 
than single transactions (Bhabra et al., 1999; Bowman & Singh, 1993; Brauer & Schimmer, 
2010; Haynes et al., 2002; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Schipper & Thompson, 1983). A series of 
divestitures that share a common rationale constitutes a divestiture program. Divestitures that 
are part of a program are interrelated, coordinated, and strategically consistent (Brauer & 
Schimmer, 2010; Kronenwett, 2010). Divestiture programs can be clearly distinguished from 
stand-alone divestitures. In contrast to a single transaction, a series of transactions that are 
undertaken in a coherent manner marks a major adjustment of a firm’s strategy and, eventually, 
its portfolio of businesses. Further, in covering a more prolonged, often multi-year period, it 
signals a substantial commitment of management to the initiated change. Thus, it indicates a 
strategic rather than a tactical rationale (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). Prior research has only 
selectively examined divestitures as part of a series (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Brauer & Schimmer, 
2010). Berger and Ofek (1999) find refocusing programs to be often preceded by a corporate 
control event, and that abnormal returns for the related announcements are positive and 
significant. Brauer and Schimmer (2010) examine the market reaction to divestitures that are 
part of a program and find them to be superior to stand-alone divestitures. 
In this study, I analyze when firms decide to announce divestiture programs and its capital 
market reaction. Therefore, I collect a unique dataset of 148 divestiture programs announced 
by a cross-industry and cross-country sample of 101 European firms between 1997 and 2014. 
The study seeks to advance divestiture research in multiple ways. First, it provides a detailed 
description of the occurrence and rationales of divestiture programs. Second, it considers the 
diversity of divestiture by comparing when firms decide to announce a divestiture program in 
contrast to a stand-alone divestiture. Third, it examines the market reaction to programs by 
rationale and considers the degree of information disclosure in program announcements. 
Three primary program rationales emerge in this study. Programs are, to a similar extent, 
undertaken for financial motives in response to debt or liquidity concerns, out of a refocusing 
rationale in a move to exit specific industries or geographies, or out of a streamlining rationale 
aimed at cleaning up a firm’s business portfolio. The study acknowledges the multiplicity of 
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rationales in contrast to prior research that focused solely on refocusing (Berger & Ofek, 1999). 
Further, regarding the announcement timing, divestiture programs are found to either be 
announced solely, as part of a broader restructuring program, or as part of an acquisition. 
Overall, program announcements are found to often coincide with a firm’s results presentation. 
I consider a variety of antecedents to help explain a firm’s decision to announce a divestiture 
program in contrast to a stand-alone divestiture. I find that firms often choose to announce a 
program after a change in top management or when financially distressed. Thus, they seem to 
consider programs as the preferred choice when they face uncertainty and need to restore market 
trust. This confirms the proposition that programs mark major and likely more far-reaching 
changes than stand-alone divestitures. As such, they allow firms to restore financial health and 
serve as strong signaling to the market. Further, I acknowledge recent divestiture research and 
consider prior divestiture experience (e.g., Bergh & Lim, 2008; Peruffo et al., 2018) and 
industry waves (e.g., Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008). I find 
that only distant experience increases the likelihood of a divestiture program and that firms are 
less likely to announce a program after a divestiture wave in their primary industry.  
In line with prior divestiture research (cf. Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Lee & Madhavan, 2010), 
programs are found to result in positive abnormal returns. Returns and their drivers vary by 
program rationale. Generally, while program announcements often provide a strategic context, 
they may lack the specificity of stand-alone divestiture announcements. I draw on signaling 
theory to argue that the effectiveness of the seller’s signaling is dependent on the degree of 
information shared with investors and that the provision of sufficient information increases the 
credibility of a program. Indeed, communicating a program value is found to be a significant 
positive predictor of abnormal returns. The results suggest that it is primarily for programs with 
a financial rationale or those announced as part of a restructuring program, where program value 
increases the signaling effectiveness and credibility of a divestiture program. Further, for 
divestiture programs with a refocusing rationale, the results indicate that specifying the assets 
to be divested is found to predict positive abnormal returns significantly. 
This study is divided into five sections, including this introduction. The second section provides 
the theory and hypotheses. The third section describes the sample, presents the variables under 
study, and outlines the methods for analysis. The fourth section reports the results. The final 
section discusses the results, its implications, its limitations, and draws the conclusion.  
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3.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
In the following, I present the theoretical background to derive the research hypotheses. First, 
I elaborate on the effect of an array of antecedents of divestiture on a firm’s decision when to 
announce a program in contrast to a stand-alone transaction. Second, I discuss the relation 
between the provision of program specifics and the market reaction to program announcements.  
3.2.1 The decision between divestiture programs and stand-alone divestitures 
Prior literature has exhaustively discussed the antecedents of divestitures (e.g., Brauer, 2006; 
Kolev, 2016). However, it has mostly focused on stand-alone divestitures and has not examined 
the antecedents of divestitures programs, nor has it examined how antecedents differ between 
stand-alone divestitures and divestiture programs. Generally, literature has examined and 
identified antecedents of divestitures concerning governance, performance, strategy, and firm 
environment (Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996). In their study on refocusing firms, Berger and Ofek 
(1999) have come closest to examining the antecedents of divestiture programs. They examine 
firms that decrease diversification through divestiture, however, without differentiating 
between refocusing that involves single in contrast to multiple transactions. They find 
refocusing to be often preceded by a corporate control event such as a new CEO, compensation 
changes, shareholder pressure, or financial distress. I built on their findings and other 
antecedents that were examined in the context of stand-alone divestitures when differentiating 
between programs and stand-alone divestitures. Given that divestiture programs often mark a 
major adjustment of a firm’s strategy and its portfolio of businesses, I examined antecedents 
that are most likely to ignite such major changes: CEO turnover, new blockholder, financial 
distress, prior divestiture experience, and industry divestiture waves. 
CEO turnover 
The appointment of a new CEO often changes future corporate decision-making (Weisbach, 
1995). Research shows that CEO tenure is related to an economic investment cycle and that 
agency problems increase with tenure, spurring both overinvestment and inefficiencies (Pan, 
Wang, & Weisbach, 2016). Managerial decisions that do not consider the economic interests of 
a firm but serve personal interests, e.g., in the form of “empire building”, constitute managerial 
opportunism. Such opportunism can easily lead to disadvantageous situations, e.g., an overly 
diversified firm or the accumulation of debt as a consequence of too many or too large 
acquisitions (Haynes et al., 2002; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Markides, 1995). In such a situation, 
new CEOs will try to reverse errors from the past before they are attributed to them (Weisbach, 
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1995). Even if firms operate efficiently and are well-managed, new CEOs may want to clean 
their house to have a solid foundation for their policies. Research shows that this holds 
independent of whether a new CEO follows a successful but retiring or a poorly performing 
and fired predecessor (Weisbach, 1995). Further, the likelihood of significant changes in 
strategy is higher when a new CEO comes from outside the organization (Wiersema, 1992). 
Restructuring through divestitures is an option to reverse poor prior decisions (Haynes et al., 
2002). Prior studies on divestitures and refocusing unanimously identify a change in top 
management as an antecedent for divestment (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Feldman et al., 2016; 
Hayward & Shimizu, 2006; Pan et al., 2016; Shimizu & Hitt, 2005; Weisbach, 1995). Also, 
poorly performing acquired units are likely to be divested following a change in CEO 
(Weisbach, 1995). Accordingly, Pan et al. (2016) find the probability of divesting to increase 
sharply in the year of turnover, peak in the following year, and continuously decrease thereafter.  
The announcement of a divestiture serves as a strong and easily observable signal to 
stakeholders that the new CEO is in full control and is taking immediate action. This effect and 
the house-cleaning signal is likely even stronger if the new CEO announces a divestiture 
program and a full portfolio review instead of a single transaction. Further, in contrast to a 
stand-alone divestiture, the announcement of a program does not yet require the identification 
of specific assets to divest. Instead, it allows an outsider to signal immediate action to the firm’s 
stakeholders while at the same time granting time to reach a full understanding of the business 
portfolio. 
Hypothesis 3.1: Firms will engage in divestiture programs rather than stand-alone 
divestitures following the appointment of a new CEO. 
New blockholder 
Blockholders are shareholders that hold more than 5% of a firm's stock (Bergh et al., 2019). 
They are argued to serve as a monitoring instance and have a disciplinary effect on a firm’s 
management (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As such, they help to 
overcome agency problems and to align interests between shareholders and managers (Kolev, 
2016). New large shareholders may find themselves just as motivated as a new CEO to 
challenge inefficient strategies in an attempt to maximize the value of their holding. However, 
research also finds dividend payout rates to increase with blockholder ownership (Bethel & 
Liebeskind, 1993), suggesting that they may also be driven by short-term motivation when 
initiating divestments. When an investor enters a firm that is believed to be mismanaged and 
uses the power of his voting rights to exert pressure on managers and “influence the processes 
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or outcomes” of decision-making, he engages in what is termed “activism” (Chen & Feldman, 
2018; Ryan & Schneider, 2002: 555). Activist investors are typically hedge funds. Their 
behavior includes voting proxies to counter management positions, shareholder proposals, and 
frequent contact with a firm’s management (Ryan & Schneider, 2002). Other investors that 
actively engage with the management and its strategy are private equity funds, competitors, or 
strategic investors. In contrast, most of the blockholders that typically buy into large 
corporations are global asset management firms, banks, and other financial institutions. Prior 
research has offered mixed results concerning the impact of blockholders on divestiture 
decisions. In a meta-analysis on the antecedents of corporate divestitures, Kolev (2016) does 
not find an effect. In contrast, some studies have associated blockholder equity or shareholder 
pressure with an increased likelihood to divest (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Bethel & Liebeskind, 
1993; Hoskisson et al., 1994) and to favor spin-offs over other modes of divestiture (Bergh & 
Sharp, 2015).  
A new blockholder that exerts pressure on managers will likely do so in a targeted fashion to 
maximize the outcome of his actions. Thus, the investor is more likely to focus on specific units 
instead of initiating a wide-ranging program, whose outcome is difficult to foresee. This is also 
supported by Bergh’s (1995) finding that blockholder ownership is related negatively to size 
and relatedness of units sold, suggesting that blockholders favor the sale of small and unrelated 
units, whose impact on firm operations is more predictable and less disruptive. 
Hypothesis 3.2: Firms will engage in stand-alone divestitures rather than divestiture 
programs following the buy-in of a new blockholder. 
Financial distress 
A firm that is in financial distress and under pressure from its investors or its banks may 
consider restructuring through divestitures as a possible way out (Dranikoff et al., 2002; 
Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Indeed, financial distress has been described as the most 
prominent predictor for divestitures (Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996). Pressure on firm 
management may have exacerbated due to poor stock market performance, the incurrence of 
losses, or because the firm has accumulated sizeable amounts of debt. Research has argued that 
poor performance indicates organizational efficiency problems, whereas strong performance 
indicates the effectiveness of current strategies (Iyer & Miller, 2008; Johnson, 1996; Kolev, 
2016; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Other than organizational or financial restructuring, 
portfolio restructuring in terms of divestitures may then be an option to reduce efficiency 
problems or provide financial leeway (Hamilton & Chow, 1993; John & Ofek, 1995; Lang et 
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al., 1995). An overwhelming body of literature has linked divestiture to financial distress or 
poor performance (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Brauer, 2006; Chang, 1996; Duhaime & Grant, 1984; 
Feldman et al., 2016; Montgomery & Thomas, 1988; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Berger and 
Ofek (1999) find the occurrence of debt restructuring and Chapter 11 filing to be significantly 
higher for refocusing firms. Interestingly, while research has also found that low-performing 
firms can increase performance through divestitures, they have been found to still perform 
below competitors (Montgomery & Thomas, 1988; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018).  
When a firm is financially distressed, a single divestiture may not be enough to satisfy its 
financial needs and demands from investors and banks. In contrast, the announcement of a 
divestiture program signals action at times when action is demanded and allows reinstating 
corporate efficiency through systematically reviewing the portfolio. 
Hypothesis 3.3: Firms will engage in divestiture programs rather than stand-alone 
divestitures when they are in financial distress. 
Divestiture experience 
Learning theory argues that a firm's capability to perform an action increases as it accumulates 
knowledge and learns over time from repeatedly engaging in similar actions (Levitt & March, 
1988). Given that divestitures are complex events involving a multi-stage process, knowledge 
and learning from previous divestitures may help firms to master the complexity and increase 
their likelihood to divest again (Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer, 2006; Brauer et al., 2017; Kolev, 
2016). Indeed, a large body of literature has found that divestiture likelihood increases with 
divestiture experience (Kolev, 2016; Peruffo et al., 2018; Shimizu & Hitt, 2005; Villalonga & 
McGahan, 2005). It has been argued that the patterns established from prior experience create 
pressure for managers to follow in future decision-making (Kolev, 2016). On the contrary, firms 
that have never engaged in divestitures may not even consider them as a viable move at all 
(Shimizu & Hitt, 2005). The expectation of a positive performance effect as described by large 
parts of literature (e.g., Lee & Madhavan, 2010) and the confidence from prior experience 
should then increase the likelihood of management to divest again (Kolev, 2016).  
The frequency of divestitures in prior years does not only allow for inferences on a firm’s 
capability to divest in the future but also its need to do so. The opportunities for divestiture in 
a firm’s portfolio of businesses are naturally limited as long as divestitures are supposed to be 
in line with a firm’s strategy and to create value. Thus, while firms may still undertake single 
divestitures, recent divestitures should lower the need for a wide-ranging divestiture program. 
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Hypothesis 3.4: Firms will engage in stand-alone divestitures rather than divestiture 
programs based on their prior divestiture experience. 
Industry divestiture wave 
Acquisitions and divestitures alike often cluster within industries and occur in what has been 
termed “industry waves” (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; McNamara et al., 2008; Mulherin & 
Boone, 2000). Such waves are characterized by a sharp surge in the number of undertaken 
transactions. After some years with heightened transaction levels, their number drops back to 
pre-wave levels (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev, & Dykes, 2012; 
McNamara et al., 2008). Although, a number of explanations for acquisition waves have been 
discussed, the financial theory was so far unable to explain their occurrence satisfactory 
(Harford, 2005; Park, Morel, & Madhavan, 2009). Prior research has mostly examined the 
relation between industry waves and abnormal returns. It has found the timing or positioning 
of a firm’s restructuring moves to influence stock market reaction. Firms that divest at the peak 
of a wave have been found to receive the lowest abnormal returns (e.g., Brauer & Wiersema, 
2012; McNamara et al., 2008). Due to high levels of information asymmetry, firms that divest 
at a late stage of a wave will likely be perceived to imitate the behavior of their industry peers 
(Brauer & Wiersema, 2012). The decision for when a firm enters a wave has been argued to be 
shaped by their awareness for the firm environment, their motivation to act, and their capability 
to do so (Haleblian et al., 2012). Also, divestors are more likely to divest during industry merger 
waves given more favorable market conditions (Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019). 
While valuation during an industry divestiture wave is typically higher (cf. Humphery-Jenner 
et al., 2019), investors may react less enthusiastic to late movers suspecting them to act imitative 
or opportunistic rather than to improve a firm’s efficiency (cf. Brauer & Wiersema, 2012). 
Information asymmetry may hamper the liberating effect of a divestiture program on the stock 
market. Thus, firms may prefer other restructuring moves or stand-alone divestitures over 
divestiture programs at a late stage of an industry divestiture wave.  
Hypothesis 3.5: Firms will be less likely to engage in divestiture programs during a 
divestiture wave in their primary industry. 
3.2.2 The market reaction to divestiture program announcements 
Divestiture research has extensively examined divestiture wealth effects in the context of stand-
alone divestiture announcements and agrees that these effects are positive (cf. Brauer & 
Schimmer, 2010; Lee & Madhavan, 2010; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). Further, research has found 
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the market reaction to the announcement of individual divestitures that are part of a program to 
be superior compared to stand-alone divestitures (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). In analyses in 
Chapters 2 and 4, I compare program sell-offs and non-program sell-offs, I find abnormal 
returns for both to be significant. While returns for program sell-offs are higher, the difference 
is not significant. However, an OLS regression predicts a positive and significant effect of 
program affiliation on the market reaction in a consolidating industry (see Chapter 4). 
In contrast to stand-alone divestiture announcements, this study focuses on divestiture program 
announcements that will likely result in multiple divestitures. The effects of announcements 
that entail multiple divestitures have primarily been examined in the context of refocusing or 
downscoping moves of large US corporations during the 1980s (cf. Johnson, 1996). These 
studies find that such refocusing announcements that may or may not entail multiple 
transactions are rewarded with positive abnormal returns (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Markides, 
1992a; Slovin, Sushka, & Ferraro, 1995). This study extends the research scope beyond the 
refocusing rationale by also considering such moves that do not necessarily narrow a firm’s 
focus, such as streamlining or financial motives.  
A divestiture program is an interrelated, coordinated, and strategically consistent series of 
divestitures (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Kronenwett, 2010). In contrast to a single divestiture, 
divestiture programs often entail a significant change in strategy and signal a commitment to 
this change in terms of future transactions. When announcing a program, the firm antedates part 
of the signaling that would otherwise occur at the time of the individual divestitures’ 
announcements. Through a divestiture program announcement, a firm induces and commits to 
a coherent strategy for the subsequent individual announcements to follow. If the restructuring 
move signals such a coherent strategy, has an impact on future income, was not already 
expected before, and did not fall short of investors’ expectations, it should result in positive 
abnormal returns (Bowman & Singh, 1993).  
This study draws from signaling theory to explain the abnormal returns around divestiture 
program announcements. Signaling theory describes a behavior where “one party, the sender 
must choose whether and how to communicate (or signal) ... information, and the other party, 
the receiver, must choose how to interpret the signal” (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 
2011: 39). Thus, in signaling theory, a divestor’s behavior ultimately reduces information 
asymmetry by providing information to the uninformed investor. Research has also relied on 
screening theory to explain the functioning of information markets (Bergh et al., 2019). It 
focuses on the buyer-side and the usage of screens to reduce information asymmetry (Stiglitz, 
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1975, 1979). Bergh et al. (2019) argue that investors use screens to overcome information 
disadvantages in the context of divestitures, such as changes in blockholder equity. 
In the following, I focus on the information problems that arise with the announcement of a 
divestiture program. Given high levels of information asymmetry and ambiguity about the 
source of value creation, investors will likely find it challenging to assess the consequences of 
divestitures (Bergh et al., 2019; Brauer & Wiersema, 2012). This issue becomes even more 
pressing when firms announce divestiture programs in a state of uncertainty or when financially 
distressed. Divestiture announcements often lack financials (Haynes et al., 2002; Lee & 
Madhavan, 2010), and fail to reveal the motivation behind divestitures or conceal it behind 
professionalized corporate communications. However, while individual announcements call 
out the assets to divest, divestiture program announcements may not even reveal those and refer 
to unspecified asset sales.  
The quality and subsequent reception of the signal sent to the investors in the form of the 
program announcement will likely depend on what information concerning the scope and scale 
of the program is shared with the market. The provision of such data is what differentiates a 
credible divestiture program from an unspecific mulling of assets sales. If sufficient information 
is both provided and perceived positively by investors, it should be a predictor of market 
reaction. In particular, I examine program value, program length, and whether specific 
program assets were named, in terms of industries or business units. The sending of these 
signals comes at a certain cost to a firm in that they shape the future expectations of investors, 
who will ultimately hold the firm accountable to its commitment through the market valuation. 
Thus, a firm that is unable to fulfill what it announced will have to bear additional costs in terms 
of higher market return penalties. 
Prior divestiture research finds the deal value or transaction price and its declaration to be a 
predictor of abnormal returns in many instances (e.g., Afshar, Taffler, & Sudarsanam, 1992; 
Klein, 1986; Mulherin & Boone, 2000). Not disclosing a price can easily be interpreted as 
concealing unfavorable information (Haynes et al., 2002). The same should hold for divestiture 
program value. Many of the firms in the sample divest for financial reasons, e.g., debt 
reduction, liquidity, or profitability concerns. In such cases, the market may already anticipate 
a divestiture program and have expectations on its scope and scale. For the market reaction to 
be positive, the announced program value may not fall short of these expectations. Thus, the 
program value should play an even more pronounced role for programs undertaken out of a 
financial rationale. For such programs, the perceived commitment to successfully address a 
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firm’s financial issues is likely to increase with the provision of a program value. In the same 
vein, for programs announced with a refocusing rationale, the value to be divested should be of 
less importance than the refocusing move itself. 
Hypothesis 3.6: The provision of a program value is associated positively with the 
abnormal returns of a divestiture program; this effect is greater for programs with a 
financial rationale. 
For programs undertaken for a financial rationale or as one of multiple restructuring moves, it 
should be not only the provision of program value but also the size of it that signals 
commitment, allows inferences on its economic significance, and thus increases the credibility 
of such a divestiture program.  
Hypothesis 3.7: Abnormal return increases with the value of a divestiture program for 
programs that are announced as part of a restructuring program or are undertaken for a 
financial rationale. 
It the same vein, the provision of a timeline or program length should reduce information 
asymmetries. However, the importance of program length likely differs by program rationale. 
For programs with a financial rationale, the provision of program length should be less critical. 
The financial rationale itself does already imply a timely implementation of the program. On 
the other hand, for refocusing moves, which are often long-term oriented, the provision of a 
timeline may significantly increase the credibility of such an announcement. Thus, the 
provision of program length should be valued more positively in the context of refocusing: 
Hypothesis 3.8: Program length is associated positively with the abnormal returns of a 
divestiture program; this effect is greater for programs with a refocusing rationale. 
The naming of specific assets to be targeted by a program should add further value to the 
information quality of a divestiture program announcement. For programs driven by a 
refocusing rationale, it contributes to the credibility of a firm’s refocusing intent if specific 
assets can be named. For firms that divest out of financial motivations, the naming of specific 
assets should be less important than the mere fact that the firm is willing to divest exhaustively. 
Hypothesis 3.9: The naming of specific assets to be divested is associated positively with 
the abnormal returns of a divestiture program; this effect is greater for programs with a 
refocusing rationale. 
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3.3 Methods 
In the methods section, I describe the underlying sample, the employed measures, and the 
methods of analysis to test the research hypotheses. 
3.3.1 Sample 
The sample was drawn from the constituents of the STOXX Europe 600 in 2000. This index 
covers the largest European firms by market capitalization from a broad range of industries. 
Prior literature on divestitures has mostly focused on the US (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1999; 
Feldman et al., 2016), while more recent studies have also taken a European or global but 
industry-specific perspective (e.g., Bergh et al., 2019; Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). In line with 
prior literature, I excluded industries that allow for limited comparability of accounting data 
across industries: the financial industry, trading/ retail industry (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Haynes 
et al., 2002) and the regulated energy sector. The study covers divestiture program 
announcements in the period from 1997 to 2014. At least four consecutive years of data between 
1995 and 2014 were required for a firm to be included in the analysis.9 This resulted in a sample 
of 271 firms across Europe. Next, I systematically searched primary (e.g., press releases) and 
secondary sources (e.g., financial press, newswires) using the Factiva database for explicit 
announcements of divestiture programs. Divestiture programs are often also labeled as disposal 
programs or asset sales plans. To be considered in the analysis, a single announcement needed 
to refer to the divestiture of multiple units or assets, the divestiture of a certain amount of sales 
                                                             
9 Construction of variables required data for the two years prior to a focal year. Thus, a minimum of four years 
allowed for at least two observation periods. 
Figure 3-1: Development of divestiture programs over time 
 
Note: N=148, excludes follow-up announcements 
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or assets, or the general intent to restructure the business portfolio or parts thereof. Finally, a 
sample of 101 firms that have made 168 announcements for 148 divestiture programs between 
1997 and 2014 remained. Announcements peaked between 1999 and 2003 (see Figure 3-1). 
Program rationale 
Following a thorough analysis of the divestiture program announcements and their coverage by 
secondary sources, three program rationales stood out: financial motives, refocusing, and 
streamlining. These rationales are in line with prior literature on divestitures (Berger & Ofek, 
1999; Brauer, 2006; Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Hamilton & Chow, 1993; Montgomery et al., 
1984). Programs that are undertaken out of financial motives divest businesses or assets in 
response to debt or liquidity concerns, e.g., a struggling industrial conglomerate that tries to 
reduce its massive debt.10 Firms that divest out of a financial rationale may also intend to 
refocus through their program. In such a case, refocusing is considered a secondary rationale, 
with the primary rationale still being the financial motive (see Figure 3-2, dotted bar segments). 
Refocusing programs divest businesses or assets to exit specific industries or geographies and 
consequently increase the focus of the business portfolio, e.g., an industrial conglomerate 
exiting its chemicals business to focus on its engineering core. Prior divestiture research has 
also referred to refocusing as downscoping (e.g., Johnson, 1996) and framed divestitures that 
follow a refocusing rationale as strategic (Montgomery et al., 1984). Streamlining programs 
                                                             
10 All program announcements that referred concerning the usage of proceeds primarily to the reduction of debt or 
the restoring of cash flows are categorized as financially motivated programs. 
Figure 3-2: Divestiture programs by rationale 
  
Note: N=148, excludes follow-up announcements 
 58 
45
13
Initial 
announcem.
68
Indication 18
Update 24
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Sole announcement
65%
Part of restructuring
program announcem.
27%
Part of  acquisition
announcem.
8%
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
ro
g
ra
m
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
ts
 
divest businesses or assets as part of a portfolio review in a “housecleaning fashion as a means 
of ridding the firm of unwanted or undesired units” (Montgomery et al., 1984: 833) or with the 
intention of “clearing the decks” (Lee & Madhavan, 2010: 1352). In contrast to refocusing 
programs, streamlining programs do not imply exiting an industry or geography, e.g., a hotel 
conglomerate that announces to review and divest part of its hotel portfolio. In addition to the 
aforementioned rationales, programs may be linked to or directly follow a previous acquisition. 
Thus, the presented rationale may be a direct consequence of the acquisition. It may involve 
both acquired and previously owned units, e.g., a firm may refocus through both acquisitions 
and divestitures, a firm may divest to streamline its portfolio or to reduce its debt levels 
following a significant acquisition. 
Announcement types 
The context in which divestiture programs are announced varies and does so often with the 
program rationale. Three major divestiture program announcement types were identified: sole 
announcement, part of an acquisition announcement, and part of a restructuring program 
announcement (see Figure 3-3). In a sole announcement, the firm announces a divestiture 
program without the announcement of other restructuring moves. Based on the sample, those 
were clustered as initial announcement, indications, and updates. An initial announcement is, 
for example, the announcement to realize EUR 1.0 billion from divesting non-core assets over 
the next 12 months. When tracking programs back to their original announcement, it became 
apparent that firms often refer to indications or single statements made by their top management
Figure 3-3: Divestiture program announcements by announcement type 
  
Note: N=168, includes follow-up announcements 
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Table 3-1: Specifics of the largest divestiture programs in the sample 
Divestor Program 
name 
Year Primary 
program 
rationale 
Announcement 
type 
Program characteristics Description 
Program assets 
named 
Program 
value  
(in % to be 
divested) 
Expected 
proceeds  
(in EUR 
M) 
Sales to be 
divested  
(in EUR 
M) 
Program 
length  
(in 
months) 
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p
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Hays Sale of non-
personnel business 
2003 Refocusing Sole announcement Express mail delivery, 
document storage, goods 
distribution 
56 n/a 2200 n/a Strategic review of new CEO concluded 
insufficient linkages between divisions. Exit 
three divisions and focus on personnel unit. 
GEA/ MG Sale of chemicals 
business 
2003 Refocusing Sole announcement Dynamit Nobel AG, 
Solvadis AG 
46 n/a n/a 15 New strategy by new CEO to focus on 
engineering and exit chemicals. 
Alcatel-
Lucent 
Shift Plan 2013 Streamlining Part of a restructuring 
program announcem. 
Unspecified 44 1000 n/a 30 Three-year plan by new CEO incl. EUR 1B 
in unspecified asset sales & further measures. 
Lonmin Sale of coal 
business 
1999 Refocusing Sole announcement 
(Indication) 
Ashanti, coal interests 42 800 n/a n/a Focus on pure precious metals business and 
exit coal business and interests. 
Scottish & 
Newcastle 
Sale of pubs 2002 Streamlining Sole announcement Unspecified – 1,500 pubs 40 3500 n/a 10 Sale of up to 1,500 UK pubs with the 
possibility of a lease-back option. 
T
o
p
-5
  
b
y
 ex
p
ected
 p
ro
ceed
s 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
Sale of non-core 
assets 
2001 Financial 
motives 
Sole announcement 
(Indication) 
Real estate, cable assets, 
Sprint stake, etc. 
10 16500 n/a 10 Confirmation by a spokesperson that 
operations may be sold to reduce debt. 
Vivendi Vivendi debt 
reduction program 
2002 Financial 
motives 
Sole announcement Houghton Mifflin, others 10 10000 n/a 9 Program by new CEO to sell EUR 5B in 
assets amid pressure to restructure. 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
Sale of non-core 
assets 
2002 Financial 
motives 
Sole announcement Real estate, cable assets, 
minority stakes 
6 8500 n/a 14 Announcem. by new CEO to reduce debt 
through the sale of non-strategic assets. 
BT group BT transformation 
program 
2000 Financial 
motives 
Part of a restructuring 
program announcem. 
Unspecified 6 8200 n/a 12 Transformation program including GBP 5B 
disposals to to reduce debt by 2001. 
Rio Tinto Alcan acquisition 
financing 
2007 Refocusing Part of an acquisition 
announcement 
Alcan's packaging 
business, others 
13 7300 n/a n/a Exit packaging & others to finance part of 
the GBP 18.7B Rio Tinto-Alcan deal. 
T
o
p
-5
  
b
y
 sa
les to
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e d
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Thyssen 
Krupp 
Portfolio 
optimization  
2011 Financial 
motives 
Sole announcement Waupaca, Tailored 
Blanks, others 
23 n/a 10000 n/a Portfolio optimization initiative by new CEO 
to expand finan. base & increase flexibility. 
Siemens 10-Point-Program 1998 Financial 
motives 
Sole announcement 
(Update) 
Components businesses, 
IC copper com. cables, 
Siemens Nixdorf, others 
14 n/a 8700 n/a Update on portfolio measures of 10-Point-
Program to revitalize & restore profitability – 
overall DM 17B to be divested. 
Thyssen 
Krupp 
ThyssenKrupp 
disposal program 
2003 Financial 
motives 
Sole announcement Unspecified 19 n/a 7000 n/a Disposal of EUR 7B in a bid to further cut 
high debt levels bolstering finances. 
Fiat Sale of Magneti 
Marelli units  
2001 Financial 
motives 
Sole announcement 
(Indication) 
Unspecified - various 
Marelli units 
8 n/a 4500 n/a Review of options for the portfolio of Marelli 
to improve financial position. 
Unilever Sale of specialty 
chemicals 
1997 Refocusing Sole announcement Four specialty chemical 
businesses 
9 n/a 3600 6 Exit of specialty chemicals w/ sale of four 
units over the next three to six months. 
Note: Program value based on the sales to be divested or the expected proceeds relative to total sales or enterprise value at the end of the previous fiscal year 
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and not a detailed program announcement. In an indication, the CEO or CFO announces that 
the firm is considering divestitures or has initiated a portfolio review that may result in the 
divestment of assets yet to be identified, e.g., a CFO attends an investor meeting and announces 
that the firm is currently undertaking a portfolio review to identify assets for divestment. When 
a firm realizes that the announced scope is not broad enough, refines the original announcement, 
or adds more specifics, it announces a program update. A firm could, for example, announce 
that its previously outlined program will be extended for another 12 months and that the target 
will be increased to EUR 1.5 billion. Given that divestiture is not the only way to increase firm 
efficiency, firms may also resort to restructure in other ways. The decision to divest may then 
be announced as part of a restructuring program announcement among a bundle of various 
restructuring moves, e.g., a firm announces to tackle its massive debt load and profitability 
concerns, through divestitures, workforce reductions, and cost-cutting. In other cases, the intent 
to divest is announced as part of an acquisition announcement, e.g., a firm announces the 
acquisition of a major competitor and announces the divestment of units to refocus on its core 
or finance the acquisition. With regard to timing, the sample of this study showed that 
divestiture programs are often announced together with the firm’s quarterly or annual results. 
In fact, 48% of the divestiture program announcements in this study were made on the same 
day or as part of a firm’s results announcement. This was accounted for in the event study and 
the analysis of returns through variables explicitly considering the results announcements. 
Table 3-1 provides a perspective on the variety of the sample. It shows the largest divestiture 
programs in the sample. Respectively, it presents the five largest programs by relative program 
value and absolute value in terms of expected proceeds and sales to be divested.  
3.3.2 Measures 
In the following, I describe the variables to examine a firm’s decision when to announce a 
divestiture program and the capital market reaction to such announcements. All accounting data 
was taken from Worldscope, stock and market index data from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream, 
and divestitures from SDC. Program-specific characteristics were hand-collected based on the 
program announcements obtained from Factiva. Additional variables were compiled manually, 
as described below. 
The decision between divestiture programs and stand-alone divestitures 
The dependent variable for the first research question describes a firm’s choice between a 
divestiture program, a stand-alone divestiture, and non-divesting. Thus, it draws a clear 
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distinction to stand-alone divestitures. Divestitures program announcements were identified as 
described in the sample section. The 148 programs were undertaken over 146 firm periods. To 
avoid sample bias, follow-up announcements to a prior announcement were excluded if that 
prior announcement was already included in the study. For stand-alone divestitures, an initial 
list of sell-offs undertaken by the sample was obtained from SDC.11 Transactions needed to be 
flagged as a divestiture deal by SDC, be announced between 1997 and 2014 and eventually be 
completed. Further, I excluded the sale of non-operational assets such as property or buildings 
and divestitures, where the holding is not reduced to minority holding, e.g., the formation of a 
50/50 joint venture. These criteria were applied based on the SDC fields deal type and deal 
synopsis. Given that the sample included the largest European firms divesting is likely part of 
their organizational routines. To ensure that only substantial divestitures were included, I 
required each transaction to divest at least 5% of firm size.12 The median of the divested firm 
size of the 101 firms in the sample takes a value of 0.42% for all 2,641 transactions for which 
size was available. This confirms that most divestitures in the sample were rather small in size 
and supported setting a size threshold. To avoid the inclusion of divestitures that were part of 
the identified divestiture programs, I excluded divestitures in the year prior to and the two years 
past a divestiture program. Overall, I identified 152 divestitures that fulfilled the 
aforementioned criteria. They were undertaken over 142 firm periods. 
The independent variables describe those antecedents of divestiture whose effect on the 
decision between a divestiture program and a stand-alone divestiture was under examination. 
CEO turnover. The variable takes a value of 1 if the firm’s top executive changed in the focal 
or the previous year.13 Depending on the country and the firm, a top executive could either be 
the chief executive officer (CEO) or the executive chairman of the board of directors. To 
identify management changes, I built an executive database for the sample by systematically 
                                                             
11 I built on the divestiture sample presented in Chapter 2. 57 firms included in that prior study were also part of 
the current study. For the remaining 44 firms, I obtained new data from SDC. 
12 Prior literature has mostly measured divestiture size based on transaction price (e.g., Haynes, Thompson, and 
Wright, 2002) or unit sales (e.g., Pathak, Hoskisson, and Johnson, 2014). However, given the issue of incomplete 
transaction financials (Haynes et al., 2002; Nanda and Narayanan, 1999), I employed a multi-step approach to 
ensure a sample size as large as possible. Where available, I scaled unit sales data with the previous year’s parent’s 
sales to measure size. If sales were not available, I used based on their availability in the following order transaction 
price, including net debt, relative to previous year’s enterprise value, unit’s assets relative to previous’ year’s total 
assets, or divested employees relative to previous year’s total employees. 
13 Capturing CEO change and new blockholders in the previous and the focal year, assured that the variable also 
considers a proper period for programs announced at the end of a year. Applying this approach came closest to 
measuring the 360 days prior to the actual announcement. Given that the model compared firm periods, also those 
without any divestiture, it was not possible to operationalize CEO turnover relative to an announcement date. 
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searching primary (e.g., press releases) and secondary sources (e.g., financial press, newswires) 
using the Factiva database and filtering for the subject “management moves”. 
New blockholder. The variable takes the value of 1 if the firm received a new blockholder in 
the focal or previous year. Prior literature has considered shareholders with a holding greater 
than 5% to be blockholders (e.g., Bergh et al., 2019; Owen et al., 2010). Given, limited off-the-
shelf availability of ownership data for Europe and different disclosure requirements, I relied 
on three sources to build a comprehensive database: annual reports, Factiva, and Bloomberg. 
Annual reports served as a starting point to identify blockholders for the sample firms. Most 
firms reported shareholdings above 3% or 5% in their reports. Also, I systematically searched 
primary (e.g., press releases) and secondary sources (e.g., financial press, newswires) using the 
Factiva database and filtering for ownership changes. In a last step, I manually reviewed 
ownership changes through the Bloomberg Terminal, which lists institutional ownership by 
quarters for most of the periods covered in the observation period. To be considered, a new 
blockholder needed to take a stake above 5% of the share capital and voting rights. A threshold 
of 5% assures mandatory disclosure for all of the sample firms. Further, I required a new 
blockholder to hold a stake above this threshold for at least one year to be considered. As part 
of the supplementary analysis, I differentiated between passive and non-passive blockholders. 
Financial distress variables. I captured financial distress based on three measures: dividend 
cut, negative net income, and stock underperformance. Dividend cut takes a value of 1 if the 
dividend per share in the past fiscal year is lower than in the year before (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 
1999; Owen et al., 2010). Negative net income takes the value of 1 if a firm has reported a 
negative income in the past fiscal year (e.g., Feldman et al., 2016; Lang et al., 1995). Divestiture 
literature has previously considered prior stock performance as an indicator of financial distress 
(e.g., Owen et al., 2010). Stock underperformance was measured by calculating the cumulative 
excess returns for the two years prior to the focal period and ranking the firms.14 The excess 
returns were calculated by deducting the return of a reference index from the realized return. 
Given that the STOXX Europe 600, from which the sample was drawn, did not offer return data 
for the entire observation period, I choose the S&P Europe 350 as the reference index. The 
bottom quartile of firms was considered to underperform.15 
                                                             
14 In line with prior literature, I also measured stock performance as buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Owen, Shi, 
and Yawson, 2010). Results were robust. 
15 Prior literature has also considered interest coverage. I operationalized it to take a value of 1 if earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) relative to total interest expense (e.g. Bergh and Sharp, 
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Divestiture experience. I measured divestiture experience as the number of divestitures in all 
three years prior to the focal period (e.g., Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019). Further,  I included 
individual variables for each of the three years. The transaction needed to be a divestiture of 
operational assets and to capture the entire holding in a unit or reduce the holding to a minority. 
Again, I required divestitures to exceed a minimum size threshold to be included in the analysis. 
This ensured that each transaction offered meaningful learning opportunities for the 
organization. I required divestitures to be greater in size than 0.42%, the upper boundary of the 
second quartile of the divestiture size distribution. I used experience dummies for the proportion 
tests. 
Divestiture wave. The variable takes a value of 1 if the focal period is within an industry 
divestiture wave. In case no divestiture wave was identified for the respective industry and 
period, the variable takes a value of 0. Further, I differentiated in the same manner whether the 
focal period is before, at, or after the peak of a wave. An industry was defined as all firms 
sharing the same four-digit SIC code. To identify industry divestiture waves, I followed the 
methodology proposed by Brauer and Wiersema (2012). I filtered those industries of the sample 
firms that had at least one year in which more than 30 divestitures were undertaken.16 Next, I 
identified the peak of a wave as the year with the highest number of divestitures. The start of a 
wave was determined as the year where the number of divestitures was less than 50 percent of 
the peak number. The end was determined as the year where the number of divestitures declined 
by 50% compared to the peak (McNamara et al., 2008). McNamara et al. (2008) limit the length 
of waves to a maximum of six periods. Given that many of the waves identified in this study 
exceeded such a limit, I relaxed this constraint. However, to assure that these further waves 
constitute a substantial deviation from normal divestiture levels, I required their peak to reach 
at least double the level of the median divestiture amount in the respective industry. The non-
randomness of the identified divestiture waves was confirmed by applying the procedure 
developed by Harford (2005). The identified divestiture waves are outlined in Table 3-2. 
In line with prior literature, I included a number of control variables in the analysis and lagged 
them by one period: Firm current ratio, firm size, firm leverage, and year dummies. Firm 
current ratio is the level of slack resources and was operationalized as the firm’s current assets 
                                                             
2015; Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995) is less than three (Demiroglu and James, 2015). Given that, the variable 
exhibited a correlation of 0.75 with negative net income. I omitted the variable to avoid multicollinearity issues. 
Results are robust to replacing the negative net income with interest coverage, which itself is not significant. 
16 The announcement date was used to allocate a divestiture to a certain year.  
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over current liabilities (Feldman et al., 2016). Firm size was calculated as the natural logarithm 
of total assets (Bergh & Sharp, 2015; Brauer et al., 2017). Firm leverage was operationalized 
as total debt scaled by total assets (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Dickerson et al., 1997; Haynes et al., 
2002). I also considered year-dependent effects through year dummies (Brauer et al., 2017; 
Haynes et al., 2002).17 
The market reaction to divestiture programs 
The dependent variable for the second research question is the divestiture program market 
return. It was measured as the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on the three days surrounding 
a divestiture program announcement using event study methodology. For event studies to be a 
valid method of analysis, several criteria have to be fulfilled according to McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997): market efficiency, unanticipated event, no confounding effects. First, the study 
relied on a European sample. All firms were listed and traded on the most important stock 
                                                             
17 In unreported models, I also included previous year’s industry sales growth as a control variable to account for 
the industry environment (e.g., Haynes et al., 2002). Results were robust. 
Table 3-2: Identified industry divestiture waves in the sample 
SIC 
Code 
Industry Description Wave date 
range  
Peak 
year 
Total 
 
n 
First 
year 
n 
Peak 
year 
n 
Last 
year 
n 
2721 Periodicals: Publishing, Or 
Publishing And Printing 
1995-2003 2000 264 19 43 19 
2731 Books: Publishing, Or Publishing 
And Printing 
1997-2002 1999 175 14 45 21 
2899 Chemicals And Chemical 
Preparations, Not Elsewhere 
Classified 
1997-2002 2000 181 22 47 21 
4412 Deep Sea Foreign Transportation 
Of Freight 
1995-1998 1997 105 - 37 11 
4812 Radiotelephone Communications 1999-2004 2000 168 21 43 16 
4813 Telephone Communications, 
Except Radiotelephone 
1999-2008 2002 579 37 85 41 
7011 Hotels And Motels 1997-2002 1999 246 18 60 28 
  2009-2014 2010 268 24 66 - 
7376 Computer Facilities Management 
Services 
2004-2013 2006 256 17 34 14 
8748 Business Consulting Services, 
Not Elsewhere Classified 
2006-2014 2010 241 15 40 - 
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market in their respective countries at the time of the study and were subject to their 
communication regulations. Second, each announcement signaled new information to 
investors. I relied on Factiva to identify traces for program announcements and to track those 
back to the initial announcement. This has been the reason why “indications” were included in 
the sample. While an informed investor may anticipate a divestiture program in advance, this 
approach assured that it was neither discussed in primary nor secondary sources before the 
announcement. Third, I accounted for confounding effects in two ways. Divestiture programs 
are often announced in the context of and on the same day as other events such as results 
presentations, restructuring programs, or acquisitions. Results presentations and restructuring 
program announcements were accounted for through control variables in the main analysis. 
Acquisition announcements that included a divestiture program announcement were excluded. 
To eliminate further confounding effects, I adhered to the methods suggested by McWilliams 
and Siegel (1997). I excluded confounding events in the 5-day window around the 
announcement date using Factiva to screen the press coverage of a firm. After excluding 
acquisitions and confounded announcements, 144 out of 168 announcements remained in the 
final sample. Further, to account for the OLS regression’s sensitivity to outliers and avoid 
distortions, I winsorized the sample at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels based on the CAR (-1, +1) 
(e.g., Owen et al., 2010). 
The independent variables describe the program characteristics that were obtained from 
primary and secondary coverage of divestiture programs through Factiva. 
Program value dummy. Announced program value was measured as a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 if a program value was provided and 0 if no value was provided.  
Program value. The actual program value was calculated as the relative share to be divested. 
Based on the sales to be divested or the expected proceeds, the share was measured relative to 
total sales or enterprise value at the end of the latest prior fiscal year. For program updates, the 
increase in sales to be divested or expected proceeds was measured. For programs where no 
value was provided, the variable was set to a value of 0. As shown in Table 3-3, 68% of all 
announcements in the OLS sample stated a program value. On average, the announced 
programs divested 14.5% of firm size, and the median size was 9.8%. Thus, many of the 
programs likely altered a firm’s operations significantly. 
Program length dummy. Announced program length was measured as a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 if a timeline was provided. For the descriptives, shown in Table 3-3, the length was  
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measured in years. If programs were announced to be concluded within the next few months, it 
was measured as half a year. For programs that announced to be concluded by the end of the 
year, the remaining months’ share of the calendar year were measured. 60% of all announced 
divestiture programs in the OLS sample provided a timeline and were, on average, scheduled 
to run for 1.49 years or 18 months (see Table 3-4).  
Program assets named dummy. The variable captures whether the announcement names 
specific assets, industries, or geographies to be divested. This was the case for 89 
announcements or 62% of the OLS sample (see Table 3-4). For divestiture programs with a 
refocusing rationale, 91% of all announcements named specific assets to be divested.  
 
Table 3-3: Descriptive program characteristics 
Full sample  Total sample Financial 
rationale 
Refocusing 
rationale 
Streamlining 
rationale 
 N 
(% of 
sample) 
Avg. Min Me-
dian 
Max N 
(% of 
sample) 
Avg. N 
(% of 
sample) 
Avg. N 
(% of 
sample) 
Avg. 
Program value  
(as % of overall firm) 
 115 
(68%) 
14.2% 0.5% 9.5% 55.6% 53 
(76%) 
11.3% 37 
(65%) 
19.2% 28 
(58%) 
13.0% 
Program length  
(in years) 
 99 
(59%) 
1.49 0.33 1.17 4.17 48 
(69%) 
1.37 27 
(47%) 
1.32 27 
(56%) 
1.90 
Program assets named  104 
(62%) 
    38 
(54%) 
 52 
(91%) 
 19 
(40%) 
 
Value, length and 
specific assets provided 
 45 
(27%) 
    22 
(64%) 
 19 
(33%) 
 6 
(13%) 
 
Total sample  168     70  57  48  
 
OLS Sample  Total sample Financial 
rationale 
Refocusing 
rationale 
Streamlining 
rationale 
 N 
(% of 
sample) 
Avg. Min Me-
dian 
Max N 
(% of 
sample) 
Avg. N 
(% of 
sample) 
Avg. N 
(% of 
sample) 
Avg. 
Program value  
(as % of overall firm) 
 98 
(68%) 
14.5% 0.5% 9.8% 55.6% 45 
(79%) 
11.8% 30 
(65%) 
18.8% 23 
(56%) 
14.0% 
Program length  
(in years) 
 87 
(60%) 
1.49 0.33 1.17 4.17 40 
(70%) 
1.33 25 
(54%) 
1.34 22 
(54%) 
1.95 
Program assets named  89 
(62%) 
    31 
(54%) 
 42 
(91%) 
 16 
(39%) 
 
Value, length and 
specific assets provided 
 40 
(28%) 
    18 
(32%) 
 18 
(39%) 
 4 
(10%) 
 
Total sample  144     57  46  41  
Note: OLS sample excludes confounded events and acquisition announcements. 
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All information points were available for 40 observations or 28% of the OLS sample. 
Many divestiture programs are announced concurrently with other events. Thus, I included 
control variables to account for these cases and to avoid the reduction of sample size. The 
restructuring program dummy takes a value of 1 if the divestiture program was announced 
alongside other restructuring measures, e.g., workforce reductions, or cost-cutting. Three 
controls were included to account for the fact that close to half of all divestiture programs were 
announced on the same day as a firm’s results. Net profit negative takes a value of 1 in the case 
negative results were reported. Net profit change is the change in net profit for the reported 
period relative to the previous comparable period. I capped the variable at -100% and +100%. 
In case a firm changed from profit to loss, the variable was set to -100%. Coherently, when it 
changed from loss to profit, it was set to +100%. The variable takes a value of 0 if no results 
were reported. In addition, I included the firm control variables outlined for the first research 
question for those analyses where sample size allowed further variables, namely: Firm current 
ratio, firm size, and firm leverage. Further, in unreported models, dummy variables for the 
usage of the program proceeds were included (debt repayment, core/acquisitions, return to 
shareholders). However, their inclusion did not increase model fit. 
3.3.3 Data analysis 
Two approaches were applied to examine the decision between the announcement of a 
divestiture program and a stand-alone divestiture. First, proportion tests were used to test for 
equality of proportions for each independent variable between the years in which a divestiture 
program is announced with those years of a stand-alone divestiture and the non-divesting years. 
In addition, I also tested for equality of proportions between divestiture programs by a specific 
rationale (refocusing, streamlining, and financial) and all other divestiture programs. Second, a 
multinomial logit model was estimated to compare the effects of the independent variables on 
the likelihood to undertake a divestiture program or a stand-alone divestiture that was not part 
of a program against the base case of non-divesting.18 The application of the multinomial logit 
model is in line with prior divestiture research that has examined similar research settings (e.g., 
Damaraju et al., 2015; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018).  
The presented hypotheses with regard to the market reaction were tested through an event study 
analysis and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with cumulative abnormal returns as 
                                                             
18 The multinomial regression was fitted using STATA’s mlogit command. 
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the dependent variable. For the event study, I applied the Fama-French-3-Factor (FF3F) Model. 
In contrast to single-factor models, a multi-factor model allows capturing abnormal market 
performance more accurately. The FF3F regresses firm excess returns (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) over an 
estimation window with market excess returns (𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡), the differences in return of small 
and big firms measured by market capitalization (small minus big, 𝑆𝑀𝐵), and the difference in 
return between firms with a high book to market ratio and those with a low ratio (high minus 
low, 𝐻𝑀𝐿): 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 =  ∝𝑖+ 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  (1) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is a firm’s actual return on day t, 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the market return on day t and 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 is the risk-free 
return on day t. The estimation was based on a window of one trading year (255 days) prior to 
30 days before the announcement (e.g., Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; Depecik et al., 2014) 
The abnormal return 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 was calculated as the difference between the actual return and the 
expected return measured by the FF3F model: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝑟𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡)  (2) 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the event windows were calculated as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
.  (3) 
In the next step, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) was calculated as the 
arithmetic mean across all events. Statistical significance was tested using the parametric Patell 
(1976) z-test and cross-sectional z-test as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), as well as the 
non-parametric generalized sign test according to Cowan (1992). I obtained Fama/French 
European 3 Factors daily data for market return, SMB, HML, and risk-free return from Kenneth 
French’s Fama/French data library published by Dartmouth College.  
Next, to identify the impact of program characteristics on the market reaction, I ran a regression 
with cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. The analysis is based on a pooled 
cross-sectional sample, with some firms announcing multiple divestiture programs in the study. 
Prior divestiture research has highlighted the issue of unobserved heterogeneity in similar 
settings and proposed the application of a random-effects model, including firm-specific error 
terms (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012). For the sample of this study, a Hausman (1978) test rejected 
the consistency of a fixed-effects estimator, and a Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange 
multiplier test rejected the appropriateness of random-effects. Thus, I ran pooled cross-sectional 
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OLS regressions on the cumulative abnormal returns in the three days around an announcement. 
The application of an OLS regression to explain abnormal returns is a common practice in 
divestiture research (e.g., Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019; Owen et al., 2010). Also, I performed 
quantile regressions at the 25th quantile, the median, and the 75th quantile. This allows 
highlighting differences in the explanatory power of the variables at different points in the 
distribution of the cumulative abnormal returns (e.g., Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019).  
3.4 Results 
In the following, I present the results of the multinomial logit regression and proportion tests to 
analyze the decision between divestiture programs and stand-alone divestitures. Subsequently, 
the results of the event study and the respective OLS regressions to determine the drivers of the 
market reaction are provided. 
3.4.1 Multinomial logit regression and proportion tests 
Table 3-4 presents the proportions per antecedent for divestiture program years, stand-alone 
divestiture years, and non-divesting years and reports the results of z-tests for differences in 
proportions. Table 3-5 presents the same for different program rationales. Table 3-6 presents 
the correlations among the variables that are part of the multinomial logit model. The 
correlations suggested no multicollinearity problem.19 Table 3-7 reports the main effects of the 
multinomial logit models: the coefficients, the robust standard errors in the brackets below, 
and the significance based on the p-value. Further, it reports the average marginal effects 
(AME), their robust standard errors, and significance based on the pAME-value. Also, Wald chi2, 
Pseudo R2, and Log pseudolikelihood are reported for all four iterations of the analysis. Model 
1 is the base model, Model 2 differentiates the financial distress variable, Model 3 the 
divestiture experience variable, and Model 4 the industry divestiture wave variable. The results 
for the different antecedents are presented in the same order as the theoretical background: CEO 
turnover, new blockholder, financial distress, prior divestiture experience, and industry 
divestiture waves. 
CEO turnover 
As hypothesized in Hypothesis 3.1, the announcement of a divestiture program is closely related 
to a change in top management. 45% of all divestiture program announcements were preceded 
                                                             
19 Correlations were only high between the category variables financial distress and divestiture experience, and 
those variables that determine their value (5.1 through 5.3 and 6.1 through 6.3). Given that these were never part 
of the same model iterations, this correlation was neglected. 
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by a CEO change in the previous or focal period. This is a significantly higher proportion than 
for stand-alone divestitures or non-divesting periods (see Table 3-4). Programs with a financial 
rationale followed a CEO turnover more often than refocusing or streamlining programs (see 
Table 3-5). The multinomial logit regression, as presented in Table 3-7, confirms this. CEO 
turnover is a highly significant determinant of a divestiture program announcement in the base 
model (b = 0.60, p = 0.000) and all other models. CEO turnover increases the average 
probability of a divestiture program announcement by 0.05 (pAME = 0.000). For stand-alone 
divestitures, no significant effect of CEO turnover was identified. 
 
Table 3-4: Proportions and proportion tests comparing firm years with divestiture programs 
to such with stand-alone divestitures and non-divesting years 
 Divestiture 
program 
announcem. 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
announcem. 
z-statistic  Non-divesting z-statistic  
CEO turnover 45% 26% 3.28*** 28% 4.16*** 
New blockholder 34% 35% -0.17 33% 0.27 
Financial distress  60% 39% 3.54*** 39% 4.84*** 
Dividend cut 21% 13% 1.61* 14% 2.28*** 
Negative net income 25% 19% 1.16 14% 3.36*** 
Stock underperformance 41% 24% 3.10*** 26% 3.97*** 
Divestiture experience 81% 82% -0.34 70% 2.67*** 
Divestiture exp. t-1 48% 54% -0.95 41% 1.54** 
Divestiture exp. t-2 51% 51% -0.13 41% 2.30** 
Divestiture exp. t-3 49% 51% -0.59 39% 2.01** 
Divestiture wave 13% 8% 1.25 11% 0.64 
Before peak 5.5% 4.2% 0.49 2.8% 1.76** 
At peak 4.1% 0.7% 1.88** 1.5% 2.34*** 
After peak 3.4% 3.5% -0.04 7.0% -1.63* 
N 146 142  1309  
Note: The table shows the results of tests on the equality of proportions. It tests for no difference in proportions 
for two subsamples. Specifically, it tests the difference of the proportion for years with a divestiture program 
compared to years with a stand-alone divestiture and non-divesting years. A negative z-statistics indicates a lower 
proportion in comparison, and a positive z-statistics indicates a higher proportion. Significance levels are 
indicated next to the z-statistics: 
* p < 0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01 
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New blockholder 
The analysis did not show a significant effect of a new blockholder on the probability of either 
a divestiture program or a stand-alone divestiture announcement. Thus, Hypothesis 2, which 
predicted a new blockholder to be a significant antecedent of stand-alone divestitures, could not 
be confirmed. The proportion of stand-alone divestiture announcements preceded by a new 
blockholder amounted to 35%, only slightly more than the 33% for non-divesting periods and 
34% for divestiture program announcements. The proportion does not significantly differ across 
program rationales (see Table 3-4). Accordingly, the multinomial logit model revealed no 
significant effect of the arrival of a new blockholder (see Table 3-7). 
Table 3-5: Proportions and proportion tests comparing program announcements by different 
rationales 
 Divestiture program announcements 
Total Financial  z-statistic  Re-
focusing 
z-statistic  Stream-
lining 
z-statistic  
CEO turnover 45% 54% 1.69** 38% -1.14 41% -0.58 
New blockholder 34% 31% -0.66 40% 1.06 32% -0.41 
Financial distress  60% 79% 3.53*** 46% -2.41*** 52% -1.18 
Dividend cut 21% 35% 3.13*** 18% -0.55 7% -2.70*** 
Negative net income 25% 42% 3.68*** 10% -2.97*** 20% -0.77 
Stock underperformance 41% 50% 1.63* 30% -1.97** 43% 0.34 
Divestiture experience 81% 83% 0.43 76% -1.07 84% 0.66 
Divestiture exp. t-1 48% 50% 0.37 50% 0.36 43% -0.76 
Divestiture exp. t-2 51% 48% -0.47 50% -0.12 55% 0.61 
Divestiture exp. t-3 49% 52% 0.37 44% -0.67 50% 0.33 
Divestiture wave 13% 19% 1.66** 8% -1.30* 11% -0.39 
Before peak 5.4% 9.6% 1.63* 2.0% -1.33* 4.5% -0.33 
At peak 4.1% 7.7% 1.62* 2.0% -0.93 2.3% -0.73 
After peak 3.4% 1.9% -0.74 4.0% 0.28 4.5% 0.49 
N 146 52  50  44  
Note: The table shows the results of tests on the equality of proportions. It tests for no difference in proportions 
for two subsamples. Specifically, it tests the difference of the proportion for programs driven by a specific 
rationale, e.g., refocusing compared to all programs of a different rationale. A negative z-statistics indicates a 
lower proportion in comparison, and a positive z-statistics indicates a higher proportion. Significance levels are 
indicated next to the z-statistics: 
* p < 0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01 
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Financial distress 
Hypothesis 3.3 predicts that firms engage in divestiture programs rather than stand-alone 
divestitures when financially distressed. Divestiture program announcements were preceded in 
60% of all instances by a financial distress event. This is a significantly higher proportion than 
the 39% for stand-alone divestitures and non-divesting periods. All three financial distress 
events (dividend cut, negative net income, stock underperformance) exhibited the highest 
proportions for divestiture programs (see Table 3-4). When differentiating by program 
rationale, intuitively, the proportion was highest for financially motivated programs at 79%. 
The proportion for refocusing programs was 46%, significantly lower than the 60% for all 
programs (see Table 3-5). Accordingly, as shown in Model 1, financial distress is a significant 
predictor in the multinomial logit regression (b = 0.87, p = 0.000). It increases the average 
probability of a divestiture program announcement by 0.07 (pAME = 0.000). Model 2 shows that 
dividend cuts and stock underperformance have a significant impact on the occurrence of a 
program. The average probability of a program is increased following a dividend cut by 0.04 
(b = 0.49, p = 0.08, pAME = 0.09), stock underperformance by 0.05 (b = 0.58, p = 0.008, 
pAME = 0.005). The effect of negative net income is 0.03 (b = 0.39, p = 0.11, pAME = 0.14) and 
slightly below significance. In contrast to the significantly explanatory power for program 
announcements, the probability of stand-alone divestitures is not found to increase following 
any of the three financial distress events (see Table 3-7). 
Divestiture experience 
Hypothesis 3.4 predicts that firms with high levels of divestiture experience would be less likely 
to initiate a divestiture program due to limited opportunities to divest and instead engage in 
stand-alone divestitures. The proportion of prior experience was similar for divestiture program 
announcements and stand-alone divestitures with 81% and 82%, respectively. Both were 
significantly higher than the 70% for non-divesting periods. The proportion of experience in t-2 
and t-3 was similar for both divestiture programs and stand-alone divestitures, at 49-51%. The 
proportion of experience in t-1 was lower for divestiture programs compared with stand-alone 
divestitures at 48% vs. 54% (see Table 3-4). Differences in proportion between different 
program rationales are non-significant (see Table 3-5). The regression, as presented in Model 1 
of Table 3-7, shows that experience from the previous three years does not increase the 
probability of a divestiture program announcement. As argued, for stand-alone divestitures 
there is a significant effect of 0.01 (b = 0.15, p = 0.000, pAME = 0.000). When differentiating 
experience by year of occurrence (Model 3), only distant experience (in t-3) is a significant 
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Table 3-6: Correlations of the multinomial logit regression sample 
   
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 5.1 5.2 5.3. 6. 6.1 6.2 6.3 7 8. 9 10 
1. Divestiture Program 1.00                
2. Stand-alone divestiture -0.10* 1.00               
3. CEO turnover 0.11* -0.01 1.00              
4. New Blockholder 0.01 0.00 0.05* 1.00             
5. Financial Distress 0.12* 0.00 0.14* 0.07* 1.00            
5.1 Dividend cut 0.06* -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.49* 1.00           
5.2 Negative net income 0.08* 0.03 0.21* 0.07* 0.52* 0.17* 1.00          
5.3 Stock underperform. 0.10* -0.01 0.12* 0.05 0.73* 0.10* 0.29* 1.00         
6. Div. experience 0.04 0.09* 0.03 0.01 0.10* 0.07* 0.15* 0.06* 1.00        
6.1 Div. experience t-1 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.11* 0.01 0.12* 0.11* 0.68* 1.00       
6.2 Div. experience t-2 0.01 0.07* 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.10* 0.00 0.73* 0.26* 1.00      
6.3 Div. experience t-3 0.04 0.07* 0.02 0.00 0.07* 0.10* 0.09* 0.00 0.68* 0.17* 0.26* 1.00     
7. Divestiture Wave 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12* 0.02 0.06* 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 1.00    
8. Firm current ratio -0.04 0.02 -0.07* 0.01 -0.06* -0.04 -0.02 -0.06* 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.09* 1.00   
9. Firm size 0.06* -0.05* -0.01 -0.19* -0.06* -0.02 -0.05* -0.06* 0.04 0.0*5 0.02 0.02 0.05* -0.15* 1.00  
10. Firm leverage -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06* 0.15* 0.07* 0.15* 0.13* 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.07* -0.22* -0.01 1.00 
* p < 0.05 
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Table 3-7: Results of the multinomial logit regression 
Model 1 – Base model 2 – Financial distress 3 – Divestiture experience 4 – Divestiture waves 
Main effects Marginal effects Main effects Marginal effects Main effects Marginal effects Main effects Marginal effects 
Divestiture 
program vs. 
non-
divesting 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
vs. non-
divesting 
Divestiture 
program 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
Divestiture 
program vs. 
non-
divesting 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
vs. non-
divesting 
Divestiture 
program 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
Divestiture 
program vs. 
non-
divesting 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
vs. non-
divesting 
Divestiture 
program 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
Divestiture 
program vs. 
non-
divesting 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
vs. non-
divesting 
Divestiture 
program 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
CEO turnover 0.60 *** -0.11  0.05 *** -0.01  0.58 *** -0.13  0.05 *** -0.01  0.60 *** -0.11  0.05 *** -0.01  0.59 *** -0.10  0.05 *** -0.01  
(0.17)  (0.22)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.16)  (0.23)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.01)  (0.02)  
New blockholder 0.23  0.04  0.02  0.00  0.25  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.24  0.05  0.02  0.00  0.20  0.02  0.02  0.00  
(0.19)  (0.16)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Financial distress  0.87 *** 0.02  0.07 *** -0.01  -  -  -  -  0.88 *** 0.06  0.07 *** 0.00  0.89 *** 0.02  0.07 *** -0.01  
(0.20)  (0.17)  (0.01)  (0.01)          (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Dividend cut -  -  -  -  0.49 * 0.20  0.04 * 0.01  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
        (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.02)  (0.02)                  
Negative net income -  -  -  -  0.39  0.38  0.03  0.03  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
        (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.02)  (0.02)                  
Stock underperform. -  -  -  -  0.58 *** -0.26  0.05 *** -0.02  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
        (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.02)  (0.02)                  
Div. experience 0.03  0.15 *** 0.00  0.01 *** 0.02  0.14 *** 0.00  0.01 *** -  -  -  -  0.03  0.15 *** 0.00  0.01 *** 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)          (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Div. experience t-1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.05  0.02  0.00  0.00  -  -  -  -  
                (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0)          
Div. experience t-2 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.00  0.22 *** 0.00  0.02 *** -  -  -  -  
                (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.01)          
Div. experience t-3 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.14 * 0.19 ** 0.01  0.01 ** -  -  -  -  
                (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.01)  (0.01)          
Divestiture wave -0.21  -0.36  -0.01  -0.03  -0.25  -0.41  -0.02  -0.03  -0.23  -0.39  -0.02  -0.03  -  -  -  -  
(0.20)  (0.34)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.20)  (0.34)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.20)  (0.35)  (0.02)  (0.03)          
Before peak -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.40  0.43  0.03  0.03  
                        (0.38)  (0.39)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
At peak -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.43  -0.89  0.04  -0.07  
                        (0.50)  (1.16)  (0.04)  (0.09)  
After peak -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -1.02 ** -0.77 * -0.07 ** -0.05  
                        (0.40)  (0.44)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
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Table 3-7: Results of the multinomial logit regression 
Model 1 – Base model 2 – Financial distress 3 – Divestiture experience 4 – Divestiture waves 
Main effects Marginal effects Main effects Marginal effects Main effects Marginal effects Main effects Marginal effects 
Divestiture 
program vs. 
non-
divesting 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
vs. non-
divesting 
Divestiture 
program 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
Divestiture 
program vs. 
non-
divesting 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
vs. non-
divesting 
Divestiture 
program 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
Divestiture 
program vs. 
non-
divesting 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
vs. non-
divesting 
Divestiture 
program 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
Divestiture 
program vs. 
non-
divesting 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
vs. non-
divesting 
Divestiture 
program 
Stand-alone 
divestiture 
Firm current ratio -0.23  0.06  -0.02  0.01  -0.26  0.05  -0.02  0.01  -0.24  0.05  -0.02  0.01  -0.22  0.06  -0.02  0.01  
(0.19)  (0.1)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.2)  (0.11)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.19)  (0.1)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
Firm size 0.23 *** -0.09  0.02 *** -0.01  0.23 *** -0.08  0.02 *** -0.01  0.23 *** -0.08  0.02 *** -0.01  0.22 *** -0.10  0.02 *** -0.01  
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.01)  
Firm leverage -0.75  0.83  -0.06  0.07  -0.83  0.79  -0.07 * 0.07  -0.71  0.85  -0.06  0.07  -0.73  0.81  -0.06  0.07  
(0.53)  (0.56)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.53)  (0.58)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.53)  (0.56)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.52)  (0.55)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Constant -6.56 *** -1.83      -6.47 *** -1.86      -6.62 *** -1.95      -6.57 *** -1.84      
(1.22)  (1.28)      (1.22)  (1.28)      (1.24)  (1.31)      (1.28)  (1.27)      
Year effects Yes        Yes        Yes        Yes        
No. of observations 1,597       1,597       1,597       1,597       
Per reference state 146  142      146  142      146  142      146  142      
Wald chi2 301.68       356.38       339.46       351.11       
Prob > chi2 0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       0.0000       
Pseudo R2 0.079       0.079       0.082       0.084       
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-878.40       -877.72       -875.51       -873.52       
Note: The 1,597 firm-year observations split in 146 years with a divestiture program announcement, 142 years with a stand-alone divestiture announcement and 1,309 non-
divesting years. Non-divesting is the base outcome, and thus not shown in the table. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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predictor of a divestiture program announcement (b = 0.14, p = 0.08). In contrast, for stand-
alone divestitures experience is a significant positive predictor in t-2 (b = 0.22, p = 0.003) and 
t-3 (b = 0.19, p = 0.011). Experience in t-1 is not found to have a significant effect (b = 0.02, 
p = 0.72). In unreported models, I used dummies instead of the number of divestitures to 
operationalize experience. All three experience dummies (t-1, t-2, t-3) are positive and 
significant for stand-alone divestitures. For divestiture programs, none of the dummies is 
significant  
Industry divestiture wave 
In line with Hypothesis 3.5, the proportion tests presented in Table 3-4 show significantly 
higher proportions for divestiture programs in contrast to non-divesting periods before (5.5% 
vs. 2.8%) and at the peak (4.1% vs. 1.5%) of an industry divestiture wave. After the peak, the 
proportion was significantly lower (3.4% vs. 7.0%). Given the generally low occurrence of 
industry divestiture waves within the sample, interpretation of the sub-samples by program 
rationale should be trodden carefully. It could be seen that occurrence is highest for programs 
with a financial rationale at and before the peak of a wave (see Table 3-5). While the coefficient 
is negative, the occurrence of a wave itself, as examined in Model 1 of Table 3-7, is no 
significant indicator of a divestiture program (b = -0.21, p = 0.27). However, the differentiation 
by timing (see Model 4) supports Hypothesis 3.5. It shows that after its peak, an industry wave 
is a significant negative predictor of a divestiture program announcement. The average 
probability of a divestiture program announcement decreases by 0.07 (b = -1.02, p = 0.011, 
pAME = 0.020) after the peak of an industry wave. Further, the same is found to hold for stand-
alone divestitures, for which the average probability decreases by 0.05 (b = -0.77, p = 0.08, 
pAME = 0.14) after the peak of an industry wave. 
Supplementary analyses 
To test for the robustness of the analysis, I ran two alternate models of the regression in addition 
to the main model. Given the panel nature of the data, a panel model recommends itself. A 
Hausman test rejected a fixed effects estimator. Thus, a multinomial logit model was fitted 
using STATA’s gsem command in connection with a latent variable at the firm level to capture 
the random effect. However, the full models could not be fitted, and computation was only 
possible for the base model without year effects. Results were robust compared with the mlogit 
regressions reported in the results section. The same holds for unreported xtlogit regressions for 
a choice between stand-alone divestitures and divestiture program announcements. 
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To ensure the robustness of the analysis, I performed further variations concerning the 
definition of variables and included further controls. First, to avoid the inclusion of divestitures 
that were part of a divestiture program in the stand-alone divestiture sample, the main regression 
excluded divestitures in the year prior and the two years after an announced divestiture program. 
When relaxing this restriction to one year prior and only one year after, 162 divestitures are 
included in the analysis, and results remain robust. Second, I replaced divestiture experience 
with dummies. The experience dummy over all three previous years is positive and significant 
for both divestiture programs and stand-alone divestitures. When differentiating by year, all 
three dummies are positive and significant for stand-alone divestitures. For divestiture 
programs, none of the individual dummies is significant. Third, I included the previous year’s 
industry sales growth as a control variable to account for the industry environment (e.g., Haynes 
et al., 2002). However, given a low explanatory power, the variable was not included in the 
reported analysis. The results remain robust. Fourth, I differentiated new blockholder in passive 
and non-passive blockholders. I deemed blockholders to be passive if they were a financial 
company without activist record, e.g., asset management firms, institutional funds, banks, and 
insurance companies. I categorized investors as non-passive if they were strategic or activist 
investors, e.g., activist funds, private equity funds, non-financial companies, or private 
investors. I employed Factiva to identify traces of activism for all financial companies. 
Differences for passive and non-passive blockholders between divestiture programs, stand-
alone divestitures, and non-divesting periods are not significant. 
3.4.2 Event study analysis 
Table 3-8 presents the average abnormal returns (AAR) for days -1, 0, 1 and the cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAAR) in the AAR/ CAAR column for all three days both by 
announcement type and announcement rationale. Positive denotes the share of announcements 
exhibiting positive abnormal returns (AR) or cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), respectively. 
Statistical significance of the abnormal returns and the share of announcements with positive 
returns is reported next to the AAR/ CAAR and the Positive columns.  
As shown in Table 3-8, divestiture programs, on average, create wealth in the three days 
surrounding the announcement (CAAR All, NR, -1, +1 = 5.03%, CAAR All, All, -1, +1 = 2.30%). Both 
the parametric and non-parametric tests indicate significance of the CAAR for all 
announcements, excluding those made together with a firm’s results presentation. When also 
considering the latter, parametric tests still indicate significance while the non-parametric 
generalized sign-test (Cowan, 1992) failed to confirm significance. When excluding those 
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Table 3-8: AAR and CAAR by program announcement type and program rationale 
Sample Event 
window 
NR - Announcements excl. 
results announcements (in %) 
All - Announcements incl. 
results announcements (in %) 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) 
z-Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) 
z-Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
All (w/o acq.) 
 
NNR = 68 
NAll = 144 
Day -1 0.66 ** * 54.41 - 0.43 * - 51.39 - 
Day 0 4.03 *** - 63.24 *** 1.79 *** - 55.56 - 
Day +1 0.34 * - 50.00 - 0.08 - - 48.61 - 
-1 to +1 5.03 *** ** 60.29 *** 2.30 *** * 55.56 - 
All_2 (w/o acq., w/o 
winsorized events) 
 
NNR = 65 
NAll = 136 
Day -1 0.38 - - 52.31 - 0.26 - - 50.00 - 
Day 0 0.47 ** - 63.08 *** 0.37 *** - 56.62 * 
Day +1 0.39 * - 50.77 - 0.15 - - 49.26 - 
-1 to +1 1.25 *** ** 60.00 *** 0.78 *** ** 55.88 - 
Returns by program announcement type 
Sole announcements 
 
NNR = 48 
NAll = 101 
Day -1 0.96 ** * 54.76 - 0.50 ** - 50.55 - 
Day 0 1.28 *** ** 66.67 *** 0.75 *** ** 60.40 *** 
Day +1 0.74 ** - 47.92 - 0.32 * - 48.51 - 
-1 to +1 2.98 *** *** 62.50 *** 1.57 *** ** 59.41 ** 
Part of restructuring 
program announcements 
 
NNR = 20 
NAll = 43 
Day -1 10.61 - - 50.00 - 0.26 - - 50.00 - 
Day 0 -0.61 *** - 55.00 - 4.25 * - 44.19 * 
Day +1 9.96 - - 55.00 - -0.52 - - 48.84 - 
-1 to +1 10.04 *** - 55.00 - 3.99 - - 46.51 - 
Part of acquisition 
announcements 
 
NNR = 12 
NAll = 13 
Day -1 0.16 - - 66.67 * 0.32 - - 69.23 ** 
Day 0 -1.72 *** - 33.33 * -1.84 *** - 30.77 ** 
Day +1 0.08 - - 50.00 - 0.19 - - 53.85 - 
-1 to +1 -1.47 - - 66.67 - -1.34 - - 69.23 - 
Returns by program rationale 
Financial rationale (w/o 
acq.) 
 
NNR = 24 
NAll = 57 
Day -1 1.70 *** ** 70.83 ** 1.13 ** * 59.65 * 
Day 0 10.18 *** - 62.50 - 2.72 ** - 42.11 - 
Day +1 0.91 *** - 58.33 - -0.13 - - 49.12 - 
-1 to +1 12.80 *** * 66.67 *** 3.72 *** - 54.39 - 
Refocusing rationale (w/o 
acq.) 
 
NNR = 23 
NAll = 46 
Day -1 0.14 - - 43.48 - 0.20 - - 52.17 - 
Day 0 1.01 *** * 69.57 ** 1.06 *** ** 71.74 *** 
Day +1 0.64 - * 56.52 - 0.42 - - 50.00 - 
-1 to +1 1.80 *** * 69.57 ** 1.69 *** ** 65.22 *** 
Streamlining rationale (w/o 
acq.) 
 
NNR = 21 
NAll = 41 
Day -1 0.05 - - 47.62 - -0.27 - - 39.02 - 
Day 0 0.29 - - 57.14 - 1.30 ** - 56.10 - 
Day +1 -0.63 - - 33.33 - -0.01 - - 46.34 - 
-1 to +1 -0.30 - - 42.86 - 1.01 - - 46.34 - 
Note: The table shows cumulative abnormal returns in % based on a Fama-French-3-Factor Model. The estimation 
was based on a one-year window (255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. After controlling for 
confounding events, and excluding acquisition announcements, 144 remained from the original sample of 168 
announcements. I measured abnormal returns for those announcements that were not made concurrently with a 
firm's results presentation (NNR) and for all announcements, including those announced with a firm’s results (NAll). 
Positive denotes the share of events exhibiting positive AR and CAR. Statistical significance was tested using the 
Patell (1976) z-test, the cross-sectional z-test as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and the generalized sign test, 
according to Cowan (1992). 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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announcements that were winsorized for the subsequent OLS regressions at the 2.5% and 97.5% 
levels, market reaction remains positive and significant, though at lower magnitude 
(CAAR All_2, NR, -1, +1 = 1.25%, CAAR All_2, All, -1, +1 = 0.78%).  
Sole divestiture program announcements yield, on average, positive and significant returns both 
when announced by themselves and when announced alongside a firm’s results’ 
(CAAR Sole, NR, -1, +1 = 2.98%, CAAR Sole, All, -1, +1 = 1.57%). Restructuring programs exhibit the 
largest returns for all announcement types in the sample (CAAR  Restructuring, NR, -1, +1 = 10.04%, 
CAAR Restructuring, All, -1, +1 = 3.99%), however, are only partially significant. The reason is that 
the restructuring program sample is home to the largest outlier in the sample, and thus is heavily 
inflated.  
When differentiating by divestiture program rationale, returns for programs with a refocusing 
rationale are positive and significant across all tests (CAAR Refocus, NR, -1, +1 = 1.80%, 
CAARRefocus, All, -1, +1 = 1.69%). Returns for programs with a financial rationale are positive and 
partially significant (CAAR Financial, NR, -1, +1 = 12.80%, CAAR Financial, All, -1, +1 = 3.72%). The 
extremely high CAAR for programs with a financial rationale and restructuring programs is 
driven by the strongest outlier in the sample. Returns for streamlining programs are not 
significant when examined by themselves. 
The daily abnormal return is highest on the day of the announcement (CAAR All, NR, 0 = 4.03%, 
CAAR All, All, 0 = 1.79%) followed by the day before (CAAR All, NR, -1 = 0.66%, 
CAAR All, All, -1 = 0.43%). On the day after the announcement, abnormal returns are 
considerably lower (CAAR All, NR, +1 = 0.34%, CAAR All, All, +1 = 0.08%) and even negative for 
streamlining programs.  
Unreported conservative two-tailed tests rejected a statistically significant difference in the 
means of CAR (-1, +1) between the different announcement types and between the different 
program rationales. Thus, a regression with CAR (-1, +1) as the dependent variable 
recommended itself to carve out the drivers of the market reaction. 
3.4.3 Ordinary least squares regression 
Next, I analyzed the effect of program characteristics on the market reaction to divestiture 
program announcements. Table 3-9 presents the correlations among the variables that are part 
of the performed regressions. The correlations indicate no multicollinearity problem. Table 
3-10 reports the results of the OLS and quantile regressions with a winsorized CAR (-1, +1) as 
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the dependent variable for the total sample and the OLS regressions for sub-samples by program 
announcement type and program rationale. As stated, acquisition announcements were not 
included in the total OLS sample. Further, no individual regression is performed on them due 
to their low N. The table shows the coefficient, the robust standard errors in the brackets below, 
and the significance based on the p-value. Further, I provide R2/Pseudo R2, the adjusted R2, the 
F-value, the root mean squared error (Root MSE), and the average variance inflation factor (Ø 
VIF). 
Hypothesis 3.6 states that program value is a positive determinant of abnormal returns and that 
this effect is greater for firms with a financial rationale. Indeed, as shown in Table 3-10 the 
provision of program value has a positive effect on CAR (-1, +1) at a significant level 
(Model 1a, b = 0.03, p = 0.02). When regressed at the 25th quantile and median quantile, 
program value is not significant. For the 75th quantile, program value is a positive and strongly 
significant predictor (Model 1c, b = 0.03, p = 0.007). This suggests that the provision of 
program value well explains positive and especially large abnormal returns. For sole program 
announcements, thus, excluding restructuring programs, the program value dummy is also a 
significant predictor (Model 2, b = 0.03, p = 0.04). As hypothesized, when differentiating by 
rationale, the provision of program value seems to drive financially motivated programs 
(Model 4a, b = 0.05, p = 0.02) but not refocusing or streamlining programs. 
Table 3-9: Correlations of the OLS sample 
   
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. CAR (-1, +1) 1.00           
2. Program value dummy 0.17* 1.00          
3. Program value 0.26* 0.56* 1.00         
4. Program length dummy 0.09 0.21* 0.05 1.00        
5. Program assets named 
dummy 
0.05 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 1.00       
6. Restructuring program -0.10 -0.04 -0.12 0.12 -0.21* 1.00      
7. Netprofit negative -0.18* 0.10 -0.01 0.04 -0.13 0.21* 1.00     
8. Netprofit change 0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.00 -0.25* -0.62* 1.00    
9. Current ratio 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.13 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00   
10. Size -0.08 0.05 -0.27* 0.07 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.14 1.00  
11. Leverage -0.11 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.13 -0.06 -0.12 0.05 1.00 
* p < 0.05, Note: Excludes announcements with confounding events and acquisition announcements 
  
8
1
 
Table 3-10: Results of OLS and quantile regressions with CAR (-1,+1) as the dependent variable 
Program announcement 
type 
All  Sole 
announcement 
Part of restruct. 
program  
Part of 
acquisition 
All All All 
Program rationale All All All All Financial  Refocusing Streamlining 
Method 
OLS Quantile regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 25th 50th 75th       
Model 1a 1b 1c 1d 2 3a 3b -   4a 4b 5 6 
Program value dummy 
0.03 ** 0.01  0.02  0.03 *** 0.03 **  0.02  
- 
 
- 
  0.05 **   0.02   0.00   
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.02)     (0.02)    (0.02)   (0.01)   
Program value (Share div.) - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
  
- 
 0.34 ** 
- 
  
- 
 0.24 * 
- 
  
- 
  
       (0.14)     (0.13)      
Program length dummy 
0.01  0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.01   0.02  
- 
 
- 
  0.01  
- 
 0.01   0.01   
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.03)     (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
Program assets named dummy 
0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01   0.00  
- 
 
- 
  -0.01  
- 
 0.05 **  0.01   
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.02)     (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
Type - Restruct. program  
-0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0.01  
- 
  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
  0.02  0.01  -0.03   -0.03   
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)        (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.02)   
Results - Net profit neg.  
-0.04 ** -0.06 ** -0.04 ** 0.00  -0.07 **  -0.01  0.02  
- 
  -0.06  -0.05  -   0.01   
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.03)  (0.05)    (0.03)  (0.03)     (0.04)   
Results - Net profit change 
-0.01  0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.01   -0.02  0.00  
- 
  -0.03 * -0.03  0.05   0.00   
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)   (0.02)  (0.03)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)   (0.03)   
Control - Firm current ratio 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01   
- 
 
- 
 
- 
  
- 
   
- 
  
- 
  
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)              
Control - Firm size 
0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01 ** -0.01   
- 
 
- 
 
- 
  
- 
   
- 
  
- 
  
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)              
Control - Firm leverage 
-0.04  -0.07  -0.04  -0.09  -0.05   
- 
 
- 
 
- 
  
- 
   
- 
  
- 
  
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.06)              
Constant 
0.08  -0.05  -0.03  0.14 ** 0.10   -0.02  -0.04 ** 
- 
  -0.03  -0.01  -0.05 **  0.01   
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.1)  (0.09)   (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.02)   
N 144  144  144  144  101   43  28  13   57  45  46   41   
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.10  0.10  0.06  0.07  0.16   0.06  0.23     0.13  0.12  0.23   0.15   
Adj. R2 0.04        0.08   0.00  0.14     0.03  0.03  0.13   0.00   
F-value 2.11 ** 1.57  1.11  4.02 *** 2.12 **  0.73  3.40 **    2.04 * 2.06 * 2.69 **  1.92   
Root MSE 0.07        0.06   0.07  0.07     0.08  0.08  0.06   0.05   
Ø VIF 1.22        1.20   1.60  2.86     1.30  1.49  1.12   1.35   
Note: The dependent variable is the CAR (-1,+1) based on a Fama-French-3-Factor Model. The estimation window covered one year (255 days) prior to 30 days before the 
announcement. Announcements with confounding events and acquisition announcements were excluded, the top and bottom 2.5% based on the CAR (-1,1) were winsorized. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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Models 3b and 4b confirm Hypothesis 3.7. Given that both program length and the naming of 
specific assets do not increase model fit and their insignificance was already determined in 
Models 3a and 4a, they are not included in this analysis. The argument was that the program 
value as share divested is a positive predictor of abnormal returns for those divestiture programs 
that are part of a restructuring program or financially motivated. Indeed, for such programs, 
abnormal returns are found to increase with program value (Model 3b, b = 0.34, p = 0.02; 
Model 4b, b = 0.24, p = 0.07). 
The announcement of program length has no effect on abnormal returns in the main model 
(Model 1a, b = 0.01, not significant) nor when specifically looking at refocusing programs 
(Model 5, b = 0.01, not significant). Thus, Hypothesis 3.8 cannot be confirmed. Additionally, 
unreported models tested the impact of program length operationalized in years; no significant 
effect could be measured. 
The naming of specific assets to be divested does not have an effect on abnormal returns in the 
main model (Model 1a, b = 0.00, not significant). As hypothesized, it is a significant and strong 
predictor for abnormal returns of programs with a refocusing rationale (Model 5, b = 0.05, 
p = 0.01). For programs with a streamlining or financial rationale, this is not the case. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3.9 is partially confirmed. The naming of specific assets has a positive effect on the 
abnormal returns for refocusing programs, and this effect is more significant compared to 
programs following other rationales. 
Supplementary analyses 
I ran variations of the model to test for robustness. I varied both the sample and variables 
included in the regression.  
With regard to the sample, I performed two variations. First, I excluded observations that 
coincided with a results announcement and the respective controls. This results in a more than 
halved sample size. The program value dummy continues to be significant in Models 1 and 4a. 
Program value as share divested is significant in Models 3b and 4b. For the naming of specific 
assets in programs with a refocusing rationale, the direction of coefficients is robust, however, 
not significant. Second, I ran the regression without winsorizing at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. 
The naming of specific assets continues to predict abnormal returns of refocusing programs 
significantly. The program value dummy continues to be significant in Model 2. For the other 
models, the direction of coefficients is robust; however, not significant. 
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Concerning variables, I ran three variations of the shown regression. First, I operationalized 
program value and length as variables that take a value of 0 if no information was provided and 
the share to be divested or the actual length of a program (in years) if the information was 
provided. Results of all models, except for Model 2, are strongly robust. Second, I included 
dummies to account for the announced usage of proceeds: debt repayment, investment in core 
or acquisitions, and distribution to shareholders (e.g., through a dividend or share buyback). 
The usage of proceeds is not a significant predictor of abnormal returns and does not increase 
model fit. Third, I included further control variables to account for the fact that programs were 
often announced as part of a restructuring program or alongside a firm’s results: 
downsizing/layoffs dummy, net profit positive dummy, dividend change (in %). All three 
variables did not increase model fit and were thus not included in the reported analyses. Fourth, 
I ran a regression on the antecedents of divestiture programs instead of program characteristics. 
Only new blockholder is found to have a positive and significant effect on abnormal returns. 
This is in line with the recent findings of Bergh et al. (2019), who argue that investors use 
screens to overcome information asymmetries and identify investment-worthy firms and that 
blockholder equity is such a screen. 
3.5 Discussion 
This study examines the antecedents of a firm’s decision to announce a divestiture program and 
the drivers of the market reaction to program announcements.  
The results of the study suggest that firms choose to announce a divestiture program rather than 
a stand-alone divestiture when facing uncertainty, change, or distress. In such contexts, 
managers seem to consider divestiture programs as the more effective move to restore 
efficiency and market trust. This is the case after a CEO turnover, that has in many studies been 
identified as a driver of divestiture (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Feldman et al., 2016; Hayward & 
Shimizu, 2006; Pan et al., 2016; Shimizu & Hitt, 2005; Weisbach, 1995). However, when 
differentiating between divestiture programs and stand-alone divestitures, CEO turnover is a 
strong predictor for the former only. In contrast, the proportion of CEO turnover anteceding 
stand-alone divestiture announcements is similar to that of non-divesting periods. Prior 
literature has argued that new CEOs aspire to a clean start and reverse errors of their 
predecessors to avoid that these will be attributed to them (Weisbach, 1995). The results of this 
study suggest that newly appointed CEOs will choose a divestiture program rather than a single 
transaction to achieve such objectives. Financial distress is another influential antecedent of a 
divestiture program announcement. Prior research has identified financial distress as the 
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strongest predictor of divestiture moves (Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996). However, the results of 
this study suggest that a financially distressed firm is more likely to engage in a divestiture 
program than a stand-alone divestiture. When financially distressed, a single divestiture may 
not be able to satisfy financial needs and market demands as effectively as a program or 
thorough portfolio review. Among, the proxies for financial distress, stock underperformance 
is the most robust antecedent of a divestiture program. The antecedents of divestiture programs 
vary by rationale. Intuitively and qua specification of the motives, financially motivated 
divestiture programs are mostly announced by financially distressed firms. Management 
turnover also coincides more often with a financially motivated divestiture program. 
In line with prior literature, I find divestiture experience to be a strong predictor of stand-alone 
divestitures (Kolev, 2016; Peruffo et al., 2018; Shimizu & Hitt, 2005; Villalonga & McGahan, 
2005). While the supplementary analysis finds an experience dummy to predict not only stand-
alone divestitures but also divestiture program announcements, the extent of experience as 
measured in the main analysis is non-significant. Only when regressing years individually, the 
results show that distant experience also predicts divestiture programs. This suggests that while 
experience per se increases the likelihood of a divestiture program announcement, the extent of 
that experience in recent years does not. This is in line with the argument made as part of the 
hypothesizing, namely that opportunities for value-enhancing divestitures should naturally be 
limited. For a frequent divestor, announcing a divestiture program makes less sense than for a 
firm that divests only seldom. Also, the results suggest that firms consider the industry situation 
for divestitures. Prior research has argued that market conditions during industry merger waves 
are more favorable, and thus firms are more likely to divest (Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019). 
While this study finds programs to occur more often before and at the peak of an industry 
divestiture wave, this is not a significant antecedent based on the multinomial logit regression. 
However, the study finds firms are significantly less likely to announce a divestiture program 
or a stand-alone divestiture after the peak of a divestiture wave in their primary industry. 
The announcement of divestiture programs results, on average, in positive cumulative abnormal 
returns for the three days around an announcement. At the same time, the results show that 
divestiture programs are often announced by financially distressed firms or after a management 
change. Naturally, divestiture program announcements entail a higher level of information 
asymmetry than stand-alone divestitures of specific units. I draw from signaling theory 
(Connelly et al., 2011) to argue that program announcements may follow the purpose of 
signaling a dedicated and strong move to the market. Such a move is then not only aimed at 
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signaling commitment, resolving a firm’s pressing financial issues, or reversing errors from 
predecessors, but also at restoring or increasing investor’s confidence. I argue that the extent to 
which a firm provides specific program details to its investors determines the credibility and, 
ultimately, the effectiveness of the signal. Accordingly, the provision of a program value is a 
strong positive predictor of abnormal returns, especially for announcements that yield high 
abnormal returns. This is in line with prior literature that has found the declaration of a 
transaction price for divestitures and relative deal size to be a strong predictor of the market 
reaction to divestiture (Afshar et al., 1992; Klein, 1986; Mulherin & Boone, 2000). This effect 
is even stronger for firms that announce a divestiture program with a financial rationale, such 
as the reduction of debt or liquidity concerns. For these programs, the results do also show that 
abnormal returns increase with the share to be divested by a program. Thus, from an investor’s 
perspective, providing a program value increases the credibility of a firm's financial efforts or 
restructuring measures. For divestiture programs with a refocusing rationale, the specification 
of the assets to be divested is found to drive abnormal returns significantly. Therefore, the 
naming of a specific industry or geography to be exited seemingly increases the credibility of 
such a move. 
3.5.1 Theoretical and practical implications 
On a general note, the findings of this study underscore the importance of considering 
divestiture programs in divestiture research. More specifically, this study generates three 
primary contributions to prior research. Each of these provides meaningful insights that enhance 
the understanding of divestiture programs and divestiture in general.  
First, the study provides a detailed description of when and for which rationale divestiture 
programs are announced. In doing so, it enhances prior research on divestiture programs that 
have focused solely on refocusing programs (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1999) or on the individual 
transactions that constitute a program (e.g., Brauer & Schimmer, 2010).  
Second, it acknowledges the diversity of divestiture by comparing the contexts in which firms 
decide to announce a divestiture program in contrast to a stand-alone divestiture. In 
distinguishing between divestiture programs and stand-alone divestitures, the study advances 
prior research on the causes and antecedents of divestiture. Prior research has mostly focused 
on examining when firms generally divest (e.g., Brauer, 2006; Kolev, 2016). In contrast, this 
study widens the understanding of when firms choose to announce a divestiture program vs. a 
stand-alone divestiture. The results stress that divestiture antecedents commonly ascribed to 
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divestitures such as CEO change or financial distress, in fact, are primarily the antecedents of 
divestiture programs and less so of stand-alone divestitures. In considering both divestiture 
experience and industry divestiture waves, the study acknowledges, confirms, and extends 
recent research (e.g., Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 2017; Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; 
Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019). The study identifies differences in how the extent of experience 
affects a firm’s likelihood to announce a divestiture program in contrast to a stand-alone 
transaction. With regard to divestiture waves, the study confirms that a firm’s divestiture intent 
is partly dependent on how other firms in its industry divest. Also, it provides a European cross-
country and cross-industry perspective on the antecedents of divestiture. Prior research has 
mostly focused on the US and UK (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1999; Berry, 2010; Haynes, Thompson, 
& Wright, 2003; Owen et al., 2010). 
Third, it examines the market reaction to the announcement of divestiture programs by 
rationale, taking into consideration the degree of information disclosure in program 
announcements. Thus, it contributes to the extensive research done on the wealth effects of 
divestitures (cf. Lee & Madhavan, 2010) in adding empirical evidence on divestiture program 
announcements. The study shows that investors reward program announcements that provide 
details and that the rewarded information differs depending on the context of the program. Thus, 
the study adds to the more recent research that draws from signaling or screening theory when 
explaining abnormal returns around divestiture programs (e.g., Bergh et al., 2019). 
For managers, the study provides important insights that help to understand how investors 
respond to divestiture program announcements and that their response differs depending on 
both the program rationale and the specifics that are communicated to the market. For investors, 
it is helpful to understand when and how firms announce divestiture programs to be able to 
interpret the signal of such an announcement accurately. 
3.5.2 Limitations and future research 
The foregoing results and implications ought to be considered within the context of the 
limitations of this study.  
First, the results of this study are based on divestiture program announcements that were 
manually collected through Factiva. However, firms may also undertake a divestiture program 
without explicitly making a program announcement. In the study presented in Chapter 2, 
individual divestitures were categorized as being part of a program based on their own 
announcements. This study leveraged the data gathered for that first study. However, in some 
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cases, no initial program announcement was identifiable even if individual transactions 
explicitly referred to a program or common rationale. This may be because some firms did 
initially not plan to undertake more than one transaction or did not communicate that decision.  
A second caveat resides in the study’s sample size. While I went to great lengths to identify 
divestiture program announcements, the overall sample size is limited. The sample size is 
sufficiently large for the main analyses of antecedents and the market reaction. However, when 
examining the market reaction by announcement type or program rationale, I had to drop 
control variables at the firm level deliberately. Further studies could extend the geographic 
scope of their studies on divestiture programs, to be able to test results with larger samples. 
Third, the study also revealed the difficulty of assessing the market reaction to divestiture 
programs given their confounded nature. Not only are programs often announced concurrently 
with restructuring programs or acquisition announcements, but the data gathering also revealed 
that they were often announced on the same day as a firm’s results. I acknowledged this by 
controlling for such events and intentionally excluding programs announced as part of an 
acquisition announcement. Future research could examine the market reaction to divestiture 
programs by considering divestiture program announcements when examining restructuring 
programs or acquisition announcements. 
3.5.3 Conclusion 
This study demonstrates that firms seem to consider divestiture programs in contrast to stand-
alone divestitures as a more effective means to restore market trust and to signal a commitment 
to the market. Accordingly, divestiture programs are found to be anteceded by contexts that 
suggest uncertainty, such as a recent management turnover or financial distress. Further, results 
on the market reaction to divestiture program announcements suggest that investors receive 
divestiture programs on average well and reward firms that overcome information asymmetries 
through providing program specifics. 
For researchers, this study stresses the importance of considering divestiture programs in 
divestiture research. For practitioners, the study provides meaningful insights to understand 
when firms undertake divestiture programs and why investors respond to some more favorably 
than to others. 
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4 DIVESTITURE AND ITS MARKET REACTION IN A CONSOLIDATING 
INDUSTRY: THE GLOBAL BREWING INDUSTRY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study provides a perspective on the market performance of divestitures in a consolidating 
industry – the global brewing industry. In 2018, the five largest players accounted for 60% of 
the global beer volume. The study sets out to answer the question to which extent capital 
markets value divestitures in an industry where players usually seek efficiency gains and growth 
through mergers and acquisitions. Based on a sample of 66 divestitures in the period from 1999-
2018, the results show that markets receive divestitures by publicly listed brewing groups on 
average positively. I measure the influential effect of success determinants concerning the 
underlying industry, the divested business, the divestiture structure, the transaction, and the 
divestor itself. 
Keywords: divestiture, industry consolidation, brewing industry, announcement returns 
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4.1 Introduction  
In 2016, when the world’s two largest brewing groups, Anheuser-Busch InBev and SABMiller, 
merged to form AB InBev, the consolidation of the global brewing industry reached a 
preliminary peak. It were primarily these two groups and their predecessors that pushed 
consolidation over the previous decades. Their efforts to gain in scale and profit from synergies 
led to today’s highly consolidated and globalized brewing industry (Howard, 2014; Mehta & 
Schiereck, 2012). While the top 5 players in 1998 accounted for only a quarter of global beer 
volume, the top 5 players in 2018 already added up to 60% of global volume. Four of the five 
largest players in 1998 have since then amalgamated into today’s largest player, AB InBev. It 
now holds a volume share of more than 30%. Prior research has described the consolidation of 
the brewing industry (Adams, 2006; Howard, 2014), its drivers (Kerkvliet, Nebesky, Tremblay, 
& Tremblay, 1998; Tremblay & Tremblay, 1988), and its effects (Chalk, 1988; Iwasaki, Seldon, 
& Tremblay, 2008; Lynk, 1985). Research has also drawn attention to the market reaction to 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the brewing industry and found it to be positive (Ebneth & 
Theuvsen, 2007; Mehta & Schiereck, 2012). 
In a consolidating industry, with fewer opportunities and increased antitrust hurdles for M&A, 
divestitures constitute one of the few options to restructure (Powell & Yawson, 2005). In line 
with literature, the example of AB InBev shows that divestitures remain a frequently exercised 
option in such industries (Markides, 1992b; Powell & Yawson, 2005). Following their 
announcement to merge, Anheuser-Busch InBev and SABMiller announced the sale of 
SABMiller’s US business and well-known international brands such as Pilsner Urquell and 
Birra Peroni to address potential antitrust concerns pro-actively. In 2017, AB InBev announced 
but later canceled the divestiture of its dusty German brands Diebels and Hasseroeder. In 2019, 
to reduce the debt amounted throughout its prior M&A spree, AB InBev carved-out its Asia-
Pacific business and eventually sold its Australian business.  
A large body of literature has explored the causes and effects of divestitures (e.g., Brauer, 2006; 
Kolev, 2016; Lee & Madhavan, 2010). Its market reaction has mostly been found to be positive 
(cf. Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Lee & Madhavan, 2010; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). Further, there 
is consensus that industry concentration drives the likelihood of large players to refocus on that 
concentrated industry (Markides, 1992b; Powell & Yawson, 2005).  
When considering both the consolidation of the brewing industry and prior divestiture research, 
the question arises, to which extent the capital markets value divestitures in an industry where 
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players usually seek efficiency gains and growth through mergers and acquisitions. This study 
aims to answer that question and to fill the research gap regarding divestitures and the brewing 
industry. It describes the consolidation of the brewing industry, the divestiture activity of 
publicly listed brewing groups, studies its market reaction, and identifies success determinants 
based on a sample of 66 divestitures in the period from 1999-2018. Further, it considers the 
divestiture of beer units by parent firms that are primarily engaged in other industries. 
The results indicate that capital markets react on average positively to divestitures by publicly 
listed breweries, however, more so to the initial announcement than to the, sometimes 
subsequent, announcement of a transaction price. Further, also the divestiture of beer units by 
non-brewing groups is found to be perceived positively.  
While the study is unable to link consolidation over time directly to the market reaction, global 
market share is found to relate negatively to it. Thus, investors seem to find little additional 
value creation potential in divestitures of firms that hold a competitive position in a 
concentrated industry. Further, the results show that within the core brewing operations, the 
sale of brand licenses for specific countries or regions relates positively to the market reaction. 
In line with prior literature (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010), I find divestitures that are part of a 
program to be rewarded with a stronger market reaction. One unanticipated finding with regard 
to firm characteristics was that the reaction to divestiture announcements relates negatively to 
a firm’s share of non-beer sales. This suggests that the market rewards firms that are more 
invested in their core brewing operations and naturally more likely to reinvest in their 
concentrated core industry. It is also supportive of prior literature’s consensus that firms earn 
above-average returns in concentrated industries, and thus are more likely to divest and refocus 
on the attractive, concentrated core industry (Markides, 1992b, 1995; Powell & Yawson, 2005).  
This study is organized into six sections. The second section describes consolidation in the 
global brewing industry. The theoretical background on the influential effect of the different 
determinants of market reaction is provided in the third section. The fourth section is concerned 
with the methodology used for the analyses. The results of the analyses are reported in the fifth 
section. Finally, the sixth section discusses the findings, their implications, limitations, and 
draws an overall conclusion.  
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4.2 Consolidation of the global brewing industry 
Over the past decades, the brewing industry has experienced a massive consolidation and 
globalization of operations, and the largest players have eventually assumed dominant positions 
across all continents (Howard, 2014; Madsen, Pedersen, & Lund-Thomsen, 2012). On the one 
hand, consolidation was driven through mergers between brewing groups and acquisitions of 
previously independent brewers. The most recent consolidating event was the merger between 
the two largest players at the time, Anheuser-Busch InBev and SABMiller, in 2016. As Figure 
4-1 shows, this was only the latest of many such moves in the last two decades. On the other 
hand, consolidation was driven by the acquisition of divested brewing units. Divestors included 
brewing groups consolidating their operations, former brewing groups that exited the industry 
in light of more attractive alternatives (e.g., FEMSA, Whitbread, Bass), conglomerates 
refocusing on their core (e.g., Danone, Philip Morris, Fraser & Neave), and financial firms (e.g., 
HypoVereinsbank, Nomura). For example, FEMSA, rooted in Mexico but home to global 
brands such as Sol, took the chance to divest their beer assets in exchange for a 20% interest in 
Heineken and continues to be its second-largest shareholder until today. In addition, divestitures 
were triggered through antitrust regulation following consolidating moves. While global brands 
are rarely divested, this has opened opportunities for brewing groups from the second row. For 
example, Asahi, until 2015, primarily focused on its home market Japan and neighboring 
Figure 4-1: Development of five-firm CR over time and major consolidation events 
 
Note: Decrease of five-firm concentration ratio (CR) in 2011 was driven by a change in Carlsberg’s volume 
reporting to include the sales of proportionally consolidated entities pro-rata going forward. 
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countries, seized the opportunity of the AB InBev merger to increase global reach and acquired 
the European brands Pilsner Urquell, Peroni, and Grolsch. 
The result of decades of consolidation are a five-firm concentration ratio (CR) of roughly 60% 
and a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 0.12 in 2018 (see Table 4-1). Both the n-firm CR 
and the HHI20 are standard measures of industry concentration used both in research and by 
antitrust authorities.21 The ten largest firms amounted to 73% of the total beer volume and again 
an HHI of 0.12. The largest brewery AB InBev held a share of 30% and a relative market share 
of 2.27 – more than double as high as the market share of the second-largest player, Heineken.  
Assembled under the AB InBev umbrella are now such names as Anheuser-Busch, Interbrew, 
AmBev, South African Breweries, Miller, and Grupo Modelo.  
                                                             
20 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in an industry. 
Given that the market shares of all firms were not available, it is calculated based on share of the largest n firms 
(e.g., Haynes et al., 2002). However, as can be seen in Table 4-1, the HHI is not sensitive to the inclusion of further 
firms with low market shares. 
21 A CR of 60% indicates an oligopolistic global brewing industry. In contrast, based on the horizontal merger 
guidelines by the US Department of Justice, a HHI below 0.15 does not indicate a concentrated market. However, 
these guidelines and similar ones by the European Comission do not usually examine the global industry structure. 
Table 4-1: Top 10 breweries by beer volume in 2018 
Rank Name Country Beer volume  
(mhl) 
Market share 
(in %) 
Relative 
market share  
1. AB InBev Belgium 567.1 29.8 2.27 
2. Heineken Netherlands 249.5 13.1 0.44 
3. China Resources Breweries China 112.9 5.9 0.20 
4. Carlsberg Denmark 112.3 5.9 0.20 
5. MolsonCoors USA/ Canada 96.6 5.1 0.17 
6. Tsingtao Brewery China 80.3 4.2 0.14 
7. Asahi Japan 57.9 3.0 0.10 
8. BGI/ Castel France 40.0 2.1 0.07 
9. Yanjing China 38.0 2.0 0.07 
10. Anadolu Efes Turkey 31.8 2.0 0.06 
Total Market size  1905.0 100.0  
Five-firm CR   59.8  
Five-firm HHI   0.12  
Ten-firm CR   72.8  
Ten-firm HHI   0.12  
Note: Total market size and Yanjing volume obtained from the Barth Report 2018/19, volumes for other breweries 
gathered manually from annual reports and other reportings. Shown values include pro-rata volumes from joint 
ventures and associated firms 
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Over the past decade, the market has also seen the rise of Chinese players. By 2018, three of 
the ten largest players were headquartered in China and held an overall market share of 10%. 
The largest of which, China Resources Breweries, gained full independence only after the AB 
InBev merger when SABMiller’s 49% stake in the joint venture with China Resources 
Enterprises was sold. It is now the third-largest player in the market. It holds a production 
volume even slightly higher than that of the long-time top 5 veteran Carlsberg. 
The development from 1998 to 2018 shows that both the five-firm CR and HHI have increased 
dramatically. The CR has more than doubled from 27.0% to 59.8%, and the HHI has increased 
sixfold (see Table 4-2). Out of the five largest firms in 1998, four have merged to form today’s 
largest player, AB InBev. Their cumulated market share of 20.9% in 1998 increased through 
both organic growth and further acquisitions to 29.8% in 2018. The second-largest player, 
Heineken, has held its position at a doubled market share of 13.1% in 2018 compared to 6.1% 
in 1998. Consolidation has not been limited to the two largest players. The other players in the 
top 5 of 2018 do each hold a higher share than their counterparts in 1998.  
Prior research on the brewing industry has stressed that the pace of consolidation has differed 
across countries (Adams, 2006). The beer market in the US has been an oligopoly for a long 
time. Many of the smaller breweries already disappeared in the 1950s, and by the turn of the 
Table 4-2: Top 5 breweries by share of beer volume in 1998, ‘03, ‘08, ‘13, and ‘18 
1998 % 2003 % 2008 % 2013 % 2018 % 
Anheuser- 
Busch 
10.0 Anheuser- 
Busch 
10.3 Anheuser-
Busch InBev 
20.3 Anheuser-
Busch InBev 
20.2 AB InBev 29.8 
Heineken 6.1 SABMiller 8.9 SABMiller 12.0 SABMiller 12.4 Heineken 13.1 
Miller 3.8 Interbrew 8.1 Heineken 8.9 Heineken 9.9 China 
Resources 
5.9 
South African 
Breweries 
3.6 Heineken 6.7 Carlsberg 7.0 Carlsberg 6.1 Carlsberg 5.9 
Interbrew 3.5 Carlsberg 5.5 Tsingtao 
Brewery* 
3.0 Tsingtao 
Brewery*  
4.4 Molson 
Coors 
5.1 
Five-firm  
CR 
27.0  39.6  51.0  53.0  59.8 
Five-firm 
HHI 
0.02  0.04  0.07  0.08  0.12 
Note: Market share calculated based on total market size obtained from Barth Reports, volumes for breweries 
gathered manually from annual reports and other reportings; underlying beer volume includes pro-rata volumes 
from joint ventures and associated firms.  
*China Resources would assume fifth place already both in 2008 and 2013; however, part of its volume was 
already included on a pro-rata basis in SABMiller’s volume, which held a 49% stake until 2016. 
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Millenium, the four largest players produced more than 90% of the domestic volume (Adams, 
2006). Likewise to the US, strong and national players have emerged in Germany, many of 
which are still operating independently (e.g., Radeberger, Bitburger), others have amalgamated 
into the global brewing giants (e.g., Becks, Spaten-Löwenbräu, Holsten). However, in contrast 
to the US, the German market continues to be more fragmented, and smaller breweries continue 
to compete successfully on a regional and local level (Adams, 2006). 
Regarding the initial drivers of the consolidation process, research has cited the automation of 
brewing and packaging, and television advertising (cf. Adams, 2006). These developments have 
led to the rise of regional champions by the end of the 1990s, such as Anheuser-Busch in the 
United States, Interbrew in Belgium, Heineken in the Netherlands, Carlsberg in Denmark, and 
South African Breweries in South Africa. Faced with limited opportunities in their often 
declining and mature home markets, a comparatively high fixed cost base, and globalizing 
suppliers and customers, they pushed their global expansion and the further consolidation of 
the global brewing industry. This behavior is most rational given that profits increase with 
industry concentration, while stronger barriers to entry protect the increased profit pools (Chang 
& Singh, 1999; Markides, 1995). Thus, the leading brewing groups have likely benefited from 
a persistent increase in their profit levels driven by scale effects such as improved bargaining 
power and the realization of synergies (Mehta & Schiereck, 2012).  
4.3 Theoretical background 
Academia agrees that the market reaction to divestiture announcements is positive (Brauer & 
Schimmer, 2010; Feldman et al., 2016; Lee & Madhavan, 2010; Owen et al., 2010; Vidal & 
Mitchell, 2018). The same should be expected for divestitures in the brewing industry. 
Nevertheless, a disparity exists in literature regarding the magnitude of the market reaction, and 
an array of potential drivers have been identified and discussed (cf. Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; 
Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). Literature in finance and strategy has often drawn on transaction cost 
economics and agency theory to explain the gains in market value following divestiture 
announcements (Lee & Madhavan, 2010). It has argued that future performance increases 
through an efficient reallocation of freed up financial and managerial resources, an increase in 
corporate efficiency, and the resolving of inefficiencies across the entire business of the 
divesting firm (Brauer, 2006; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). In the following, I provide the 
theoretical background for potential success determinants of divestitures in the global brewing 
industry concerning industry characteristics, divested business characteristics, divestiture 
structure, transaction parameters, and firm characteristics. 
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Industry characteristics 
As outlined above, the brewing industry has undergone massive consolidation over the past 
decades. Thus, I study the effect of industry structure in terms of industry consolidation, 
market share, and antitrust pressure. 
As an industry consolidates and concentration increases, the industry gains in attractiveness for 
its incumbents that benefit from above-normal profits and higher barriers to entry (Chang & 
Singh, 1999; Markides, 1995). In highly concentrated industries, divestitures constitute one of 
the few remaining restructuring options for firms, given that antitrust regulation is likely to 
impede further mergers and acquisitions (Powell & Yawson, 2005). Further, the more attractive 
a core industry is, the more likely is a firm to refocus on that core, and thus the more likely to 
divest assets that are less related to the core or of little strategic relevance for its position in the 
core industry (Markides, 1992b). However, research has also argued that firms may divest from 
concentrated industries because they are unsatisfied with their market position and have little 
hope to increase market share (Hopkins, 1991). In both cases, the divestitures driven by the 
consolidation of an industry over time should be valued positively by investors and result in 
an increase of the market reaction over time. Consistently, research has found divestiture 
likelihood to increase with an industry’s concentration (Hopkins, 1991; Markides, 1992b; 
Powell & Yawson, 2005).  
Divestiture research has relied on a firm’s market share to capture the commercial position 
and competitive performance of a firm (Chang & Singh, 1999; Çolak & Whited, 2007; Haynes 
et al., 2002). Literature has argued that leaders within a market benefit more from the focus 
increase from divestitures, and thus they will be more inclined to exit peripheral and less 
strategic businesses (Haynes et al., 2003; Markides, 1992b). Further, firms with a high market 
share that are fully profiting from above-average returns should have less reason to divest itself 
of operations (Hopkins, 1991). Therefore, when firms with a high market share divest, they 
should be more likely to exit less strategic businesses and spark a positive market reaction. 
However, when a divestiture is likely to threaten the competitive position of a market leader, it 
should result in an adverse reaction by the capital market. 
Divestitures are a crucial instrument to regulate industries and execute antitrust policy, and as 
such, they have often been applied in response to mergers and acquisitions (Brauer, 2006; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). Research has linked involuntary divestitures forced through political 
pressure or antitrust authorities to a negative capital market reaction (Boudreaux, 1975; Wright 
& Ferris, 1997). In an industry, where the five largest players account for 60% of the global 
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production and repeatedly engage in M&A, some divestitures have likely been driven by 
antitrust authorities. To account for this, I consider whether divestitures were announced to 
comply with direct antitrust pressure (or in anticipation of obedience to such). In line with 
prior research, I expect divestitures to result in less favorable market reactions if they were 
sparked by antitrust pressure. 
Divested business characteristics 
Consolidation in the brewing industry has not only occurred on a global, but also on a regional 
or national level (Adams, 2006). Brewers are likely to have grown, either from legacy or from 
acquisitions, a portfolio of businesses not limited to core brewing operations and attractive 
geographies. Instead, it is likely, that many firms do also hold brewing assets of little geographic 
relevance, as well as businesses that are not or only distantly related to brewing. I consider how 
the capital market reacts to divestitures based on their relatedness to the core brewing 
operations and their geographic scope.  
Firms diversify their product offering for various reasons, e.g., to put excess resources to use, 
to increase operating efficiency by realizing economies of scale, to create a more efficient debt 
capacity, or to reduce taxes (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Markides, 1992a). However, with increasing 
diversification, marginal benefits eventually decline, and marginal costs from organizational 
inefficiencies, coordination, and “managerial diseconomies of scale” increase (Hoskisson & 
Hitt, 1994; Markides, 1992a: 399). Literature differentiates between related and unrelated 
product diversification. Related diversification shares a similar resource profile and has been 
argued to be superior to unrelated diversification (Bergh, 1995, 1998; Chang & Singh, 1999; 
Montgomery, 1994). Consistently, it is argued that the less related a resource profile is to a 
firm’s core, the more difficult are the exploitation of synergies and the management across units 
(Bergh, 1998; Chang & Singh, 1999). To realize the benefits of related diversification and avoid 
the negative effects of less related diversification, firms need to proactively reconfigure 
resources through divestitures and acquisitions (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004). Further, value 
gains from selling unrelated units to a buyer with a better fit should be passed on to the seller 
in the form of a price premium due to a higher willingness to pay (John & Ofek, 1995). Indeed, 
the sale of unrelated businesses has been linked to higher post-divestiture performance than that 
of related businesses (Bergh, 1995, 1998; Chang, 1996; Depecik et al., 2014). For the brewing 
industry, the differentiation between related and unrelated businesses does not suffice. Instead, 
I differentiate between core beer/brewing operations, beer-related operations, and unrelated 
operations. These beer-related operations, such as the distribution of beer, ownership of pubs, 
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or retailers, were considered part of a brewery’s core business at some point. For example, the 
former UK brewers Whitbread or Brass used to own and operate a large number of pubs that 
were eventually divested during the observation period. In line with prior research, I consider 
the relatedness of the divested unit and argue that the divestiture of unrelated units should be 
received more positively than the divestiture of core or beer-related units. 
Firms diversify geographically to overcome home-market disadvantages, tap opportunities for 
higher returns, and ultimately reduce the risk of failure (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994). However, 
geographic diversification also comes with organizational complexity (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; 
Lu & Beamish, 2001, 2004). While its benefits allow firms to initially overcome complexity, 
firms will eventually reach a threshold of internationalization at which costs of complexity 
exceed the benefits (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006; 
Lu & Beamish, 2004). Research has argued that firms refrain from withdrawing from home 
markets whereas they willingly divest distant units as long as commitment and dependence on 
the respective region is low (Benito & Welch, 1997; Landier, Nair, & Wulf, 2009). The market 
reaction to both foreign and domestic divestitures has been found to be positive (Borde, Madura, 
& Akhigbe, 1998; Gleason, Mathur, & Singh, 2000; Sicherman & Pettway, 1992). However, it 
is difficult to differentiate between domestic and foreign markets in an often globally operating 
industry. For example, while AB InBev is headquartered in Belgium, it has a management 
office in the US and regional headquarters across the world. Neither of its largest brands 
(Budweiser, Corona, and Stella Artois) is at home in Belgium. Instead, as with other consumer 
products, when measuring the geographic scope, I argue, that one has to differentiate between 
global brands, their brand licenses for specific countries or regions, and local/ other assets 
not associated with a firm’s international brands. Global brands are of strategic relevance in a 
globally consolidating industry, and firms will likely only divest those if forced to do so. Such 
divestitures should result in a negative market reaction. Their brands' licenses for specific 
countries or local assets are less relevant and should be easy to disentangle from the rest of the 
firm. Consistently, in their study on brand divestments, Depecik et al. (2014), find only the 
divestiture of local or regional brands to have a positive effect on firm value. The divestment 
of such more distant brand assets unlocks resources that can be invested in core geographies or 
global brands. Further, compared to the divestment of local assets, it should be more likely to 
spark capital market interest. Thus, I expect the divestiture of brand licenses for specific 
countries or regions to be valued positively by the market. 
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Divestiture structure 
Divestitures do often occur as part of a series of multiple transactions (Berger & Ofek, 1999; 
Haynes et al., 2002; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992; Markides, 1995). A 
structured series of strategically consistent divestitures that extends over a prolonged period – 
a divestiture program – signals commitment. This commitment suggests a strategic rather than 
a tactical rationale (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). Both strategic divestitures (Montgomery et al., 
1984) and strategically consistent decisions have been linked to superior performance compared 
to their respective opposites (Robinson & Pearce, 1988; Sen, 1993). Research has also found 
that experienced divestors earn higher announcements returns (Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019) 
and argued that divestiture programs facilitate learning and its application in future divestitures 
(Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). The analysis in Chapter 3 showed that the announcement of a 
divestiture program itself results on average in a positive market reaction. Further, the 
supplementary analysis in Chapter 2 compared market returns for divestitures that constitute a 
program – program divestitures – with non-program divestitures. While the former were found 
to yield higher returns, this difference was not significant. Finally, Brauer and Schimmer (2010) 
have found program divestitures in the pharmaceutical industry to yield superior shareholder 
returns compared to non-program divestitures. In line with prior literature, I expect program 
divestitures to be superior compared to non-program divestitures. 
Transaction parameters 
Prior literature has considered transaction parameters such as transaction price, relative deal 
size, and consideration type when determining the market reaction to divestiture 
announcements (Afshar et al., 1992; Bergh & Lim, 2008; Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; Klein, 
1986; Mulherin & Boone, 2000; Owen et al., 2010; Slovin, Sushka, & Polonchek, 2005).  
On many occasions, research has found the declaration of a price, the transaction price, or its 
relative size to influence stock market returns upon a divestiture announcement (Afshar et al., 
1992; Klein, 1986; Mulherin & Boone, 2000). I analyze the relation of the market reaction to 
both transaction price and relative deal size, given that the latter allows investors to draw 
inferences on the economic consequences and potential efficiency gains from divestiture 
(Afshar et al., 1992; Brauer & Wiersema, 2012). I expect both transaction price and relative 
deal size to relate positively to the market reaction.  
In their study on the method of payment in asset sales, Slovin et al. (2005) find equity deals to 
be more value-enhancing than cash sales. Divesting for equity instead of cash may suggest the 
initiation of a strategic alliance or convey favorable information about the seller’s perception 
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and the expected productivity of the sold unit (Slovin et al., 2005). Thus, I expect divestitures 
where the consideration type is equity to result in a more favorable market reaction. 
Firm characteristics 
In addition and in line with prior literature, I include controls at the firm-level of the divestor: 
firm current ratio, firm size, firm leverage, and firm diversification.  
The higher the current ratio, the level of slack resources, the lower should be the financial 
constraints a firm faces, and thus also the necessity to divest (Feldman et al., 2016; Kolev, 2016; 
Montgomery & Thomas, 1988; Owen et al., 2010). If a firm divests, despite a high current ratio 
and in a consolidating industry, the divestiture is most likely driven by a strategic instead of a 
financial motive. Generally, strategic transactions have been found to result in higher 
performance (Montgomery et al., 1984).  
Firms of a large size, in many cases, also manage large business portfolios. Large firms have a 
large asset base, and thus more flexibility to choose which assets to divest (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1992). However, firm size creates complexity and inefficiencies, eventually undermining 
corporate control (Kolev, 2016). Research has found that firm size increases the likelihood of 
a firm to divest (Feldman et al., 2016; Kolev, 2016; Owen et al., 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1992). Prior literature has employed firm size as a control variable when examining the wealth 
effects of divestiture and has not found a significant effect (e.g., Brauer & Schimmer, 2010).  
High leverage has been shown to relate positively to a firm’s likelihood to divest (Feldman et 
al., 2016; Haynes et al., 2003; Owen et al., 2010). When faced with limited cash flows and high 
costs for further external financing, divestitures become an attractive financing source (Lang et 
al., 1995). Studies have also linked firms that divest to repay debt to a more favorable market 
reaction (Lang et al., 1995), and have highlighted the positive effect of effective lender 
monitoring (Lasfer, Sudarsanam, & Taffler, 1996). However, research has also argued that high 
leverage firms have less negotiating power when selling assets and found returns to be lower 
for those firms (Hearth & Zaima, 1984; Sicherman & Pettway, 1992).  
Divestiture research has associated a firm’s diversification level with the likelihood to divest 
and wealth effects gained from its announcement (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1999; Dittmar & 
Shivdasani, 2003; Haynes et al., 2003; Kolev, 2016). Similar to firm size, high diversification 
may indicate complexity and potential control issues (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Further, a 
highly diversified firm is less dependent on a single division facilitating the divestiture of such 
units (Kolev, 2016).  
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4.4 Methods 
In the following, I describe the dataset, the applied dependent, independent, and control 
measures, and the method of data analysis. 
4.4.1 Sample 
The sample of divestitures was drawn from Thomson Reuters’ SDC database. Transactions 
needed to fulfill several criteria to be included in the initial dataset: 
i. The transaction was flagged as a divestiture deal by SDC.  
ii. The deal status was “completed”. 
iii. The divestiture was announced between 01.01.1999 and 31.12.2018. 
iv. The divestiture reduced the holding to below 50% from a previous majority holding or 
a 50% stake. The latter were included to account for the fact that the large breweries 
frequently engage in joint ventures as part of their brand and licensing strategy.  
v. The ultimate parent’s primary standard industrial classification (SIC) needed to be 2082, 
“Manufacturing of malt beverages”. Non-beer ultimate parents within that industry, e.g., 
distillers or falsely-classified transactions, were excluded manually.22  
This resulted in 365 transactions.23 282 of which were undertaken by publicly listed companies. 
While coverage of publicly listed companies in databases such as SDC should naturally be 
good, this is less likely for private companies. In many cases, these are substantially smaller, 
and thus it is likely that a large part of their activities goes unrecorded. Therefore and since this 
study analyzes the market reaction to divestitures, I focus on publicly listed breweries for the 
analysis. Figure 4-2 shows the development of these divestitures against the development of 
the industry’s five-firm concentration. 
To obtain the final sample for the event study analysis, I set a size threshold for transactions to 
avoid the inclusion of small and marginal transactions unlikely to attract sufficient shareholder 
                                                             
22 Exceptions were made in two cases. The sample includes Heineken, whose ultimate parent is the holding 
company L'Arche Green NV with the primary SIC of 6799, “Investors not elsewhere classified”. Further, the 
sample includes transactions that mark the exit of a firm’s beer engagement, e.g. Whitbread, and Bass. In addition, 
I relied on segment sales data from Worldscope to validate that beer constituted a firm’s primary business as the 
segment with the most sales. As a consequence Hitejinro (most sales: distilled beverages), the Swallow Group 
(most sales: hotels) and Wolverhampton & Dudley (most sales: retail outlets) were excluded.  
23 The number excludes divestitures that were duplicates or falsely labelled as divestitures by SDC, e.g., both the 
divestor and acquirer were subsidiaries of the same parent company, the divestor held only a minority interest in 
the sold assets or a transaction was falsely allocated to a parent. 
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attention. This is in line with prior literature (e.g., Owen et al., 2010; Rosenfeld, 1984). For 
transactions to be included, I required deal value to be at least USD 50M. This left a sample of 
83 divestitures by 23 brewing groups. I employed Factiva to verify the announcement dates 
stored in the SDC database. In line with prior research, I tracked for each divestiture the 
announcement of the intent to divest and of the transaction price (e.g., Afshar et al., 1992). 
Overall, 110 announcements were made to announce the 83 divestitures. 24  
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) note a number of criteria that need to be fulfilled in the context 
of event studies: market efficiency, unanticipated event, and no confounding effects. First, a 
sample of transactions by public firms was chosen, all of which were listed and traded on their 
home countries’ stock markets. As such, they were subject to respective communication 
regulations. Second, I assured that each divestiture announcement signaled new information to 
the market and validated the announcement dates stored in SDC through a manual search in 
Factiva. Third, I accounted for confounding effects following the methods suggested by 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997). I controlled for such events on the 5-day window around the 
  
                                                             
24 For one of the 83 divestitures, the announcement to divest had to be dropped due to insufficient firm stock price 
data, the announcement of the transaction price was included. One further divestiture had to be dropped completely 
given that no stock data was available. Three announcements that solely announced the offer of an acquirer after 
the announcement of the intent and before the announcement of the transaction pricewere not included. 
Figure 4-2: Development of divestiture activity of publicly listed brewing groups over time 
 
Note: Decrease of five-firm CR in 2011 driven by a change in Carlsberg’s volume reporting to include the sales 
of proportionally consolidated entities only pro-rata. 
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announcement relying on Factiva to screen the press coverage of each divestor. 86 
announcements for 66 divestitures of brewing groups remained in the sample after controlling 
for confounding events.  
To portray divestiture activity in the brewing industry in its entirety, I include the divestiture of 
beer operations by parents that are not primarily engaged in brewing. Thus, I relax the constraint 
with regard to the parent’s primary business and apply the criteria to the divested unit. Further, 
I again require deal value to be greater than USD 50M and the divestor to be a public company. 
This resulted in 12 divestitures by 10 firms. In total, 16 announcements were made regarding 
these divestitures. After controlling for confounding events 14 announcements for 11 
divestitures remained in the sample. 
Table 4-3 shows the sample distribution by both brewing and non-brewing groups and 
announcement type. Table 4-4 provides the divestiture activity of publicly listed brewing 
groups that undertook at least one divestiture that fulfilled the aforementioned criteria. For each 
divestor, it provides the ultimate parent of its brewing operations at the end of the study. Thus, 
it highlights the continuing consolidation process throughout the observation period. Table 4-5 
shows the 15 largest sell-offs in the sample, the majority of which were undertaken by large  
   
Table 4-3: Sample distribution by parent industry and announcement type 
 
Full sample Final sample (after controlling for 
confounding events) 
 Divestitures Announcements Divestitures Announcements 
Brewing groups 83 110 66 86 
Divestiture announcements 
(Intent & Price) 
 55  38 
Divestiture intent 
announcements 
 28  23 
Divestiture price 
announcements 
 27  25 
Non-brewing parents 12 16 11 14 
Divestiture announcements 
(Intent & Price) 
 8  7 
Divestiture intent 
announcements 
 4  3 
Divestiture price 
announcements 
 4  4 
Total 95 126 77 100 
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global players and involved part of their brewing operations. Brewers were able to realize 
EBITDA multiples of 7.3 - 14.8x for these divestitures. Their motives are in line with prior 
divestiture research and involve refocusing, debt repayment, and regulatory concerns in light 
of mergers or large acquisitions. Four out of the 15 largest sell-offs are related to the recent AB 
InBev-SABMiller merger.
Table 4-4: Sample distribution by divestor 
Divestor 
at the time of 
divestiture  
Ultimate parent  
of the brewing 
operations by the 
end of the study 
Country Divestitures 
All USD > 50M USD > 50M & 
no confounding 
event 
AB InBev  
(from 2016 onwards) 
AB InBev Belgium 6 3 1 
Anheuser-Busch 
InBev (until 2015) 
AB InBev Belgium 22 8 6 
SABMiller AB InBev UK 17 9 5 
Foster's Group AB InBev Australia 21 8 8 
Kirin Kirin Japan 30 8 7 
Scottish & Newcastle Heineken UK 16 8 6 
Heineken Heineken Netherlands 26 7 4 
Carlsberg Carlsberg Denmark 26 6 4 
InBev AB InBev Belgium 9 3 3 
Sapporo Sapporo Japan 6 3 2 
Ambev AB InBev Brazil 2 2 2 
Bass AB InBev UK 5 2 2 
Fomento Economico 
Mexicano 
Heineken Mexico 4 1 1 
Stichting Interbrew AB InBev Belgium 4 2 2 
Asahi Asahi Japan 11 2 2 
Pivovarna Lasko Heineken Slovenia 3 2 2 
Whitbread AB InBev UK 5 2 2 
Daniel Thwaites Daniel Thwaites UK 2 1 1 
Holsten-Brauerei Carlsberg Germany 2 1 1 
Lion Nathan Kirin Australia 7 1 1 
MolsonCoors MolsonCoors USA 5 1 1 
Tsingtao Brewery Tsingtao Brewery China 1 1 1 
XinJiang Hops XinJiang Hops China 3 1 1 
Molson  MolsonCoors Canada 3 1 1 
Total   233 83 66 
  
1
0
4
 
Table 4-5: The 15 largest sell-offs by publicly listed breweries between 1999 and 2018 
 Divestor Year Acquirer Divested unit Unit 
Industry 
Divestiture 
type 
Divested 
share 
Deal value  
(bn USD) 
EBITDA
multiple 
Description 
1. SABMiller 2015 Molson Coors MillerCoors US operations & 
licenses 
Brewing Sell-off 58.0% 12.0  14.0 
(EBITA) 
Adressal of antitrust concerns for AB InBev / 
SABMiller merger (confounded) 
2. AB InBev 2016 Asahi  Plzensky Prazdroj operations 
& brands (Pilsner Urquell) 
Brewing Sell-off 100.0% 7.8 14.8 Adressal of antitrust concerns for the AB InBev / 
SABMiller merger 
3. FEMSA 2009 Heineken Brewing operations, brands & 
licenses (Sol, Dos Equis) 
Brewing Sell-off 100.0% 7.3 9.1 Focus on soft drinks in exchange for a 20% 
economic interest in Heineken  
4. Scottish & 
Newcastle 
2003 Investors SN Retail business Restaurants, 
Pubs, Hotels 
Sell-off 100.0% 4.2 11.0 
(Op. profit) 
Repay debt and focus on the beer business 
5. Bass 2000 Interbrew Brewing operations, brands & 
licenses (Bass, Carling UK, 
etc.) 
Brewing Sell-off 100.0% 3.5 9.7 Maximize shareholder value and focus on hotel 
and pub business 
6. AB InBev 2016 Coca-Cola Coca-Cola Beverages Africa Other 
beverages 
Sell-off 54.5% 3.2 - Exercising of change of control clause following 
AB InBev/ SAB Miller merger 
7. Anh InBev 2009 CVC CEE brewing operations, 
brands & licenses 
(Staropramen) 
Brewing Sell-off 100.0% 3.0 - Repay debt to pay off loans from Anheuser-Busch 
takeover 
8. AB InBev 2013 Constellation 
Brands 
Cia Cervecera de Coahuila, 
Corona & Modelo US 
perpetual licenses 
Brewing Sell-off 100.0% 2.9 9.4  Sale to gain antitrust approval for the acquisition 
of Grupo Modelo 
9. SABMiller 2015 Asahi Various European brands 
(Peroni, Grolsch, Meantime) 
Brewing Sell-off 100.0% 2.9 13.3 Adressal of antitrust concerns for the AB InBev / 
SABMiller merger 
10. AB InBev 2009 Blackstone Busch Entertainment Other Sell-off 100.0% 2.7 - Repay debt to pay off loans from Anheuser-Busch 
takeover 
11. Molson Coors 2007 SABMiller MolsonCoors US operations 
& licenses 
Brewing Sell-off 58.0% 2.6 7.3 Formation of MillerCoors JV, Molson Coors to 
hold 42% of new company 
12. AB InBev 2012 Constellation 
Brands Inc 
Crown Imports Brewing / 
Distribution 
Sell-off 50.0% 1.9 - Sale to gain antitrust approval for the acquisition 
of Grupo Modelo 
13. AB InBev 2009 Investors Oriental Brewery operations, 
brands & licenses (Cass) 
Brewing Sell-off 100.0% 1.8 9.0 Repay debt to pay off loans from Anheuser-Busch 
takeover – includes buy-back option 
14. Interbrew 2001 Molson Carling UK operations & 
brands 
Brewing Sell-off 100.0% 1.7 8.0 Sale to gain antitrust approval for Bass brewing 
acquisition 
15. SABMiller 2011 Anadolu Efes SABMiller operations & 
licenses in RU & UA 
Brewing Sell-off 100.0% 1.6 - Sale in exchange for a 24% interest in Anadolu 
Efes (confounded) 
Note: Based on SDC database & press releases; Year reflects the intent announcement year; Transactions with at least one confounded announcement are marked as such under 
Description 
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4.4.2 Measures 
The data for the construction of the variables was obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream, 
Worldscope, and SDC. In addition, press releases were obtained for all divestiture 
announcements in the sample to validate the data from the stated databases. Market share was 
computed based on the Barth report and annual reports. 
Dependent variable 
Divestiture market returns. I applied an event study methodology to measure the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) on the three days surrounding a divestiture announcement as a proxy 
for the success of divestitures. A favorable market reaction in terms of a stock price increase 
reflects a positive change in investors’ belief regarding the firm’s future. Also, to consider the 
sensitivity to outliers and avoid distortions of results, I winsorized the CAR of all 110 
announcements (-1, +1) at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels (e.g., Owen et al., 2010). 
Independent variables 
Industry – 2009-2018. I compared the first to the second half of the observation period to 
account for the consolidation of the brewing industry over the past two decades. This is in line 
with prior research on the brewing industry (Mehta & Schiereck, 2012). The variable takes a 
value of 1 if a divestiture was undertaken in the second half, the years 2009-2018. 
Industry – Market share top 5. Global market share was calculated based on the production 
volume reported in the annual report of a firm relative to the total beer production volume, as 
reported by Barth. The variable takes a value of 1 if the divestor was one of the five largest 
brewing groups by market share at the time of divestiture.  
Industry – Antitrust pressure. The variable takes a value of 1 if press releases and secondary 
press coverage of divestitures obtained through Factiva stated that a divestiture was undertaken 
to comply with direct antitrust pressure or in anticipation of obedience to such.  
Relatedness. To capture the relatedness of assets, I differentiated between core beer/ brewing, 
beer-related, and unrelated assets through three dummy variables. I again relied on the SDC 
database to obtain the divested unit’s primary industry SIC code (see Table 4-6). The assigned 
industries in SDC were validated manually. 37% of divestitures involved a brewery’s core 
operations in terms of the brewing itself, beer brands, or licenses for specific regions. Another 
26% involved related activities, such as pre-production, raw materials, distribution, wholesale, 
and retail operations. Unrelated activities made up another 36% of transactions. As also shown 
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in Table 4-6, the smaller and likely less diversified private companies in the sample, divested 
mostly core brewing operations. As part of the multivariate analyses, three dummies were 
included to account for the differences in relatedness. 
Geographic scope. I differentiated divestitures in global brands, their brand licenses for 
specific countries or regions, and local/ other assets. I relied on press releases and secondary 
press coverage identified through Factiva to identify the geographic scope of divestitures. 
Structure - Program. The variable takes a value of 1 in case the divestiture could be related to 
a divestiture program. Prior research has taken different approaches. It has either assigned all 
transactions following a program announcement to that program (e.g., Bhabra et al., 1999), 
required transactions to be clustered in time (e.g., Laamanen & Keil, 2008) or analyzed the 
individual divestiture announcements (Brauer & Schimmer, 2010). I assumed a two-fold 
approach and considered both the individual announcements and divestiture program 
announcements through press releases and secondary press coverage identified through 
Factiva. I required programs to have been publicly known at the time of the announcement.  
Transaction – Price. Divestiture size was measured as the log of the transaction price (Bergh, 
1995; Bergh et al., 2019). For the CAAR analysis, I compared the top 20 with the bottom 20 
divestitures by transaction price. 
Table 4-6: Sample distribution by industry relatedness 
Industry Full 
sample 
All public 
firms 
All private 
firms 
Description Main SIC codes 
C
o
re 
Beer/ Brewing 31 (37%) 91 (32%) 53 (64%) Brewing, beer brands, 
licenses 
2082 
B
eer-R
ela
ted
 
Pre-production 
& raw materials 
5 (6%) 14 (5%) 1 (1%) Malthouses, glass/ 
container production 
2083, 2821, 3221, 
3411, 4221 
Distribution & 
wholsale 
0 (0%) 21 (7%) 1 (1%) Wholesale, logistics & 
transport 
5181 
Retail outlets 17 (20%) 46 (16%) 12 (14%) Pub, restaurants, hotels, 
grocery stores, markets 
5149, 5411, 5812, 
5813, 7011 
U
n
rela
ted
 
Other beverages 10 (12%) 41 (15%) 8 (10%) Soft drinks, wine, 
liquor 
2084, 2085, 2086, 
2082 (non-beer) 
Other 20 (24%) 69 (24%) 8 (10%) All other - 
Total 83 282 83   
Note: SIC code allocation is directional. The allocation was manually reviewed based on the deal synopsis 
reported in SDC and further Factiva research in unclear cases. 
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Transaction – Relative deal size. Relative divestiture size was measured as transaction price 
plus net debt relative to the previous year’s enterprise value. For the CAAR analysis, I 
compared the top 20 with the bottom 20 divestitures by relative deal size. 
Transaction – Consideration. I operationalized consideration type as a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 for equity deals or hybrid deals (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; Mehta & 
Schiereck, 2012). 
Firm – Current ratio. The level of slack resources was measured as the previous year’s current 
assets over current liabilities (Feldman et al., 2016).  
Firm – Size. The size of a firm was calculated as the natural logarithm of the previous year’s 
total assets (Bergh & Sharp, 2015; Brauer et al., 2017).  
Firm - Leverage. A firm’s indebtedness was operationalized as the previous year’s total debt 
scaled by total assets (Berger & Ofek, 1999; Dickerson et al., 1997; Haynes et al., 2002). 
Firm - Diversification. The diversification of a firm was measured as the share of non-beer sales 
relative to the firm’s total sales. For firms where sales per segment were not available through 
Worldscope, annual reports were consulted to approximate non-beer sales based on volume 
figures. 
4.4.3 Data analysis 
For each presented determinant, I contrasted the wealth effects measured through an event 
study of the announcements that exhibited the respective characteristic with those that did not 
exhibit the respective characteristic. Further, I ran multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions with cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable to gain a complete 
picture of the influential effects of the determinants. 
In line with prior divestiture research (e.g., Dittmar & Shivdasani, 2003; Owen et al., 2010), I 
applied the standard Market Model (MM) event study methodology to measure the short-term 
market return of divestiture announcements. 
The MM estimates return on day 𝑡 following a single-factor model: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∝𝑖+ 𝛽𝑖 × 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  (1) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is a firm’s actual return on day t, 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the return of the national reference market on the 
same day, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term and 𝛽𝑖 is the sensitivity of 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 on the reference market. Given 
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that a global sample was chosen, home market indices (e.g., FTSE 100, BEL 20, S&P/ASX 50) 
are used for each firm to avoid issues with differences in operating hours (Park, 2004). The 
estimation window covered one trading year (255 days) prior to 30 days before the 
announcement date (e.g., Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; Depecik et al., 2014). 
The abnormal return 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 was calculated by subtracting the expected return measured by the 
MM from the actual return: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡− (∝𝑖+ 𝛽𝑖 × 𝑅𝑀,𝑡)      (2) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the different event windows were calculated as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
.  (3) 
Next, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) was calculated as the arithmetic mean 
across all events. The statistical significance of the returns was tested applying the parametric 
Patell (1976) z-test and cross-sectional z-test as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), as well as 
the non-parametric generalized sign test according to Cowan (1992). 
Finally, to identify the influential effects of the determinants on the market reaction, I ran a 
multivariate regression with the CAR on the three days surrounding the announcement as the 
dependent variable. Prior literature has stressed the issue of unobserved heterogeneity in 
settings with a pooled cross-sectional sample, where some firms announce multiple moves 
throughout a study and suggested the application of a random-effects model, including firm-
specific error terms (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012). I ran both a Hausman (1978) test and a 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test to determine the consistency of a fixed-
effects and a random-effects estimator, respectively. Both were rejected. Consequently, I relied 
on pooled cross-sectional OLS regressions. This is in line with prior divestiture research (e.g., 
Humphery-Jenner et al., 2019; Owen et al., 2010).  
4.5 Results 
The results section presents the findings of the event study analysis and the ordinary least 
squares regression. 
4.5.1 Event study analysis 
Table 4-7 shows the abnormal returns of the 86 of 110 divestiture announcements by brewing 
groups and 14 of 16 announcements by non-brewing groups for which no confounding events 
were identified. I show the daily average abnormal returns (AAR) for the days -1, 0, 1 as well  
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as the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for the three days surrounding the 
announcement based on a Market Model (MM). Further, I show the CAAR (-1, +1) after 
winsorizing the 86 announcements by brewing groups at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. Positive 
reports the share of divestiture announcements that displayed positive abnormal returns (AR) 
or cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The statistical significance is shown next to the AAR/ 
CAAR and Positive columns. The means, standard deviation, and correlations of the 
determinants are presented in Appendix 4-1 and Appendix 4-2. 
The divestiture announcements of brewing groups were found to result in a positive market 
reaction on the three days surrounding the announcement (CAAR -1, +1 = 0.82%). Both the 
parametric and non-parametric tests confirm the significance of these returns. As outlined in 
the sample section, I differentiated between the announcement to divest and the declaration of 
the transaction price. The 38 unconfounded divestiture announcements that announced both the 
Table 4-7: AAR and CAAR of divestiture announcements 
Sample Event 
window 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Winsorized 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
Brewing groups 
 
 
N = 86 
Day -1 0.12 - - - 52.33 - 
Day 0 0.38 - *** ** 54.65 - 
Day +1 0.32 - ** - 58.14 * 
-1 to +1 0.82 0.76 *** *** 62.79 *** 
Divestiture 
announcements 
(Intent & Price) 
N = 38 
Day -1 0.26 - -  - 52.63 - 
Day 0 0.61 - *** - 55.26 - 
Day +1 0.79 - *** *** 68.42 ** 
-1 to +1 1.66 1.49 *** *** 78.95 *** 
Divestiture intent 
announcements 
 
N = 23 
Day -1 0.15 - -  - 60.87 - 
Day 0 0.78 - *** * 60.87 - 
Day +1 0.18 - - - 56.52 - 
-1 to +1 1.12 1.18 *** ** 65.22 - 
Divestiture price 
announcements 
 
N = 25 
Day -1 -0.11 - -  -  44.00 -  
Day 0 -0.34 - - -  48.00 - 
Day +1 -0.28 - -  - 44.00 -  
-1 to +1 -0.73 -0.74 - -  36.00 - 
Non-brewing groups 
 
 
N = 14 
Day -1 -0.71 - - - 50.00 - 
Day 0 -0.94 - - - 42.86 - 
Day +1 3.89 - *** - 78.57 ** 
-1 to +1 2.23 0.91 - - 57.14 - 
Note: The table shows abnormal returns in % based on a MM. The estimation was based on a one-year window 
(255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. Positive denotes the share of events exhibiting positive AR 
and CAR. Statistical significance was tested using the Patell (1976) z-test, the cross-sectional z-test as proposed 
by Boehmer et al. (1991) and the generalized sign test, according to Cowan (1992). 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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intent to divest and the price concurrently result in positive and highly significant wealth effects 
(CAAR -1, +1 = 1.66%,). Firms that only announced the intent to divest without declaring a 
transaction price yet, experience also positive returns (CAAR -1, +1 = 1.12%,). Parametric tests 
show the significance of these returns, while the non-parametric generalized sign-test fails to 
confirm significance. For firms whose announcements only convey the transaction price, 
returns were found to be insignificant (CAAR -1, +1 = -0.73%). However, it should be noted that 
only 36% of these transactions show positive market returns. Unreported two-tailed tests find 
the difference between divestiture and divestiture intent announcements on the one side and 
divestiture price announcements on the other side to be significant.  
The market reaction to divestiture announcements of beer units by parent firms that are 
primarily engaged in other industries, while on average positive, is found to be insignificant 
(CAAR -1, +1 = 2.23%). 
Industry characteristics 
To control for the impact of the massive industry consolidation in the past decades, I examined 
how the reaction to divestiture announcements evolved over the observation period from 1999 
to 2018. I divided the observation period into two sub-periods of ten years each (see Table 4-8). 
CAAR for both periods are significant, positive and similar in size (CAAR 1999-08, -1, +1 = 1.37%, 
CAAR 2009-18, -1, +1 = 1.57%). The difference in CAAR increases when winsorizing. However, 
unreported two-tailed tests rejected the significance of the difference. Results are generally 
robust when considering all 86 announcements, although differences in returns for the two 
periods are more pronounced. 
Further, I consider the market share of the divestor and single out those divestitures that were 
announced by one of the top 5 brewing groups at the time (see Table 4-8). The 23 divestiture 
announcements of the largest brewing groups result in a positive and significant CAAR of 
1.15% over the three-day window around the announcement. All divestiture announcements by 
the other brewers result in a higher and significant CAAR of 1.64%. However, an unreported 
conservative two-tailed test rejects the significance of the difference in CAAR. 
Several divestitures in this study were announced in reaction or anticipation of antitrust 
concerns. However, the events are too few to derive meaningful inferences from testing the 
significance of abnormal returns. Nevertheless, to provide a perspective as exhaustive as 
possible, I present the respective announcements in Appendix 4-3. Contrary to the expected, all 
the announcements by brewing groups except for one result in positive abnormal returns. The 
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only divestiture not directly related to previous M&A activities and undertaken by a non-
brewing group, the government-forced sale of the Myanmar Brewery by Fraser & Neave, 
results in a strongly negative CAR. Voluntary divestitures exhibit a positive and significant 
CAAR of 1.40% on the three days surrounding the announcement date (see Table 4-8). 
Divested business characteristics 
Table 4-9 shows the CAAR when differentiating announcements by relatedness. I find the 
CAAR for divestitures for core brewing operations to be positive and significant 
(CAAR -1, +1 = 2.37%). Results are robust when winsorizing. Unexpectedly, the CAAR for 
Table 4-8: AAR and CAAR of divestiture announcements by industry characteristics 
Sample Event 
window 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Winsorized 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
Consolidation 
1999-2008 
 
 
N = 35 
Day -1 0.19 - - - 54.29 - 
Day 0 0.68 - *** * 57.14 - 
Day +1 0.49 - - - 62.86 * 
-1 to +1 1.37 1.22 *** *** 74.29 *** 
2009-2018 
 
 
N = 26 
Day -1 0.25 - - - 57.69 - 
Day 0 0.67 - ** - 57.69 - 
Day +1 0.65 - ** ** 65.38 - 
-1 to +1 1.57 1.57 *** *** 73.08 ** 
Market share 
Top 5 brewing  
groups 
 
N = 23 
Day -1 0.22 - - - 56.52 - 
Day 0 0.47 - - - 52.17 - 
Day +1 0.46 - - * 69.57 ** 
-1 to +1 1.15 1.15 ** * 73.91 ** 
Others 
 
 
N = 38 
Day -1 0.22 - - - 55.26 - 
Day 0 0.80 - *** ** 60.53 - 
Day +1 0.62 - ** * 60.53 - 
-1 to +1 1.64 1.51 *** *** 73.68 *** 
Antitrust pressure 
Antitrust Too small N=6, see Appendix 4-3 
Voluntary 
 
 
N = 55 
Day -1 0.22 - - - 56.36 - 
Day 0 0.72 - *** ** 60.00 - 
Day +1 0.47 - * ** 60.00 - 
-1 to +1 1.40 1.31 *** *** 72.73 *** 
Note: The 61 announcements comprised the 38 divestiture announcements and the 23 divestiture intent 
announcements. The table shows abnormal returns in % based on a MM. The estimation was based on a one-year 
window (255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. Positive denotes the share of events exhibiting 
positive AR and CAR. Statistical significance was tested using the Patell (1976) z-test, the cross-sectional z-test 
as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and the generalized sign test, according to Cowan (1992). 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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divestitures from the core is higher than that of less related divestitures. An unreported one-
tailed test shows the difference return between core divestitures and unrelated divestitures to be 
significant. When applying a conservative two-tailed test, the significance of this difference is 
narrowly missed. The market reaction to the divestiture announcement of both beer-related 
(CAAR -1, +1 = 1.10%) and unrelated assets (CAAR -1, +1 = 0.93%) is positive and significant. 
While returns for the divestiture of beer-related assets are higher than for those of unrelated 
assets. An unreported conservative two-tailed test does not find this difference to be significant.  
The divestiture of global brands is rare, and the events are too few to derive meaningful 
inferences from testing the significance of the CAAR. While divestitures of brand licenses are 
more frequent and returns are highly significant, their N is still low. Thus, I provide the 
divestitures and market returns of global brands and their licenses to deliver a perspective as 
Table 4-9: AAR and CAAR of divestiture announcements by divested business characteristics 
Sample Event 
window 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Winsorized 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
Relatedness 
Core beer/ brewing 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 0.72 - * ** 70.00 * 
Day 0 1.28 - *** ** 65.00 - 
Day +1 0.37 - - - 70.00 * 
-1 to +1 2.37 2.04 *** *** 75.00 ** 
Beer-related 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 -0.56 - - - 40.00 - 
Day 0 0.71 - ** - 65.00 * 
Day +1 0.95 - ** * 65.00 - 
-1 to +1 1.10 1.17 - - 70.00 * 
Unrelated 
 
 
N = 21 
Day -1 0.48 - * * 57.14 - 
Day 0 0.07 - - - 42.86 - 
Day +1 0.38 - - - 57.14 - 
-1 to +1 0.93 0.93 *** *** 76.19 *** 
Geographic Scope 
Global brand Too small N=3, see Appendix 4-4 
Brand license Too small N=9, see Appendix 4-4 
Other/ local 
 
 
N = 49 
Day -1 -0.01 - - - 51.02 - 
Day 0 0.38 - ** - 53.06 - 
Day +1 0.57 - ** ** 59.18 - 
-1 to +1 0.94 0.97 *** *** 71.43 *** 
Note: The 61 announcements comprised the 38 divestiture announcements and the 23 divestiture intent 
announcements. The table shows returns in % based on a MM. The estimation was based on a one-year window 
(255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. Positive denotes the share of events exhibiting positive AR 
and CAR. Statistical significance was tested using the Patell (1976) z-test, the cross-sectional z-test as proposed 
by Boehmer et al. (1991) and the generalized sign test, according to Cowan (1992). 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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exhaustive as possible. Appendix 4-4 presents the respective divestitures. It can be observed 
that returns, with few exceptions, are positive and that the average CAAR is relatively high. 
The market reaction to the divestiture of local/ other assets is positive and significant 
(CAAR -1, +1 = 0.94%), though at a low level given that it mostly comprises unrelated assets. 
The 12 unconfounded divestitures by brewing groups that are shown in Appendix 4-4 are all 
part of the 20 divestitures from the core shown in Table 4-9.  
Divestiture structure 
I recognize the diversity of divestiture structure and compare the announcements of divestitures 
that are part of a structured series with a shared rationale – a divestiture program – with that of 
divestitures that could not be related to such a program (see Table 4-10). Program divestitures 
are found to result in a positive and significant CAAR of 1.81% on the three days around an 
announcement. The CAAR measured for non-program divestitures is also positive and 
significant, though lower, at 1.28%. The results are in line with expectations. The difference in 
returns is robust when winsorizing the sample. However, an unreported conservative two-tailed 
test does not find this difference to be significant. 
Transaction parameters 
I rely on divestiture and divestiture price announcements to examine the relationship between 
transaction parameters and abnormal returns.  
Table 4-10: AAR and CAAR of divestiture announcements by divestiture structure 
Sample Event 
window 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Winsorized 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
Program divestitures 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 -0.21 - - - 50.00 - 
Day 0 0.97 - *** ** 65.00 - 
Day +1 1.05 - ** ** 75.00 ** 
-1 to +1 1.81 1.81 *** *** 80.00 *** 
Non-program 
divestitures 
 
N = 41 
Day -1 0.43 - - - 58.54 - 
Day 0 0.53 - *** - 53.66 - 
Day +1 0.32 - - - 58.54 - 
-1 to +1 1.28 1.16 *** *** 70.73 *** 
Note: The 61 announcements comprised the 38 divestiture announcements and the 23 divestiture intent 
announcements. The table shows returns in % based on a MM. The estimation was based on a one-year window 
(255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. Positive denotes the share of events exhibiting positive AR 
and CAR. Statistical significance was tested using the Patell (1976) z-test, the cross-sectional z-test as proposed 
by Boehmer et al. (1991) and the generalized sign test, according to Cowan (1992). 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4-11 shows the CAAR for the top 20 and bottom 20 divestitures by relative deal size and 
transaction price. The divestitures with the largest relative deal size result in a positive CAAR 
of 0.93% on the three days around the announcement date, whereas the divestitures with the 
smallest deal size result in a positive but lower CAAR of 0.38%. An unreported conservative 
two-tailed test fails to confirm the significance of this difference. While the difference between 
the abnormal returns for the top (CAAR -1, +1 = 1.03%) and bottom (CAAR -1, +1 = 0.04%) 
divestiture announcements by transaction price is more pronounced, an unreported two-tailed 
test does again not find this difference to be significant. 
Table 4-11: AAR and CAAR of divestiture price announcements by transaction parameters 
Sample Event 
window 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Winsorized 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
Relative deal size 
Top 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 -0.28 - - - 50.00 - 
Day 0 0.92 - *** * 65.00 - 
Day +1 0.29 - ** - 55.00 - 
-1 to +1 0.93 0.59 *** - 60.00 - 
Bottom 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 0.25 - - - 40.00 - 
Day 0 0.00 - - - 50.00 - 
Day +1 0.13 - - - 55.00 - 
-1 to +1 0.38 0.38 - - 60.00 - 
Transaction price 
Top 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 0.02 - - - 55.00 - 
Day 0 1.22 - *** * 70.00 * 
Day +1 -0.21 - - - 55.00 - 
-1 to +1 1.03 0.71 *** - 55.00 - 
Bottom 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 -0.11 - - - 35.00 - 
Day 0 -0.63 - - * 35.00 - 
Day +1 0.78 - *** - 70.00 ** 
-1 to +1 0.04 0.03 - - 60.00 - 
Consideration type 
Equity consideration Too small N=4, see Appendix 4-5 
Cash only 
 
 
N = 59 
Day -1 0.04 - - - 52.54 - 
Day 0 0.09 - - - 55.93 - 
Day +1 0.14 - - - 55.93 - 
-1 to +1 0.26 0.30 - - 67.80 * 
Note: The 63 announcements comprised the 38 divestiture announcements and the 25 divestiture price 
announcements. The table shows abnormal returns in % based on a MM. The estimation was based on a one-year 
window (255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. Positive denotes the share of events exhibiting 
positive AR and CAR. Statistical significance was tested using the Patell (1976) z-test, the cross-sectional z-test 
as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and the generalized sign test, according to Cowan (1992). 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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Further, I examine the effect of consideration type on wealth effects. However, the sample of 
divestitures with a consideration that included not only cash but also equity is too small to test 
the significance of abnormal returns. Thus, I provide the respective divestitures, the type of 
equity consideration, and the abnormal returns in Appendix 4-5. The study of these divestitures 
conveys interesting insights. Most announcements are found to result in positive CAR. This is 
irrespective of whether the equity consideration was acquirer stock, a minority holding in a 
newly formed joint venture, stock of the divestor itself, or in another holding. I identify negative 
returns only for the transaction price announcement of FEMSA’s brewing operations sale to 
Heineken in 2010, for which it received a 20% shareholding in Heineken. In contrast, the 
divestiture announcement of this transaction at a time at which no specific price had yet been 
disclosed resulted in the highest abnormal returns of this study (see Appendix 4-4). Thus, this 
specific market reaction could also be considered a correction of a CAR of over 25% that the 
original announcement yielded. Announcements of divestitures with cash-only considerations 
resulted on average in positive and weakly significant market returns (see Table 4-11, CAAR -
1, +1 = 0.26%). 
Firm characteristics 
To examine the firm characteristics, I again rely on the divestiture and divestiture intent 
announcements to capture only the initial market reaction to a divestiture.  
Table 4-12 provides the results of this analysis. I contrasted the 20 divestiture announcements 
with the highest value of each characteristic with those 20 with the lowest value. The market 
returns for the groups with higher returns are found to be positive and strongly significant. 
Significance for the groups that yielded lower returns varies. In line with expectations, the 
abnormal returns of the firms with high current ratios are higher (CAAR -1, +1 = 1.81%) than 
those of low current ratio firms (CAAR -1, +1 = 0.88%). When comparing CAAR dependent on 
firm size, I find small firms to experience higher returns (CAAR -1, +1 = 1.98%) in contrast to 
larger firms (CAAR -1, +1 = 1.27%). With regard to leverage, I find the divestiture 
announcements of low leverage firms to be rewarded with higher returns (CAAR -1, +1 = 2.36%) 
than those of high leverage firms (CAAR -1, +1 = 1.11%). Abnormal returns of firms with a high 
share of beer sales are found to be higher (CAAR -1, +1 = 2.50%) than those of more diversified 
firms (CAAR -1, +1 = 0.70%). Unreported conservative two-tailed tests find only the difference 
between the reaction to announcements of lightly and highly diversified firms to be significant.  
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Table 4-12: AAR and CAAR of divestiture announcements by firm characteristics 
Sample Event 
window 
AAR/ 
CAAR 
Winsorized 
CAAR 
Patell 
(1976)  
z-Test 
Boehmer 
et al. 
(1991) z-
Test 
Positive Cowan 
(1992) 
GenSign 
z-test 
Firm current ratio 
Highest 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 0.62 - - * 70.00 ** 
Day 0 0.69 - *** ** 70.00 ** 
Day +1 0.49 - - - 55.00 - 
-1 to +1 1.81 1.81 *** *** 80.00 *** 
Lowest 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 -0.29 - - - 40.00 - 
Day 0 -0.15 - - - 35.00 - 
Day +1 1.31 - *** *** 80.00 *** 
-1 to +1 0.88 0.95 - - 75.00 ** 
Firm size 
Largest 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 0.27 - - - 50.00 - 
Day 0 0.46 - - - 55.00 - 
Day +1 0.54 - - ** 70.00 * 
-1 to +1 1.27 1.27 ** - 70.00 * 
Smallest 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 0.30 - - - 60.00 - 
Day 0 0.13 - - - 45.00 - 
Day +1 1.55 - *** *** 85.00 *** 
-1 to +1 1.98 1.98 *** *** 85.00 *** 
Firm leverage 
Highest 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 0.17 - - - 65.00 - 
Day 0 0.31 - ** - 55.00 - 
Day +1 0.63 - - - 70.00 * 
-1 to +1 1.11 1.11 *** ** 70.00 * 
Lowest 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 0.52 - - - 45.00 - 
Day 0 1.09 - *** - 65.00 - 
Day +1 0.75 - * * 70.00 ** 
-1 to +1 2.36 2.10 *** ** 90.00 *** 
Firm diversification ( % of non-beer sales) 
Highest 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 0.24 - - - 60.00 - 
Day 0 0.04 - - - 55.00 - 
Day +1 0.43 - - - 55.00 - 
-1 to +1 0.70 0.77 ** - 65.00 - 
Lowest 20 
 
 
N = 20 
Day -1 0.54 - - - 55.00 - 
Day 0 0.98 - *** - 55.00 - 
Day +1 0.99 - ** *** 80.00 *** 
-1 to +1 2.50 2.18 *** ** 80.00 *** 
Note: The 61 announcements from which the samples where drawn comprised the 38 divestiture announcements 
and the 23 divestiture intent announcements. The table shows returns in % based on a MM. The estimation was 
based on a one-year window (255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. Positive denotes the share of 
events exhibiting positive AR and CAR. Statistical significance was tested using the Patell (1976) z-test, the 
cross-sectional z-test as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and the generalized sign test, according to Cowan 
(1992). 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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4.5.2 Ordinary least squares regression 
Next, I analyzed the influential effects of the determinants on the market reaction to divestitures 
in multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with a winsorized CAR (-1, +1) as the 
dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 4-13. The table shows the coefficients, 
the robust standard errors in the brackets below, and the significance based on the p-value. 
Further, I provide R2, the adjusted R2, the F-value, the root mean squared error (Root MSE), 
and the average variance inflation factor (Ø VIF). The models 1 through 10 examine the 61 
divestiture and intent to divest announcements of the final sample. The models 11 through 16 
are based on the final sample of the 63 divestiture and transaction price announcements. As 
stated above, the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables used throughout 
the analysis are presented in Appendix 4-1 and Appendix 4-2.  
Model 1 shows the effect of the control variables – the firm characteristics. Firm diversification 
is found to be negatively related to the market reaction (Model 1, b = -0.05, p = 0.05). This 
effect is persistent throughout the other models. The firm current ratio, size, and leverage have 
no significant relation to the market reaction. Given their function as established control 
variables, all four variables are included in the further models. 
Models 2 through 5 test the effect of the industry characteristics. The time of the announcement, 
included to test the effect of industry consolidation, is not found to affect the market reaction 
(Model 2, b = 0.00, not significant). Regarding market share, the regression relates a top 5 
market position negatively to the realized abnormal returns (Model 3, b = -0.02, p = 0.01). 
Antitrust pressure is not found to affect the market reaction (Model 4, b = 0.01, not significant). 
Model 5 tests all three industry variables concurrently, the significant negative effect of a top 5 
market position persists. 
Characteristics of the divested business are tested in models 6 through 8. Relatedness in terms 
of both core beer/ brewing (Model 6, b = 0.00, not significant) or unrelated assets (Model 6, 
b = -0.01, not significant) is not found to have a determining effect on the market reaction. 
Concerning geographic scope, the divestiture of brand licenses for specific countries or regions 
is found to have a statistically significant and positive effect on the measured market reaction 
(Model 7, b = 0.02, p = 0.01). The divestiture of global brands is not found to have an influential 
effect (Model 7, b = 0.01, not significant).25 Model 8 tests all relatedness and geographic scope
                                                             
25 It should be noted that the final sample tested includes only three global brand divestitures, given that many of 
these divestitures were found to be announced near other confounding events. 
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Table 4-13: Results of OLS regressions with CAR (-1,+1) as the dependent variable 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Industry - 2009-2018 - 
 0.00  
- 
 
- 
 0.00  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 (0.01)    (0.01)             
Industry - MS Top 5 - 
 
- 
 -0.02 ** 
- 
 -0.02 ** 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.01 * 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.02 ** 
  (0.01)   (0.01)      (0.01)       (0.01)  
Industry - Antitrust - 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.01  0.01  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
   (0.01)  (0.01)             
Relatedness - Core - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.00  
- 
 -0.02 ** 
- 
 -0.01  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.00  
     (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)       (0.01)  
Relatedness - Unrelated - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.01  
- 
 -0.01  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
     (0.01)   (0.01)          
Geography - Global brand - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.01  0.02  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
      (0.01)  (0.01)          
Geography - Brand license - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.02 ** 0.04 *** 
- 
 0.03 
(0.01) 
*** 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.01  
      (0.01)  (0.01)         (0.01)  
Structure - Program  - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.01 ** 0.02 ** 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.02 ** 
        (0.01)  (0.01)       (0.01)  
Transact. - Rel. deal size - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.00  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
           (0.06)      
Transact. - ln(Price) - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.00  
- 
 0.00  0.00  
            (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  
Transact. - Equity cons. - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.04 ** 0.03 ** 0.04 *** 
             (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Firm - Current ratio 
0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.01  
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Firm - Size 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Firm - Leverage 
-0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  -0.05  -0.05 * -0.05 * -0.06 * -0.07 ** -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.04  
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Firm - Diversification 
-0.05 * -0.05 * -0.07 *** -0.05 * -0.08 *** -0.04  -0.04 * -0.05 ** -0.05 ** -0.07 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.03 * -0.04 ** -0.07 *** 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Constant 
0.04  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.04  -0.03  -0.06  
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
N 61  61  61  61  61  61  61  61  61  61  63  63  63  63  63  63  
R2  0.17  0.17  0.24  0.18  0.25  0.20  0.28  0.29  0.24  0.39  0.22  0.22  0.24  0.29  0.30  0.44  
Adj. R2 0.11  0.10  0.17  0.10  0.15  0.11  0.20  0.18  0.17  0.29  0.16  0.15  0.17  0.23  0.22  0.33  
F-value 3.26 ** 2.84 ** 3.59 *** 2.57 ** 2.68 ** 2.85 ** 3.72 *** 3.34 *** 3.42 *** 4.27 *** 5.71 *** 4.53 ** 4.78 *** 9.00 *** 9.02 *** 11.64 *** 
Root MSE 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  
Ø VIF 1.23  1.27  1.77  1.21  1.67  1.50  1.25  1.72  1.26  1.86  1.20  1.32  1.24  1.30  1.35  1.93  
Note: The dependent variable is the CAR (-1,+1) based on a MM. The estimation window covered one year (255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. Announcements 
with confounding events were excluded, the top and bottom 2.5% based on the CAR (-1,1) were winsorized. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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variables. The significant effect of the divestiture of brand licenses is robust in this setting. 
When including the geographic scope variables, relatedness to the core is found to have a 
diminishing effect on the market reaction to a divestiture announcement (Model 8, b = -0.02, 
p = 0.04). In addition to the significant control variable, firm diversification, firm leverage is 
found to relate negatively to the market reaction in Models 7 and 8.26 
The influential effect of the divestiture structure is tested in Model 9. The affiliation with a 
previously announced divestiture program is found to have a significantly positive effect on the 
market reaction to a firm’s divestiture announcement (Model 9, b = 0.01, p = 0.05). The 
negative relation of both firm diversification and firm leverage to the market reaction is robust. 
Model 10 tests all those determinants concurrently for which significance was established in 
the previous models. The negative effect of a top 5 market position (Model 10, b = -0.01, 
p = 0.1), the positive effect from divesting brand licenses (Model 10, b = 0.03, p = 0.004) and 
the positive effect from affiliation with a divestiture program (Model 10, b = 0.02, p = 0.03) 
persist. Relatedness to the core is not found to have a significant effect (Model 10, b = -0.01, 
p = 0.2). The negative relation of both firm diversification and firm leverage to the market 
reaction is robust. Model 10 is also found to achieve the highest fit of Models 1 through 10. 
Model 11 shows the effect of the control variables – the firm characteristics – against the 
backdrop of the changed sample with divestiture and divestiture price announcements. Firm 
diversification is again found to have a significantly negative effect on the market reaction 
(Model 11, b = -0.05, p = 0.002). In addition, firm current ratio is seen to have a significant 
positive effect on the market reaction (Model 11, b = 0.02, p = 0.01). Firm size and firm leverage 
are not found to have a significant effect.  
The effect of the examined transaction parameters is tested in Model 12 through 15. Contrary 
to the expected, relative deal size (Model 12, b = 0.00, not significant) and transaction price 
(Model 13, b = 0.00, not significant) are not found to have a significant effect on the market 
reaction the price announcement. In contrast, the type of consideration, in terms of a full or 
partial equity consideration, is found to have a strongly significantly positive effect on the 
market reaction (Model 14, b = 0.04, p = 0.01). Model 15 tests both the effect of transaction 
price and equity consideration concurrently. The significance of equity consideration persists. 
However, given that only four of the 64 transactions included in the regression analysis resulted 
                                                             
26 The dummy variables Relatedness – Related and Geography – Local/ Other were omitted automatically because 
of collinearity with the other respective relatedness and geographic scope dummy variables.  
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in full or partial equity consideration, the interpretation of this effect should be trodden 
carefully. Appendix 4-5 provides a detailed overview of the particular transactions.  
Model 16 tests all determinants that have proofed significant throughout the previous models 
with the changed sample introduced in Model 11. The positive effects of an equity consideration 
(Model 16, b = 0.04, p = 0.002), and the negative effect of high diversification (Model 16, 
b = -0.07, p = 0.001) prevail. Also, the positive effect of an affiliation with a divestiture program 
identified in Models 9 and 10 (Model 16, b = 0.02, p = 0.04), and the negative effect of a top 5 
market position identified in Models 3, 5 and 10 are robust (Model 16, b = -0.02, p = 0.03). 
To control for the robustness of the model, I varied the dependent variable from the winsorized 
CAR (-1, 1) to a non-winsorized CAR (-1, 1) and CAR (-1, 2). The results are robust. Further, 
I varied the variables to capture consolidation over time and re-ran Model 2 with four instead 
of two time segments. When including variables for 2004-2008, 2009-2013, and 2014-2018, 
neither of those is found to have a significant effect on the market reaction.  
4.6 Discussion 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the capital market reaction to divestiture 
announcements and its determinants in the consolidating brewing industry. An industry where 
players usually seek efficiency gains and growth through mergers and acquisitions. 
The capital market reaction to divestitures by brewing groups is found to be on average positive. 
This is in line with prior divestiture research (cf., Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Lee & Madhavan, 
2010; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). When differentiating between the type of announcement, 
divestitures that announce both the intent to divest and the transaction price concurrently result 
in the highest market reaction. This is in agreement with the findings of Afshar et al. (1992). I 
find announcements that announce the transaction price after the intent to divest has already 
been declared to result in significantly lower results compared with the announcements that 
initially declared the intent to divest. Further, the reaction to the divestiture of beer units by 
non-brewing groups is also found to be on average positive. 
With regard to the examined industry characteristics, I find only market share to be a significant 
determinant of the market reaction. Prior literature has argued that firms with a large market 
share are likely to profit more from an increase in focus through divestiture (Haynes et al., 
2003). In contrast, in the examined brewing industry, the capital markets seem to consider 
divestitures by market leaders on average to be detrimental to future firm value and penalize 
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such moves. One explanation may be that investors see little potential for further value creation 
in divestitures by firms that already hold a competitive position in such a concentrated industry. 
Further, neither the consolidation of the industry over time nor antitrust pressure is found to 
relate significantly to the market reaction. The descriptive analysis of divestitures driven by 
antitrust pressure does not hint towards a strictly negative reaction to such divestitures. A 
possible explanation for this could be “quasi-forced” divestitures, as noted by Boudreaux (1975: 
625). Such divestitures that are undertaken in anticipation of obedience to antitrust regulation 
are voluntary to the degree that future cash flows are perceived as worth less than the immediate 
selling price (Boudreaux, 1975). Supportive of the findings of Wright and Ferris (1997), the 
only government-forced divestiture not related to antitrust regulation results in a sharply 
negative market reaction.  
When examining the effect of characteristics of the divested business, CAAR is found to be the 
highest for the divestiture of core brewing operations. However, in the multivariate regression, 
no significant effect of relatedness itself is identified. Only when further differentiating assets 
by geographic scope, I find that the divestiture of core brewing operations relates negatively to 
the market reaction. The previously identified higher returns for divestitures from the core seem 
to have been driven primarily by the high returns for the divestiture of beer brand licenses for 
specific countries or regions. The divestiture of such assets that are both more distant compared 
to global beer brands and more relevant than local assets is found to relate significantly positive 
to the market reaction. This is partly in line with prior research by Depecik et al. (2014) that 
found only the disposal of local or regional brands to have a positive effect on firm value. In 
contrast, entire global beer brands were divested only seldom. One of the few opportunities for 
second-row players to acquire such was the divestitures in anticipation of obedience to antitrust 
regulation following the Anheuser-Busch InBev and SABMiller merger. 
Further, the study confirms the understanding that capital markets value consistency and 
structure in divestitures. More specifically, the affiliation with a structured divestiture program 
is found to relate significantly positive to the market reaction. This finding corroborates the 
findings outlined in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and the study of Brauer and Schimmer (2010). It 
again stresses the importance of considering structural characteristics when examining 
divestitures. 
Relative deal size and transaction price are not found to have a significant effect on the market 
reaction to those announcements that declared the transaction price. The results of Chapters 2 
and 3, and, on many occasions, prior literature (e.g., Afshar et al., 1992; Klein, 1986; Mulherin 
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& Boone, 2000) have found both to be strong determinants of the market reaction. However, 
findings in previous research are not unanimous, likewise to the results of this study, it has not 
always identified a significant relationship (e.g., Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; Owen et al., 2010). 
Consistent with the findings of Slovin et al. (2005), the partial or full consideration in equity is 
found to relate positively to the market reaction. This finding should be considered with caution, 
given that only a small number of the divestitures in the sample was actually paid with equity. 
The influential effect of the firm characteristics, included as controls throughout the analysis is 
mostly in line with prior research. As expected, a firm’s current ratio is found to relate 
significantly positively to the market reaction to divestiture price announcements. This is 
supportive of the argument made in the literature review that a divestiture despite a high current 
ratio suggests a careful selection of the assets to divest and a rather strategic rationale. Results 
also hint towards a negative effect of firm leverage on the market reaction. This is in agreement 
with the argument that a firm’s negotiating power deteriorates with leverage and that high 
leverage firms select the assets to divest driven rather by financial distress than strategic criteria 
(Hearth & Zaima, 1984; Sicherman & Pettway, 1992). Firm size is not found to relate 
significantly to the market reaction. One unanticipated finding of this study was produced 
regarding firm diversification. Both the direct comparison of firms with a high and low 
diversification and the multivariate analysis relate the share of non-beer sales negatively to the 
market reaction. Thus, the market seems to reward firms that are more invested in their core 
brewing operations. One possible explanation could be that these firms are naturally more likely 
to reinvest in their concentrated core industry. This finding is supportive of prior literature’s 
consensus that returns in concentrated industries are above-average, and thus that firms 
operating in these industries are also more likely to divest and refocus on their attractive, 
concentrated core industry (Markides, 1992b, 1995; Powell & Yawson, 2005). 
4.6.1 Theoretical and practical implications 
Collectively, the results of this study contribute to extant research on divestitures and the 
brewing industry in several ways.  
First, the study adds to the large body of literature on the market reaction to divestitures (cf. 
Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Lee & Madhavan, 2010; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). Specifically, it 
contributes evidence on the market reaction to divestitures and its determinants in a 
consolidating industry. While no direct effect of industry consolidation over time is identified, 
the negative relation of market share constitutes a new insight and adds to prior literature. With 
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regard to relatedness and geographic scope, the results advance the findings of Depecik et al. 
(2014) in specifically considering regional brand licenses of otherwise international or global 
brands and relating them positively to the market reaction. Further, it confirms the results of 
Brauer and Schimmer (2010) on the market reception of program vs. non-program divestitures. 
The unanticipated, adverse effect of diversification into non-beer sales advances the 
understanding of the relationship between product diversification and the market reaction to 
divestitures. Finally, the study provides cross-country evidence from an industry not yet 
regarded in divestiture research. While more recent divestiture research has also relied on global 
or cross-country samples (e.g., Bergh et al., 2019; Feldman et al., 2016; Vidal & Mitchell, 
2018), the studies where an industry-specific focus has been chosen have not specifically 
highlighted the context or specifics of that industry (e.g., Brauer & Schimmer, 2010; Depecik 
et al., 2014; Vidal & Mitchell, 2018). 
Second, the study adds to the research on the brewing industry. It considers the thus far 
disregarded sell-side of acquisitions in the brewing industry. Previous research has only studied 
the acquirer's perspective of transactions in the brewing industry (e.g., Ebneth & Theuvsen, 
2007; Mehta & Schiereck, 2012). Further, the study provides a detailed and current review of 
the consolidation in the global brewing industry. Thus, it continues other research on the 
brewing industry that has provided similar overviews in the past (Adams, 2006; Ebneth & 
Theuvsen, 2007; Howard, 2014; Madsen et al., 2012).  
For managers in the brewing industry, this study provides insights into how the capital markets 
perceive divestitures in their consolidated industry. The results show that the market reacts more 
critically to divestitures by market leaders and more diversified firms. This implies that market 
leaders and more diversified firms are well-advised to provide a detailed reasoning of their 
divestiture motive, their reinvestment strategy, and the strategic implications for their brewing 
business to avoid prejudgement. While divesting from the core is often rightly argued to entail 
negative implications for performance, the positive effect of divesting regional brand licenses 
shows that the capital markets effectively differentiate based on the geographic scope of core 
operations. The positive effect of divestitures undertaken as part of a divestiture program 
stresses the importance of divesting in a structured and strategically consistent manner. 
4.6.2 Limitations and future research 
Finally, the study is subject to several important limitations that need to be considered when 
interpreting its results. 
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First, the study was deliberately set in the global brewing industry, and its results should be 
interpreted in light of this consolidating industry. Further, the study considered the competitive 
position of the brewing groups based on their global market share. While I acknowledge 
differences on a national level as described by prior literature (Adams, 2006), I also 
acknowledge that the globalized players have assumed competitive positions in more 
fragmented markets, and thus lifted competition to a global level. Future research could test the 
generalizability of results through studies in other concentrated industries, or controlling for 
industry concentration in a cross-industry setting. 
Second, the sample size was naturally limited due to the focus on one specific industry, the 
concentrated nature of that industry, and the minimum size threshold for deal value. Future 
research could overcome sample size issues by testing the market reaction and its determinants 
in multiple concentrated industries. 
Third, the study analyzed the short-term market reaction to divestiture announcements to 
capture the immediate effect such a move has on investors and to avoid the exclusion of more 
recent divestitures. While event studies are the most common setting in divestiture research and 
allow for a broad comparison across studies, prior literature has also argued that such a setting 
does not fully appreciate divestitures’ effects over time (Haynes et al., 2002) nor their 
complexity (Brauer, 2006; Kolev, 2016). Research has also highlighted that capital markets 
may find it difficult to accurately assess divestitures due to limited availability of data (Bergh 
et al., 2019). Further research could test the performance effect of divestitures in a consolidating 
industry based on the accounting performance of a firm. 
4.6.3 Conclusion 
This study sets out to answer the question to which extent capital markets value divestitures in 
an industry where players usually seek efficiency gains and growth through mergers and 
acquisitions. As such, it provides evidence from divestitures in the consolidating brewing 
industry and contributes to both extant research on divestitures and research on the brewing 
industry. 
The results demonstrate that while capital markets generally value divestitures in a concentrated 
industry, investors consider divestitures of market leaders or more diversified firms, on average 
detrimental to future firm value. For firms that already hold a competitive position in a 
concentrated industry, investors seem to see little additional value creation potential through 
divestitures. For diversified firms, uncertainty, whether funds will be reinvested in the attractive 
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concentrated core business, may be a cause of the markets’ adverse reaction. Further, the results 
show that even within core operations, the sale of more distant assets, such as brand licenses 
for specific countries or regions, is perceived positively. Finally, the study stresses the upside 
of divesting in a structured and strategically consistent manner through a concerted divestiture 
program. 
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4.7 Appendix 
Appendix 4-1: Means, standard deviations and correlations of divestiture announcements and divestiture intent announcements (N=61) 
 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 
1. CAR -1, 1 0.01 0.03 1.00                   
2. CARWinsorized -1, 1 0.01 0.03 0.96* 1.00                  
3. Industry - 2009-2018 0.43 0.50 0.03 0.07 1.00                 
4. Industry - MS Top 5 0.38 0.49 -0.08 -0.07 0.29* 1.00                
5. Industry - Antitrust 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.20 1.00               
6. Relatedn. - Beer/Brewing 0.33 0.47 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.24 1.00              
7. Relatedn. - Beer-related 0.33 0.47 -0.08 -0.06 -0.25 -0.04 0.00 -0.49* 1.00             
8. Relatedn. - Unrelated 0.34 0.48 -0.13 -0.13 0.07 -0.21 -0.24 -0.51* -0.51* 1.00            
9. Geo. - Global brand 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.26* 0.29* 0.43* 0.33* -0.16 -0.16 1.00           
10. Geo. - Brand license 0.15 0.36 0.39* 0.34* -0.08 -0.13 0.02 0.60* -0.29* -0.30* -0.09 1.00          
11. Geo. - Other/ Local 0.80 0.40 -0.35* -0.31* -0.07 -0.04 -0.25 -0.71* 0.35* 0.36* -0.46* -0.84* 1.00         
12. Structure - Program 0.33 0.47 0.08 0.12 -0.04 -0.04 0.36* 0.03 0.18 -0.21 0.33* 0.00 -0.18 1.00        
13. Transact - Rel. deal size 0.06 0.10 0.39* 0.35* -0.06 -0.35* -0.11 -0.02 0.12 -0.10 -0.06 0.11 -0.07 -0.10 1.00       
14. Transact - Price 5.69 1.27 0.39* 0.38* 0.13 0.13 0.30* 0.23 0.08 -0.30* 0.47* 0.30* -0.52* 0.35* 0.35* 1.00      
15. Transact - Consideration 0.07 0.25 0.42* 0.33* -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 0.24 -0.04 -0.19 -0.06 0.26* -0.20 -0.19 0.20 -0.01 1.00     
16. Firm - Current ratio 0.92 0.39 0.12 0.14 -0.18 -0.42* -0.21 0.10 -0.41* 0.31* -0.21 0.28* -0.14 0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.14 1.00    
17. Firm - Size 16.34 1.37 -0.01 -0.01 0.41* 0.64* 0.15 0.18 -0.06 -0.12 0.33* 0.02 -0.20 0.11 -0.45* 0.39* -0.29 -0.34* 1.00   
18. Firm - Leverage 0.33 0.12 -0.26* -0.26* 0.13 0.13 -0.06 0.07 0.07 -0.14 0.12 0.08 -0.13 0.35* -0.05 0.13 -0.20 -0.14 0.14 1.00  
19. Firm - Diversification 0.30 0.19 -0.27* -0.25* -0.33* -0.68* -0.12 -0.30* 0.06 0.23 -0.20 0.01 0.10 0.13 0.13 -0.07 -0.24 0.38* -0.40* 0.06 1.00 
* p < 0.05 
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Appendix 4-2: Means, standard deviations and correlations of divestiture announcements and divestiture price announcements (N=63) 
 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 
1. CAR -1, 1 0.01 0.03 1.00                   
2. CARWinsorized -1, 1 0.01 0.03 0.97* 1.00                  
3. Industry - 2009-2018 0.38 0.49 0.15 0.20 1.00                 
4. Industry - MS Top 5 0.38 0.49 -0.08 -0.07 0.26* 1.00                
5. Industry - Antitrust 0.11 0.32 0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.14 1.00               
6. Relatedn. - Beer/Brewing 0.33 0.48 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.29* 1.00              
7. Relatedn. - Beer-related 0.32 0.47 -0.09 -0.08 -0.18 -0.04 -0.02 -0.48* 1.00             
8. Relatedn. - Unrelated 0.35 0.48 -0.09 -0.06 0.04 -0.16 -0.26* -0.52* -0.50* 1.00            
9. Geo. - Global brand 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.26* -0.12 -0.13 1.00           
10. Geo. - Brand license 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.15 -0.10 -0.10 0.24 0.65* -0.31* -0.34* -0.08 1.00          
11. Geo. - Other/ Local 0.79 0.41 -0.23 -0.19 0.00 0.00 -0.32* -0.72* 0.35* 0.37* -0.36* -0.90* 1.00         
12. Structure - Program 0.33 0.48 0.10 0.17 -0.07 -0.07 0.18 -0.07 0.17 -0.09 0.26* -0.06 -0.06 1.00        
13. Transact - Rel. deal size 0.06 0.10 0.02 -0.07 -0.11 -0.35* -0.06 0.01 0.14 -0.15 -0.05 0.14 -0.11 -0.08 1.00       
14. Transact - Price 5.61 1.20 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.28* 0.26* 0.13 -0.38* 0.36* 0.41* -0.54 0.27* 0.34* 1.00      
15. Transact - Consideration 0.06 0.25 0.51* 0.40* -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 0.23 -0.04 -0.19 -0.05 0.22 -0.19 -0.18 0.20 0.00 1.00     
16. Firm - Current ratio 0.91 0.40 0.25* 0.26* -0.15 -0.33* -0.21 0.14 -0.41* 0.27* -0.18 0.21 -0.12 0.06 -0.07 -0.17 0.22 1.00    
17. Firm - Size 16.23 1.36 0.02 0.04 0.36* 0.61* 0.06 0.16 0.01 -0.17 0.25* 0.04 -0.15 0.06 -0.44* 0.39* -0.26* -0.32* 1.00   
18. Firm - Leverage 0.34 0.13 -0.33* -0.28* 0.13 0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.08 -0.07 0.09 0.04 -0.08 0.31* -0.04 0.05 -0.23 -0.26* 0.03 1.00  
19. Firm - Diversification 0.30 0.20 -0.31* -0.31* -0.27* -0.65* 0.00 -0.21 0.05 0.16 -0.12 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.10 -0.07 -0.24 0.20 -0.35* 0.17 1.00 
* p < 0.05 
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Appendix 4-3: AAR and CAAR of divestiture announcements of divestitures driven by antitrust 
pressure 
Divesting firm Year Divested unit Confound. 
event 
AR 
(-1) 
AR 
(0) 
AR 
(+1) 
CAR  
(-1, +1) 
B
rew
in
g
 g
ro
u
p
s 
AB InBev 2016 Plzensky Prazdroj operations & 
brands (Pilsner Urquell) 
No -0.42 -0.57 0.51 -0.48 
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2013 Cia Cervecera de Coahuila, Corona & 
Modelo US perpetual licenses 
No 0.43 5.52 0.31 6.26 
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2012 Crown Imports Acquisition 0.51 1.74 1.64 3.89 
Ambev 2000 Bavaria Brazil operations & brand No 0.36 -0.26 0.12 0.22 
SABMiller 2015 Various European brands (Peroni, 
Grolsch, Meantime) 
No -0.63 2.18 0.38 1.93 
SABMiller 2015 US operations & licenses 
(MillerCoors) 
Acquisition 0.54 1.38 1.31 3.23 
Scottish & Newcastle 2000 Pubs No -0.82 -1.85 5.76 3.09 
Scottish & Newcastle 2000 Leased pubs No 2.33 -3.23 1.58 0.67 
Whitbread PLC 1999 Whitbread beer company, brands & 
licenses (Boddingtons) 
Acquisition -0.33 3.11 3.84 6.63 
AAR/ CAAR (excl. confounding events) 0.21 0.30 1.44 1.95 
N
o
n
-
b
rew
in
g
 
Fraser & Neave 2014 Myanmar brewery, brands & licenses 
 
No -0.46 -0.42 -4.96 -5.85 
Note: The table shows AR, CAR, AAR, CAAR in % based on a MM. The estimation was based on a one-year 
window (255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. 
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Appendix 4-4: AAR and CAAR of divestiture announcements of global beer brands and brand 
licenses 
Divesting firm Year Type Divested 
brands/ licenses 
Confound. 
event 
AR 
(-1) 
AR 
(0) 
AR 
(+1) 
CAR  
(-1, +1) 
B
rew
in
g
 g
ro
u
p
s 
AB InBev 2016 Global brand Pilsner Urquell No -0.42 -0.57 0.51 -0.48 
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2013 License Corona & Modelo US 
perpetual licenses 
No 0.43 5.52 0.31 6.26 
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2009 Global brand Staropramen No 1.87 -0.20 1.48 3.15 
Anheuser-Busch InBev 2009 Global brand Cass Results 1.36 0.10 -1.05 0.41 
Ambev 2002 License AmBev AR, BO, PY 
and UY 
No 1.30 0.04 4.28 5.62 
Bass PLC 2000 License Bass, Worthington 
Carling & Grolsch UK 
No 4.45 1.29 -1.73 4.01 
Foster's Group 2006 License Foster's VN and IN No -0.62 0.34 1.01 0.74 
Foster's Group 2006 License Foster's Europe No 1.38 2.55 0.28 4.20 
Heineken 2018 License Heineken CN Share purchase 0.31 2.03 -0.35 2.00 
Heineken 2013 License Hartwall, Heineken 
DK, FI, and baltics 
No 2.18 0.86 0.44 3.47 
Kirin 2017 License Kirin BR No 0.43 0.91 -1.59 -0.24 
Lion Nathan 2004 License Lion Nathan CN, Kirin 
CN 
No 0.84 -0.56 0.15 0.43 
MolsonCoors 2007 License MolsonCoors US No 2.42 9.97 1.03 13.42 
SABMiller 2015 Global brand Peroni, Grolsch, 
Meantime 
No -0.63 2.18 0.38 1.93 
SABMiller 2015 License SABMiller US Acquisition 0.54 1.38 1.31 3.23 
SABMiller 2011 License SABMiller RU & UA Trading statem. 0.40 0.21 0.16 0.77 
Scottish & Newcastle 2007 Global brand Kronenbourg Trading statem. -0.23 -2.75 1.43 -1.54 
Whitbread 1999 License Whitbread beer (e.g., 
Boddingtons), Stella 
Artois & Heineken UK  
Acquisition -0.33 3.11 3.84 6.63 
AAR/ CAAR (excl. confounding events) 1.14 1.86 0.55 3.54 
N
o
n
-b
rew
in
g
 
g
ro
u
p
s 
Coca Cola Amati 2011 License SABMiller AU No 0.65 -0.46 0.67 0.85 
Danone 2000 Global brand Kronenbourg, Alken 
Maes 
Results -1.96 0.57 0.08 -1.31 
Fomento Economico 
Mexicano 
2009 Global brand Sol, Dos Equis No -3.42 -1.28 31.52 26.82 
Nomura 1999 Global brand Pilsner Urquell No -0.95 1.72 0.63 1.40 
Philip Morris 2002 Global brand Miller No -0.31 -0.96 -0.79 -2.06 
AAR/ CAAR (excl. confounding events) -1.56 -0.17 10.45 8.72 
Note: The table shows AR, CAR, AAR, CAAR in % based on a MM. The estimation was based on a one-year 
window (255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. 
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Appendix 4-5: AAR and CAAR of divestiture price announcements with an equity 
consideration 
Divesting firm Year Divested brands 
 
Equity Confound. 
event 
AR 
(-1) 
AR 
(0) 
AR 
(+1) 
CAR  
(-1, +1) 
B
rew
in
g
 g
ro
u
p
s 
Ambev 2002 AmBev operations & 
licenses in AR, BO, PY 
and UY 
Acquirer stock No 1.30 0.04 4.28 5.62 
MolsonCoors 2007 MolsonCoors US 
operations & licenses 
Joint venture 
stock 
No 2.42 9.97 1.03 13.42 
SABMiller 2011 SABMiller operations & 
licenses in RU & UA 
Acquirer stock Trading 
Statement 
0.40 0.21 0.16 0.77 
SABMiller 2002 Hotel & Gaming Assets Joint venture 
stock 
No 1.68 -0.13 -0.40 1.16 
XinJiang Hops 2015 Xinjiang Wusu Beer Asset swap 
(divestor stock) 
No -0.59 -0.49 10.26 9.18 
AAR/ CAAR (excl. confounding events) 1.20 2.35 3.80 7.34 
N
o
n
-b
rew
in
g
 g
ro
u
p
s 
Danone 2000 Brewing operations & 
brands (Kronenbourg, 
Alken Maes) 
Acquirer stock Results -1.96 0.57 0.08 -1.31 
Diageo 2015 Desnoes & Geddes 
operations & brands 
(Red Stripe) 
Asset swap 
(other stock) 
No 0.08 -1.56 1.27 -0.20 
Fomento Economico 
Mexicano 
2010 Brewing operations & 
brands (Sol, Dos Equis) 
Acquirer stock No -7.33 -13.95 13.55 -7.73 
Philip Morris  2002 Brewing operations & 
brands (Miller) 
Acquirer stock No 1.77 1.04 1.07 3.88 
AAR/ CAAR (excl. confounding events) -1.82 -4.82 5.30 -1.35 
Note: The table shows AR, CAR, AAR, CAAR in % based on a MM. The estimation was based on a one-year 
window (255 days) prior to 30 days before the announcement. 
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5 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
While divestitures and especially its performance effects have been thoroughly examined in 
prior research, the theoretical background and the empirical evidence of this dissertation 
emphasize the value of further research on divestitures. It shows that wide avenues for future 
research exist. This dissertation picks up on extant literature, marches along these avenues, and 
makes contributions regarding the structure, motives, and performance effects of divestitures.  
Divestiture structure is considered in all three studies, and thus in three different research 
settings. The findings emphasize the importance of considering divestiture programs in 
divestiture research. The results provide meaningful insights to both researchers and 
practitioners to understand when firms announce a divestiture program, how they relate to firm 
performance, and how the market reacts to the announcements associated with a program. First, 
in contrast to stand-alone divestitures, divestiture programs seem to be the means of choice to 
restore market trust and signal commitment in the context of uncertainty. Second, evidence 
suggests that there is a limitation to the benefits of divestiture programs. Specifically, learning 
in the context of divestiture programs seems to be outweighed by the negative performance 
associated with years of restructuring. Third, the capital markets receive divestiture programs 
positively, both the announcement of a program and of the divestitures that constitute a 
program. Investors reward firms that overcome information asymmetries through the disclosure 
of program specifics.  
The dissertation considers the motive of divestiture in versatile ways. The results invite to 
further research and allow for three primary conclusions. First, the role of motive, in terms of 
strategically driven divestitures, does not explain post-divestiture firm performance. Second, 
there is no single dominant motive for divestiture programs. Programs are close to equally 
distributed across a refocusing, financial, or streamlining rationale. Third, the market reaction 
to divestiture programs does not differ significantly by rationale. However, the degree to which 
market reaction is affected by the disclosure of program specifics is dependent on the 
underlying program rationale.  
All three studies in this dissertation ultimately measure divestitures’ performance effects and 
their determinants. The results of which are, in part, already addressed above with regard to 
structure and motive. The studies consider both the short-term market reaction and post-
divestiture firm performance. Overall, it can be concluded that capital markets perceive 
divestitures and divestiture programs as value-creating. However, the results also show that this 
 132 
does not necessarily translate into actual post-divestiture firm performance. The results with 
regard to experience effects, divestiture programs, and the findings in the context of the 
consolidating brewing industry stress the importance of considering contingencies when 
analyzing the performance effects of divestitures.  
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